☢ test - Í

Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 121 S. Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (January 9, 2001). Reversing Seventh Circuit; determination of prejudice under ineffective assistance analysis doesn’t require determination whether any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Defendant here contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to argue for his charges to be “grouped” for purposes of the federal sentencing guidelines, which would have resulted in a sentence 6-21 months shorter than that imposed. No decision here on whether counsel was actually deficient, but Government concedes, and Court unanimously holds, that District Court erred in “determining that … an increase of 6 to 21 months in a defendant’s sentence was not significant enough to amount to prejudice for purposes of Strickland .” Distinguishing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), which “holds that in some circumstances a mere difference in outcome will not suffice to establish prejudice. Id., at 369, 113 S.Ct. 838.” Lockhart doesn’t support Seventh Circuit’s holding “which denies relief when the increase in sentence is said to be not so significant as to render the outcome of sentencing unreliable or fundamentally unfair.” “The Seventh Circuit was incorrect to rely on Lockhart to deny relief to persons attacking their sentence who might show deficient performance in counsel's failure to object to an error of law affecting the calculation of a sentence because the sentence increase does not meet some baseline standard of prejudice. Authority does not suggest that a minimal amount of additional time in prison cannot constitute prejudice. Quite to the contrary, our jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (April 18, 2000). Reversing Federal Court of Appeals’ denial of defendant’s habeas petition. Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in his Virginia death penalty sentencing phase: “the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams’ favor was not justified by a tactical decision to focus on Williams’ voluntary confession. Whether or not those omissions were sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, they clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background. See 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2 nd ed., 1980).” Virginia Supreme Court misapplied U.S. Supreme Court precedent on showing of prejudice. “Cases such as Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), and Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), do not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. [fn] In the instant case, it is undisputed that Williams had a right-indeed, a constitutionally protected right-to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.” “[The Virginia Supreme Court’s] decision turned on its erroneous view that a ‘mere’ difference in outcome is not sufficient to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” Trial judge properly ruled that defendant had shown through mitigation evidence presented on motion for new trial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 80. PRELIMINARY HEARING Baldivia v. State, 267 Ga.App. 266, 599 S.E.2d 188 (April 7, 2004). “Failure to hold a preliminary probable cause hearing pursuant to Rule 26.2 provides no ground for appellate review once there has been an indictment and conviction.” Ellison v. State, 242 Ga.App. 636, 530 S.E.2d 524 (March 8, 2000). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel where “counsel failed to meet with [defendant] before that hearing. This argument is without merit, because a preliminary hearing is not required and even waiver of the hearing cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 621–622(1), 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986); McClarity v. State, 234 Ga.App. 348, 351–352(3)(a), 506 S.E.2d 392 (1998). Thus, failure of an attorney to meet with a client before the hearing is not deficient performance. In fact, errors in that hearing cannot in and of themselves afford grounds for relief when the defendant, as here, is subsequently indicted by a grand jury/ Taylor v. State, 177 Ga.App. 624(1), 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986). Nor could Ellison show any harm resulting from his attorney's performance at that hearing. He made no statements at the hearing that were later used against him, nor does the record show that he was injured by the denial of the opportunity to preserve testimony favorable to him. See Barksdale v. State, 161 Ga.App. 155, 157(2), 291 S.E.2d 18 (1982).” 81. PRESUMPTION OF INEFFECTIVENESS See also subheading DENIAL OF COUNSEL , above Wade v. State, 315 Ga.App. 668, 727 S.E.2d 275 (April 19, 2012). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no constructive denial of counsel (and thus no presumption of ineffectiveness) where counsel in fact “throughout the trial … attempted to ‘hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.’ [ United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656