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counsel appointed only 10 days before trial for rape, aggravated assault, and related charges. “We agree that counsel was given little time to get ready for trial. Given the gravity of the charges against Johnson and the severity of potential sentences he faced, counsel should have had more than a mere ten days to investigate, plan, and prepare a defense. This is true even though counsel was experienced and even though the case was not factually complex. Nevertheless, we are constrained to conclude that Johnson failed to show any prejudice to his defense as a result of counsel’s truncated preparation time. Counsel testified that he would not have done anything differently if he had had more time. Although he eventually conceded that he ‘probably’ would have subpoenaed witnesses from the hospital and investigated the 911 tape and foreign pubic hair, Johnson did not show that taking any of these actions would have yielded evidence favorable to his defense. Accordingly, Johnson cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s inadequate preparation time, the trial would have turned out differently” (footnotes omitted). Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (June 7, 2004). Murder and related convictions affirmed. “The record shows that Silvers’ retained lawyer consulted with him on numerous occasions, thoroughly investigated the case and was fully prepared for trial. Although he did not visit the scene of the crimes and did not hire an expert, neither action was material to an effective presentation of his client’s coercion defense.” English v. State, 260 Ga.App. 620, 580 S.E.2d 351 (March 27, 2003). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed. “[N]o specified amount of time exists on ‘which a counsel must spend in preparation for trial; each situation must be judged upon its own circumstances and in light of its own degree of complexity.’” Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel merely because counsel was appointed six days prior to trial; did not meet with defendant until Friday before Monday trial; and did not seek continuance. Defendant did not want continuance, and said so on record in colloquy with court. Also, defendant had previously been represented, and prior counsel turned over to trial counsel “‘a great deal of discovery.’” Accord, Morgan v. State , 275 Ga. 222, 564 S.E.2d 192 (2002); Mitchell v. State , 279 Ga. 158, 611 S.E.2d 15 (March 28, 2005); Phillips v. State , 280 Ga. 728, 632 S.E.2d 131 (July 6, 2006). Marshall v. State, 239 Ga.App. 850, 522 S.E.2d 273 (September 8, 1999). No ineffective assistance despite counsel’s recent appointment. “Although Marshall's counsel had been recently appointed to the case, she did spend an entire weekend preparing for trial. We do not find that as a matter of law this was inadequate. A review of the record shows that Marshall's trial counsel was prepared for trial and was an effective advocate.” Horne v. State, 298 Ga.App. 601, 680 S.E.2d 616 (June 29, 2009). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance shown where defendant alleges failure to investigate case adequately, but fails to show what evidence would have been uncovered by further investigation. “We have held trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to uncover an alleged victim's numerous prior false molestation allegations. Gibbs v. State, 287 Ga.App. 694, 697-698(1)(a)(i) (652 S.E.2d 591) (2007). The Georgia Supreme Court found both trial counsel ineffective in a murder case for preparing for trial in a careless and unreasonable manner as shown by comparing the evidence presented at trial with the evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing that trial counsel failed to discover. Terry v. Jenkins, 280 Ga. 341, 347(2)(c) (627 S.E.2d 7) (2006). But here, unlike the defendants in Gibbs and Terry, Horne has not developed for comparison evidence his counsel should have uncovered but did not, … or testimony an expert witness would have presented but did not. He simply argues that trial counsel should have investigated further. This argument does not establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient.” Accord, Cruz v. State , 305 Ga.App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (August 20, 2010); Pruitt v. State , 323 Ga.App. 689, 747 S.E.2d 694 (August 8, 2013). Brady v. State, 270 Ga. 574, 513 S.E.2d 199 (March 1, 1999). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel relied on co-defendant’s counsel to investigate aspects of the case. “As this Court has observed, a defense attorney may face finite resources of time and money such that a reasonably competent attorney often must rely on his own experience and judgment, without the benefit of a substantial investigation, when deciding whether or not to forego a particular line of defense. Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 320(3b), 431 S.E.2d 110 (1993). The question is whether the decision was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Although Brady argues the decision to divide responsibility with Jackson was unreasonable as it was undertaken without [counsel] Sliz making any independent decision or review of the evidence supporting the theory that others committed the crime, the record reveals that Sliz discussed pursuit of this theory with Jackson and spoke with him several times about witnesses and evidence that had been found. Sliz also spoke with the investigator Jackson employed, whom Sliz had employed in the past and whom Sliz knew to be very competent and thorough, and Sliz believed he could rely on the investigator in this instance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding Sliz’ actions reasonable.”