☢ test - Í

Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463, 464-465(2) (467 S.E.2d 551) (1996) ; Horne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132, 134-135(5) (614 S.E.2d 243) (2005). Some evidence, including the testimony of trial counsel, supported the trial court’s similar findings here. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying Ellis’s motion for new trial that was based on this claim of ineffective assistance.” Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356 (October 3, 2005). “Stipulating to the admission of polygraph test results is a valid trial strategy and there was evidence the ramifications were explained to [defendant]. Horne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132(5) (614 S.E.2d 243) (2005). Accordingly, there was no deficient performance in agreeing to the stipulation. Id. [Defendant] also contends trial counsel erred in stipulating to the admission of the polygraph results without checking [defendant’s] pre-examination mental and emotional status and, upon her failure of the exam, by failing to investigate whether she suffered a mental illness that could have affected the results of the exam. … Since there was no testimony that [defendant]’s mental and emotional status affected [defendant’s] polygraph test results, [defendant] has not shown how she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to inquire about her mental and emotional status.” Accord, Adesida v. State , 280 Ga.App. 764, 634 S.E.2d 880 (July 27, 2006). Horne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132, 614 S.E.2d 243 (May 2, 2005). “Stipulating to a polygraph examination is a valid trial strategy, [Cit.] and trial counsel testified that he explained the pros and cons of this strategy to Horne, as well as the law regarding the admissibility of polygraph test results. Additionally, Horne cannot show how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to inquire about his use of medications and mental health history, as there was no testimony from either examiner that these conditions affected the results of Horne’s polygraph examinations.” 79. PREJUDICE Darst v. State, 323 Ga.App. 614, 746 S.E.2d 865 (July 16, 2013). Physical precedent only. Convictions for aggravated child molestation reversed, based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant showed that counsel was deficient in multiple ways, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. 1. Counsel was deficient in failing “to obtain the children's school, therapy, and [DFCS] records.” At new trial hearing, defense presented the records and showed that they would have bolstered the defense argument and cast doubt on the State’s case. “During the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel admitted that he had not obtained a subpoena for any of the records prior to trial, and he offered no strategic reason for failing to do so. Instead, he stated that it was his ‘understanding’ that the Department's records for the children had been lost.[fn] Although he later testified that he ‘was told [the records] were lost,’ he never identified any person he had contacted or other measures he had taken prior to trial to verify whether the records were, in fact, available. Moreover, trial counsel admitted that he did not know what information was in the Department's records, stating that ‘[m]aybe it would have been something helpful [to Darst], maybe not.’ Instead of trying to obtain the records, he decided that he would just ‘let it go’ and try to use the absence of the records to Darst's advantage at trial by arguing to the jurors that the records were just another piece of evidence the State had failed to present that would have helped them better understand the children's background. Further, although trial counsel testified that he made some efforts to contact the children's therapist before trial, he offered no explanation for why he did not attempt to subpoena the children's therapy or school records.” 2. Counsel was deficient in failing “to consult with and utilize an expert witness who would have been able to show the jury that the children's behavior was inconsistent with having been molested by him.” Expert presented at motion hearing testified to such an opinion. Trial counsel testified that he never considered getting such an expert, and never discussed it with defendant, although he was aware that such evidence was admissible. “[T]rial counsel readily admitted that he had not made a conscious strategic decision about whether to do so.” 3. Counsel was deficient in failing “to consult with and utilize an expert witness on the subject of conducting reliable forensic interviews.” Expert presented at motion hearing demonstrated deficiencies in interviews with children here; again, trial counsel testified it never occurred to him to present such evidence and he never discussed it with defendant, although he was aware it existed. Counsel agreed his performance was deficient. “Significantly, Darst's trial counsel failed to address any of these issues in his cursory cross-examination of the forensic examiner. … [T]rial counsel admitted that he did not make a conscious strategic decision about whether to consult with or hire an expert to offer an opinion on the reliability of the interviews,” although he watched the recordings of the interviews. 4. Counsel was deficient in failing to object to harmful “ inadmissible hearsay testimony that the children's biological father and uncle had successfully completed psycho-sexual evaluations, as well as hearsay testimony that there had been a recommendation that he submit to a psycho-sexual evaluation, but that it was unclear whether he had done so.” 5. Cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance created “is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Citing Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810, 812–818(II) (708 S.E.2d 335) (2011) (the collective effect of trial counsel's errors resulted in the reversal of the defendant's death sentence).”