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correct that OCGA § 16–11–62(2) prohibits ‘any person, thorough the use of any device ... to observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which occur in any private place and out of public view ’ (Emphasis supplied.) without the consent of all persons observed. Durham is also correct that, in this case, the agents failed to obtain an ‘investigation warrant permitting the use of [video equipment] for the surveillance of such person or place[,]’ as required by OCGA § 16–11–64(c). Trial counsel acknowledged that he was unaware of this statutory provision and, had he been aware of it, he would have filed a motion to suppress the video made inside Durham's home. This, however, does not end the inquiry. Durham acknowledges that the audio recording of what transpired inside Durham's home was admissible, even if the video portion of the tape inside the home had been excluded. See Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365, 366(3) (489 S.E.2d 813) (1997) (OCGA § 16–11–62 does not apply to audio recording of a conversation by one who is a party to it.). Although not addressed by either party, it appears that, based on the language of OCGA § 16–11–62(2) emphasized above, the portion of the video made outside Durham's home would also have been admissible, based on Hardeman's consent. In addition to the audio tape of the transaction, Hardeman testified in detail about the events during the two buys and identified Durham as the man he knew as ‘Crack’ who was present and participated in both buys. Further, the agents searched Hardeman before each buy and kept him under surveillance to the extent possible during the transactions. We conclude, as did the trial court, Durham has failed to show that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the case would have been different but for the deficient performance of counsel.” Suluki v. State, 302 Ga.App. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (March 9, 2010). Conviction for possession of firearm by convicted felon reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to file motion to suppress. Officers were hiding in hotel room awaiting a murder suspect, Head. When Suluki approached, officers took him down and handcuffed him. “One officer testified that after Suluki was handcuffed in the hallway, the officer ‘went there to pick the person up off the floor.’ As he was picking up Suluki, the officer ‘noticed what I felt may have been a handgun in his waistband, rear waistband. He was laying face down when I went to pick him up and I grabbed it and pulled it out and definitely it was a handgun.’ We find that the evidence presented at trial satisfies Suluki's burden of demonstrating ‘a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion. [Cit.]’ Richardson [ v. State, 276 Ga. 548, 553(3) (580 S.E.2d 224) (2003)]. ‘An arrest warrant is valid only against the person named in it. An officer arresting one not bearing the name set forth in the warrant acts at his peril. And even though he acted in good faith in arresting another than the person named, the warrant will not justify the action.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grant v. State, 152 Ga.App. 258(1) (262 S.E.2d 553) (1979).” Trial court properly found that defendant was effectively arrested, not merely detained: “the trial testimony demonstrates a strong showing that a person in Suluki's position would have believed that his detention would not be temporary. The police surprised him from inside his room, he either fell or was taken down to the floor by police officers, placed in handcuffs, and questioned about a murder before the gun was located by the police.” McClure v. Kemp, 285 Ga. 801, 684 S.E.2d 255 (September 28, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel didn’t file motion to suppress which counsel “did not believe it would have been meritorious based on the status of the implied consent law at the time of trial,” but which later case law would have supported. “See generally Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305(2) (509 S.E.2d 618) (1998) (reasonable strategic decisions predicated on circumstances as they existed at the time of trial did not amount to ineffective assistance).” Issue: whether officers needed probable cause to arrest for DUI to invoke implied consent testing in a serious injury accident under OCGA § 40-5-55. At time of defendant’s vehicular homicide trial, prevailing law didn’t require probable cause to invoke implied consent, but Supreme Court later held that probable cause was required in Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282 (587 S.E.2d 605) (2003). Thrasher v. State, 300 Ga.App. 154, 684 S.E.2d 318 (September 22, 2009). Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress blood test results, based on untimely reading of implied consent. “Thrasher was arrested for leaving the scene of the accident at or about 4:48 p.m. when Sergeant Tucker began questioning him. Thrasher was read his implied consent rights at 5:45 p.m., 57 minutes later. There is no indication that Thrasher was formally arrested for driving under the influence at either point in time. Inasmuch as the arresting officer must read a person's implied consent rights contemporaneously with an arrest for driving under the influence involving an accident (OCGA §§ 40-5-55 and 40- 6-392(a)(4)), we must first determine whether Thrasher was under arrest for driving under the influence in the circumstances of this case, and if so when.” “Here, it is clear that Sergeant Tucker believed he had probable cause to arrest Thrasher for driving under the influence of methamphetamine immediately after questioning him at the scene of the accident. Upon further interviewing Thrasher at the county jail, the basis for Sergeant Tucker's initial probable cause determination did not change. And having been arrested for leaving the scene of the accident at or about 4:48 p.m., Thrasher was not free to leave thereafter. Given the foregoing, the absence of evidence showing Thrasher's formal arrest for driving under the influence, whether at the scene of the accident or later at the jail, and the fact that Sergeant Tucker