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nonetheless read him his implied consent rights, we conclude that Thrasher was, in fact, under arrest for driving under the influence when he was arrested at the scene of the accident and that he was not read his implied consent rights until nearly an hour had elapsed thereafter.” Ector v. State, 298 Ga.App. 847, 681 S.E.2d 654 (July 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for fleeing and eluding, trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress based on alleged illegal stop. Stop was made in connection with drug investigation. Motion to suppress was in fact filed; “[h]owever, the record shows that, in an effort to keep the mention of drugs out of the case, it was agreed prior to trial that the officers would say only that Ector was stopped because he was the target of an investigation. Moreover, it was not incumbent upon the State to present evidence to justify the stop since the stop was not challenged. Under these circumstances we will not speculate that the stop was illegal and a motion to suppress would have been successful. Hubbard v. State, 285 Ga.App. 450, 451(1) (646 S.E.2d 520) (2007).” Hortman v. State, 293 Ga.App. 803, 670 S.E.2d 99 (October 3, 2008). No ineffective assistance for failing to file motions in case where defendant “‘neither shows what motions ... should have been filed nor does he address what harm was caused by the lack of motions.’ (Citation omitted.) Harkness v. State, 225 Ga.App. 864, 866(2) (485 S.E.2d 810) (1997).” Spencer v. State, 293 Ga.App. 450, 667 S.E.2d 223 (August 27, 2008). No ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file motion to suppress; officer’s search of defendant/probationer’s home pursuant to condition of probation was supported by “reasonable or good faith suspicion” of criminal activity based on anonymous tips that defendant was selling prescription drugs from his residence, although officer was unable to corroborate those tips. Coney v. State, 290 Ga.App. 364, 659 S.E.2d 768 (March 19, 2008). In defendant’s prosecution for possession of cocaine found in car, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to suppress results of urine and blood tests obtained by State while defendant was receiving hospital treatment. Based on Cooper v. State , 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2002) (in DUI prosecution, implied consent testing could not be invoked absent arrest for DUI supported by probable cause, or accident resulting in serious injuries and probable cause to believe defendant was DUI). More pertinent authority: State v. Poppell , 277 Ga. 595, 592 S.E.2d 838 (February 16, 2004) (‘“A suspect’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the compelled withdrawal of blood.’ [Cit.]”). Perez v. State, 284 Ga.App. 212, 643 S.E.2d 792 (March 14, 2007). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to file meritorious motion to suppress. Officers detained defendant on the street on suspicion that he was involved in a series of residential burglaries. Officers had no basis for believing that defendant was armed or dangerous when they patted him down. In fact, officer “freely admitted that he performed the pat-down for weapons before he ever questioned Perez, and that he did so not because he suspected Perez of being armed or dangerous, but simply because they were in a ‘dangerous area.’” Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). Luggage taken from victim by defendant during armed robbery was returned to victim upon defendant’s apprehension. Defendant contends his trial counsel should have objected to testimony concerning the luggage, as it was not preserved for his possible use at trial. “‘Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ Brantley v. State, 199 Ga.App. 623, 623-624(1) (405 S.E.2d 533) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). On motion for new trial, Feaster made no showing of bad faith on the part of the police and thus no showing of any denial of due process of law. Consequently, Feaster has failed to show that any such objection to testimony concerning the luggage would have been successful.” Parker v. State, 281 Ga. 490, 640 S.E.2d 44 (January 8, 2007). “‘When trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress is the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.’ Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 548, 553(3) (580 S.E.2d 224) (2003). There was no such showing here.” Accord, Davis (May 5, 2004), see note below and cases thereunder; Dumas v. State , 283 Ga.App. 279, 641 S.E.2d 271 (January 16, 2007); Austin v. State , 286 Ga.App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414 (June 6, 2007); Skaggs-Ferrell v State , 287 Ga.App. 872, 652 S.E.2d 891 (October 19, 2007); Cray v. State , 291 Ga.App. 609, 662 S.E.2d 365 (May 21, 2008); Smith v. State , 303 Ga.App. 831, 695 S.E.2d 86 (April 27, 2010); Slan v. State , 316 Ga.App. 843, 730 S.E.2d 565 (July 13, 2012). Jackson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (August 11, 2006). “It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to refrain