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new trial. “See Morgan v. State, 275 Ga. 222, 227(10), 564 S.E.2d 192 (2002) (holding that counsel's alleged omission cannot be deemed prejudicial where the defendant has not shown that the omitted evidence existed, was available, and would have been favorable to his defense).” 3. No ineffective assistance “ in not asking the lay witnesses at trial their opinions about whether the trial court should extend mercy to him,” where the answers offered at hearing on motion for new trial “were generic statements that ‘everyone’ deserved to live or statements expressing a general opposition to the death penalty.” Instead, counsel was able to elicit “substantial information regarding Hulett's life that might encourage a reasonable sentencer to consider mercy. Then, in the sentencing phase closing argument, Hill drew the trial court's attention to that information.” Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (October 29, 2012). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; 1. no ineffective assistance in failing to find and present mitigating evidence where defendant “was stubbornly uncooperative with a series of attorneys and was generally opposed to the preparation of mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, the series of attorneys who undertook to represent Rice went to great lengths to develop mitigating evidence in the hope that Rice would allow them to use it at trial, while simultaneously being careful not to alienate him but, instead, attempting to gain his trust and cooperation and persuading him that he should allow mitigation evidence at trial. See Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810(II)(A) (708 S.E.2d 335) (2011) (‘[R]easonable attorney performance includes investigating mitigating evidence to the extent feasible given the defendant's willingness to cooperate and then, if the defendant insists, following his instructions regarding the ultimate defense to pursue.’).” 2. No ineffective assistance for failure to locate witness; defendant “has failed to show how counsel could have discovered her testimony under the circumstances confronting his trial counsel.” Barrett v. State, 292 Ga. 160, 733 S.E.2d 304 (October 15, 2012). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses, and associated death penalty, affirmed. 1. In sentencing phase, no prejudice in failing to seek and present mitigation evidence where defendant adamantly refused to allow its presentation. Based on Perkins v. Hall (March 18, 2011), below. Defense counsel have duty to investigate mitigation evidence regardless of defendant’s wishes, but where defendant adamantly refuses to allow the evidence to be presented, he can show no prejudice. 2. No prejudice in failing to present mitigation evidence of defendant’s “generosity, willingness to help those in need, likeableness, reliability, kindnesses to women, and sports skills” where “[m]uch of the new testimony also contains the information that Barrett was heavily involved in partying that revolved around alcohol and drug use, evidence that the jury likely would not have found to be particularly mitigating.” “Compare Schofield v. Gulley, 279 Ga. 413, 416(I)(A) (614 S.E.2d 740) (2005) (finding that trial counsel rendered prejudicially deficient performance in failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence that they were aware of that the defendant had saved the lives of two people).” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (April 4, 2011). Reversing grant of federal habeas, California courts properly rejected habeas petition, finding no ineffective assistance for failure to investigate mitigating evidence in capital murder prosecution. Ninth Circuit improperly declared a “constitutional duty to investigate” and a principle that “‘[i]t is prima facie ineffective assistance for counsel to “abandon[ ] their investigation of [the] petitioner's background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources,”’ (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). … The Court of Appeals misapplied Strickland and overlooked ‘the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and ... the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.’ 466 U.S., at 689. Beyond the general requirement of reasonableness, ‘specific guidelines are not appropriate.’ Id., at 688. ‘No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions ... .’ Id., at 688–689. Strickland itself rejected the notion that the same investigation will be required in every case. Id., at 691 (‘[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary’ (emphasis added)). It is ‘[r]are’ that constitutionally competent representation will require ‘any one technique or approach.’ [ Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 106 (131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624) (2011) (slip op. at 17)]. The Court of Appeals erred in attributing strict rules to this Court's recent case law.” As here, “it certainly can be reasonable for attorneys to conclude that creating sympathy for the defendant's family is a better idea because the defendant himself is simply unsympathetic.” The mitigation evidence suggested on habeas here “is of questionable mitigating value. If Pinholster had called Dr. Woods to testify consistently with his psychiatric report, Pinholster would have opened the door to rebuttal by a state expert. See, e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 130 S.Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 10–12) (taking into account that certain mitigating evidence would have exposed the petitioner to further aggravating evidence). The new evidence relating to Pinholster's family – their more serious substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal problems, … is also by no means clearly mitigating, as the jury might have concluded that Pinholster was simply beyond rehabilitation. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122