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n. 19(II) (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657) (1984).] To this end, counsel, who had spent a significant amount of time preparing for trial, made numerous objections to testimony and evidence introduced during the prosecutor's direct examinations of the state's witnesses.” “Citing Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6 th Cir., 1997), Wade argues that he nevertheless experienced a constructive denial of counsel because his counsel acted as a ‘second prosecutor’ by eliciting testimony about Wade's criminal history not otherwise in evidence and by disparaging him in closing argument.” Counsel’s disparagement here, however, was necessitated by defendant’s own “testimony about his criminal activities [which] was not responsive to any questions posed by his counsel.” Counsel argued that there was room for reasonable doubt despite defendant’s revelations about his past. Accord, Jones v. State , 318 Ga.App. 614, 734 S.E.2d 450 (November 16, 2012). Calloway v. State, 313 Ga.App. 708, 722 S.E.2d 422 (January 26, 2012). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no “constructive denial of counsel” based on defendant’s “strained relationship with his appointed counsel.” “[C]onstructive denial of counsel is only present ‘when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ Smith [ v. State , 312 Ga.App. 174, 718 S.E.2d 43 (October 20, 2011)]; see also Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga.App. 679, 682(1)(d) (703 S.E.2d 116) (2010) (‘[T]he attorney's failure must be complete and must occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific points.’ (punctuation omitted)). And this, Calloway failed to show. The record reflects that Calloway's counsel subjected the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, including cross-examining the State's witnesses, moving for a directed verdict on all four counts, and making a closing argument on Calloway's behalf. Accordingly, Calloway was not constructively denied counsel, and this enumeration is wholly without merit.” Accord, Phillips v. State , 329 Ga.App. 279, 764 S.E.2d 879 (October 15, 2014). Smith v. State, 312 Ga.App. 174, 718 S.E.2d 43 (October 20, 2011). Rape, kidnapping, and related convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to replace appointed counsel based on defendant’s contention “that because he was abused by his African–American grandmother, he had an ‘unworkable relationship’ with his female African– American public defender. Before trial, Smith informed the court of his dissatisfaction and asked the court to replace her. At Smith's competency trial, his public defender informed the court that Smith would not talk to her and sought permission to withdraw. The trial court deferred ruling on the request, and subsequently denied counsel's request to withdraw. Smith points to no particular instance manifesting this conflict with his defense counsel,” instead contending that prejudice should be presumed. This is not, however, one of the three instances identified by the Georgia Supreme Court where prejudice may be presumed: “(1) an actual or constructive denial of counsel, (2) government interference with defense counsel, and (3) counsel [who] labors under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affects his performance.” State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337, 338 (588 S.E.2d 738) (2003). “Consequently, as Smith has made no showing of deficient performance by his counsel and has not even attempted to show prejudice, he has not demonstrated either a Sixth Amendment or Fifth Amendment violation. This enumeration of error is without merit.” Shields v. State, 307 Ga. 830, 706 S.E.2d 187 (February 14, 2011). Convictions stemming from home invasion and attempted armed robbery affirmed; no presumption of ineffectiveness from counsel’s mistaken belief that he only had six peremptory strikes instead of nine. Harrison v. State, 298 Ga.App. 870, 681 S.E.2d 252 (July 9, 2009). No presumption of ineffectiveness despite defendant’s claim of “strained relationships among counsel, Harrison, and the trial court. He does not elaborate on this, other than to say it was ‘evident.’ … We have reviewed the entire record, and, if there was any strain among counsel, his client, and the court, it was not evident. The record reveals that counsel thoroughly cross-examined each of the witnesses against Harrison, made appropriate objections, and attempted to keep similar transaction and pretrial identification evidence from the jury. Further, Harrison was acquitted of two of the crimes charged: aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.” Crane v. State, 294 Ga.App. 321, 671 S.E.2d 123 (October 31, 2008). “‘[C]onstructive denial [of counsel] is not present unless counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. The attorney's failure must be complete and must occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific points.’ Turpin [ v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 699(1) (606 S.E.2d 244) (2004)] (citations and punctuation omitted).” No such denial here; trial counsel replaced prior counsel from same conflict defender’s office “a few days [defendant’s] trial,” spending the weekend “meeting with Crane and reviewing numerous files provided by original counsel. Before trial, new counsel reported to the court that she was prepared to go forward and Crane confirmed that he was willing to proceed.” Distinguishing cases where counsel appointed immediately before trial, e.g., Sheppard v. State , 165 Ga. 460, 467, 141 S.E. 196 (1928).