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“Counsel testified that he did not inform Gary of plea discussions with the prosecutor because he was unable to negotiate a plea that did not include a sentence of imprisonment, and Gary had said he would not plead guilty under any circumstances, especially if it required him to spend time in jail. Counsel additionally testified that he informed Gary that if he were found guilty at trial, he would probably be sentenced to a term of confinement. Under the circumstances, the court was authorized to find that counsel's decision to proceed to trial without informing Gary of the plea discussions ‘was not the result of any ineffective assistance on the part of [Gary's] trial counsel.’ Louis v. State, 202 Ga.App. 681, 682(3), 415 S.E.2d 289 (1992); see also Larochelle v. State, 231 Ga.App. 736, 738(4), 499 S.E.2d 371 (1998).” 77. POLLING JURY Soloman v. State, 294 Ga.App. 520, 669 S.E.2d 430 (October 28, 2008). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to poll jury, even where jury indicated it had a question, but then announced it had reached a verdict before the court could bring them in to address the question. “See Brooks v. State, 232 Ga.App. 115, 117(7) (501 S.E.2d 286) (1998) (there is no authority for the proposition that a trial counsel is deficient in failing to ask that the jury be polled).” Hodge v State, 287 Ga.App. 750, 652 S.E.2d 634 (October 9, 2007). Counsel is not required to request a poll of the jury to provide effective representation. Accord, Ellison v. State , 296 Ga.App. 752, 675 S.E.2d 613 (March 19, 2009); Marshall v. State , 285 Ga. 351, 676 S.E.2d 201 (April 28, 2009); Williams v. State , 300 Ga.App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (November 9, 2009); Davis v. State , 311 Ga.App. 699, 716 S.E.2d 710 (July 15, 2011); Jones v. State , 318 Ga.App. 342, 733 S.E.2d 400 (October 19, 2012); Johnson v. State , 293 Ga. 641, 748 S.E.2d 896 (September 23, 2013); Goggins v. State , 330 Ga.App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (October 8, 2014); Ruffin v. State , 296 Ga. 262, 765 S.E.2d 913 (November 17, 2014). 78. POLYGRAPH Chapman v. State, 290 Ga. 631, 724 S.E.2d 391 (February 27, 2012). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown. Defendant alleges ineffective assistance “by not having Chapman take a pre-trial polygraph in light of the fact that polygraph tests were administered to him post-trial with results which he states showed him ‘to be not deceptive in responding to questions regarding the fire and his responsibility for the incident.’ He urges that even though polygraph results are not admissible at trial without a stipulation by the State, a clear polygraph test can and often does lead the prosecution to either re-think its position on a case or re-open an investigation, and that had his trial counsel pursued a polygraph examination, it is probable that all charges against him would have been dropped. … Chapman has not established that, even with a favorable pre-trial polygraph result obtained by the defense, his prosecution would not have continued.” Harris v. State, 308 Ga.App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (March 17, 2011). Convictions for rape and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on stipulating to admission of polygraph results. “As our Supreme Court has held, ‘[s]tipulating to the admission of polygraph test results is a valid trial strategy[,] and there was evidence the ramifications were explained to [Harris].’ Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 680(6)(b) (620 S.E.2d 356) (2005). See also Ellis v. State, 280 Ga.App. 660, 662 (634 S.E.2d 833) (2006); Horne [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132, 134(5) (614 S.E.2d 243) (2005)].” Hortman v. State, 293 Ga.App. 803, 670 S.E.2d 99 (October 3, 2008). No ineffective assistance for failing “to suggest that [defendant] take a polygraph test” where defendant “failed to proffer any evidence in the motion for new trial hearing to show that the test would have elicited any admissible evidence that would have changed the outcome of the trial. See Wheat v. State, 282 Ga.App. 655, 657(1)(c) (639 S.E.2d 578) (2006). Additionally, he has not asserted, argued, or presented evidence that the state was even willing to enter into a stipulation to authorize the admission of any polygraph results.” Ellis v. State, 280 Ga.App. 660, 634 S.E.2d 833 (July 25, 2006). No ineffective assistance where counsel elicited testimony on cross-examination that defendant had declined to take polygraph examination. Context: witness unexpectedly made reference to inadmissible conversations defendant had with police. “[T]rial counsel made the conscious decision to take the ‘lesser of the evils’ and ‘deal with it,’ rather than “make it appear that [he was] hiding something.’ ‘It was more important for the jury to know that you were not hiding something, rather than to make sure that inadmissible evidence stayed out.’ He considered this a ‘strategic decision.’” “[E]liciting inadmissible testimony to address or explain a matter raised by the evidence is a reasonable trial strategy that may well fall within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. See Gordon v. State, 273 Ga. 373, 378-379(4)(f) (541 S.E.2d 376) (2001). Indeed, decisions to stipulate to or to not object to testimony relating to polygraph tests have been held to be strategic decisions that, whether wise or unwise, are not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them. See