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from making a futile motion or filing a meritless motion to suppress. See McCollum v. State, 257 Ga.App. 330, 332- 333(2)(a) (571 S.E.2d 405) (2002); Nickerson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 829, 832(2)(b) (545 S.E.2d 587) (2001).” Accord, numerous cases including Hutchens v. State , 281 Ga.App. 610, 636 S.E.2d 770 (September 20, 2006); Buckholts v. State , 283 Ga.App. 254, 641 S.E.2d 246 (January 11, 2007); Daugherty v. State , 283 Ga.App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (February 21, 2007). Callahan v. State, 280 Ga.App. 323, 634 S.E.2d 102 (July 7, 2006). No ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to file motion to suppress. “‘Because no motion to suppress was filed in this case, [the] record was [not] fully developed as to the existence of and the basis for [the officers’] reasonable suspicion to perform the stop, [if any, or for the officer’s probable cause to arrest].’ Garrett v. State, 259 Ga.App. 870, 874(2) (578 S.E.2d 460) (2002). The arresting officers were not called to testify at the motion for new trial hearing; their ‘only testimony as to the [circumstances surrounding the arrest] came during trial where no issue was raised with regard to the validity of the stop [or arrest.]’ Id. at 874(2), n.15. Callahan has not met his burden of showing the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had trial counsel made a motion. Accordingly, this claim of ineffectiveness affords no basis for relief.” Parnell v. State, 280 Ga.App. 665, 634 S.E.2d 763 (May 30, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant alleged that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress contraband pulled form his pocket after a Terry frisk; defendant contends that there was no showing that the officer was able to identify the item in his pocket as marijuana by “plain feel.” At motion hearing, however, defendant failed to present the officer who found the marijuana. “‘Failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Since [Parnell] is alleging that ineffectiveness was exhibited by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, [he] must make a ‘strong showing’ that the evidence would have been suppressed had a motion to suppress been filed.’ Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807, 809(2)(e) (439 S.E.2d 911) (1994) (citation omitted).” No such showing here, absent the testimony of the officer who conducted the frisk (who also did not testify at trial). Fitz v. State, 275 Ga.App. 817, 622 S.E.2d 46 (October 13, 2005). “Fitz contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion in limine opposing the introduction of the prior burglary offenses. ‘Whether to file pretrial motions and how to argue the motions are strategic decisions, and when reasonable in the context of the case, do not constitute error.’ Pitts v. State, 272 Ga.App. 182, 188-189(4)(a) (612 S.E.2d 1) (2005). While trial counsel did not file a motion in limine, he challenged the similar transaction evidence during the Rule 31.3(B) hearing and later objected to its introduction at trial. Such an approach was a matter of strategy and did not constitute ineffective assistance. See id.” Accord, Calhoun v. State , 327 Ga.App. 683, 761 S.E.2d 91 (June 23, 2014) (“whether to file a motion to suppress is a matter of professional judgment”); Horne v. State , 333 Ga.App. 353, 773 S.E.2d 467 (June 23, 2015) (“While Horne argues that trial counsel could have supported the motion in limine with better authority and with a better understanding of the factual circumstances involved in this case, trial counsel's decision on how to argue the motion is considered strategic and rarely constitutes reversible error.”). Davis v. State, 267 Ga.App. 245, 599 S.E.2d 237 (May 5, 2004). Failure to file a motion to suppress cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel absent a strong showing that the motion would have been successful. Accord, Albert v. State , 283 Ga.App. 79, 640 S.E.2d 670 (December 15, 2006); Hammett v. State , 288 Ga.App. 255, 653 S.E.2d 852 (November 6, 2007); Brooks v. State , 324 Ga.App. 352, 750 S.E.2d 423 (October 25, 2013); Dubose v. State , 294 Ga. 579, 755 S.E.2d 174 (February 24, 2014); Calhoun v. State , 327 Ga.App. 683, 761 S.E.2d 91 (June 23, 2014). Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 762, 598 S.E.2d 373 (April 5, 2004). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to file motion to suppress blood and urine tests obtained as a result of coerced consent after fatal automobile accident. Defendant at first refused to give samples after reading of implied consent notice, but then submitted after officers threatened to seize blood and urine samples involuntarily by search warrant if defendant did not consent. “Collier made the requisite strong showing that a motion to suppress would have been granted. Accordingly, his counsel’s failure to contest this evidence was deficient. The admission of this evidence unquestionably harmed Collier’s defense. Accordingly, we hold that the court clearly erred in determining that Collier did not meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance.” Affirmed, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (April 26, 2005) (State does not have the right to seek a search warrant to compel a person to submit blood and urine samples for drug testing when that person has invoked his right under the implied consent law to refuse such testing.). Turpin v. Helmeci, 271 Ga. 224, 518 S.E.2d 887 (June 14, 1999). Habeas court properly overturned defendant’s drug possession convictions; defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel failed to seek suppression of implied