☢ test - Í

Hinkle v. State, 282 Ga.App. 328, 638 S.E.2d 781 (November 8, 2006). “Although trial counsel admitted that he did not meet with Hinkle until two weeks before trial, ‘mere shortness of time for preparation of counsel is insufficient to show ineffectiveness.’ Randall v. State, 207 Ga.App. 637, 640(3) (428 S.E.2d 616) (1993). Accord, Johnson v. State , 290 Ga.App. 255, 659 S.E.2d 638 (February 21, 2008); Downer v. State , 310 Ga.App. 136, 712 S.E.2d 571 (June 17, 2011). Gibson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (July 12, 2006). Defendant’s convictions for homicide by vehicle and related charges reversed based on ineffective assistance; counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate history of traffic light malfunctions at intersection where collision occurred, which would have revealed that the light had a history of showing green on all sides, consistent with defendant’s assertion . Although counsel had the records showing the malfunctions, they failed to successfully subpoena the witnesses necessary to submit the documents into evidence. “Attorneys acting with reasonable diligence under these circumstances would have more actively pursued alternative means to introduce such critical evidence and would not have relied solely on the trial court’s discretion in issuing a subpoena late in the trial to secure a witness to testify about the report. Moreover, once they had this report in hand, Gibson’s attorneys also rendered deficient performance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation concerning the history of malfunctions at this intersection. Had they investigated further and discovered these other reports, they would have been able to develop a more comprehensive trial strategy to show that the signals at this intersection had a history of previous malfunctions, including showing green in all directions, which would have discredited the State’s witnesses who testified that traffic signals do not malfunction in this manner.” Evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, despite ‘eyewitness testimony that Gibson’s light was red at the time of the accident.’” Stapp v. State, 273 Ga.App. 899, 616 S.E.2d 215 (June 23, 2005). “‘When inadequate representation is alleged, the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; and whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Skillern v. State, 240 Ga.App. 34, 36(3) (521 S.E.2d 844) (1999).” Here, defendant received ineffective assistance for reasons relating both to inadequate preparation and unwise strategy: “Prior to trial, counsel did not file any pre-trial motions nor did he opt into reciprocal discovery. At the hearing [on defendant’s motion for new trial], he freely admitted that his decision in this regard was not tactical. Counsel further testified that, had he obtained a copy of [victim’s] statement to police before trial, he would have been better prepared to cross-examine [victim]. When counsel spoke with [co-defendant], she told him that she had stabbed [victim]. But [co- defendant] denied stabbing [victim] more often than she admitted to it. Even so, counsel determined his strategy would be to call [co-defendant] to testify so he could ask her about her admission that she stabbed [victim]. When he learned at the beginning of trial that [co-defendant] would not testify, counsel conceded that he should have sought severance of the trial, but did not do so in hopes that [co-defendant] would change her mind. We question counsel’s ‘strategy.’ [Cit.] In view of the fact that [co-defendant] was a co-defendant, counsel had no means of compelling her to testify. [Cit.] We also question counsel’s decision to rely on [co-defendant]’s testimony given her propensity for prevarication. Moreover, had [co-defendant] taken the stand and denied stabbing [victim], counsel would have been greatly hampered in his ability to impeach her testimony since he subpoenaed no witnesses. [Cit.] Under these circumstances, we find counsel’s strategy unreasonable. [Cit.] Furthermore, we find counsel’s failure to request any jury instructions to be unreasonable. During trial, counsel acknowledged that self-defense was a viable defense. Nonetheless, counsel failed to request a charge on either this defense or on accident, which was, counsel conceded, another applicable defense. Counsel also acknowledged that, although it can ‘be an important thing to give the jury an alternative [to aggravated assault,]’ he did not request any charges on lesser included offenses. Again, the attorney testified that his decision in this regard was not strategic. Thus, the only offense the jury had to consider was aggravated assault, and it was not instructed that it could consider whether Stapp was acting in self-defense or whether the stabbing was accidental.” Heath v. State, 268 Ga.App. 235, 601 S.E.2d 758 (July 1, 2004). Conviction for serious injury by vehicle reversed. Defendant showed prejudice where counsel made no investigation of the case and defendant had no recollection of the event but identified to counsel possible witnesses. “It is reasonable to expect a defendant’s attorney to conduct an investigation to determine the facts upon which all future decisions would be made. This is especially true where the defendant, because of trauma, has no memory of the event. Under such a circumstance, a lawyer is duty-bound to investigate so that he can properly advise his client.” Inconsistent with most case law, which would require a showing that the investigation would have likely resulted in a different outcome, not merely a possibility. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (June 17, 2004). Ineffective assistance of counsel not shown although