☢ test - Í

S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (recognizing that mitigating evidence can be a ‘two-edged sword’ that juries might find to show future dangerousness).” Three justices dissent. Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335 (March 18, 2011). Habeas court erred in denying petition; death sentence vacated based on ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate mitigation evidence suggesting that defendant “had suffered one or more brain injuries prior to his crimes.” This is so even though defendant gave instructions not to pursue any defense where he would be “labeled crazy.” “The ABA Guidelines at the time of Perkins’s trial, which this Court has acknowledged may serve as a guide to reasonable defense preparations in capital cases, indicate that trial counsel should conduct an investigation seeking possible evidence for the sentencing phase ‘regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered.’ ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989), 10.4.1 (C). See also [ Hall v. McPherson , 284 Ga. 219, 221 (663 S.E.2d 659) (2008)] (noting the relevance of published professional guidelines in assessing what might have been reasonable in a particular case). The ABA Guidelines, at first blush, might appear to be in tension with this Court’s previous decisions indicating that the client is ultimately the master of his own defense, including whether or not to present any mitigating evidence. See Colwell v. State , 273 Ga. 634, 638 (544 S.E.2d 120) (2001) (holding that the trial court had ‘properly respected Colwell’s right to make the “ultimate decision about” what sort of case to present’ (citation omitted)); Morrison v. State , 258 Ga. 683, 685-686 (373 S.E.2d 506) (1988) (noting that, at Morrison’s request, no mitigating evidence was presented). However, we provided a fuller explanation of the correct analysis in discussing the sentencing phase of another capital case: ‘The record reveals that Mize’s lawyers, despite Mize’s resistance, conducted some investigation of Mize’s background and informed Mize about pursuing a mitigation defense. But the final decision about the defense belonged to Mize.’ Mize v. State , 269 Ga. 646, 656 (501 S.E.2d 219) (1998). In other words, reasonable attorney performance includes investigating mitigating evidence to the extent feasible given the defendant’s willingness to cooperate and then, if the defendant insists, following his instructions regarding the ultimate defense to pursue. Perkins’s trial counsel plainly failed to take such an approach in investigating his background .” Accord, Barrett (October 15, 2012), above (counsel deficient for failing to investigate, but no prejudice where defendant adamantly refused to allow the evidence to be presented); Rice (October 29, 2012), above (counsel not deficient; detailing extensive efforts of counsel to identify defendant’s family members and other mitigating evidence in the face of his, and their, lack of cooperation). Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (November 30, 2009). Florida Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit erred in denying defendant’s postconviction relief; defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence at sentencing phase of capital murder trial, resulting in death sentence. “It was the first time this lawyer had represented a defendant during a penalty-phase proceeding. At the postconviction hearing, he testified that he had only one short meeting with Porter regarding the penalty phase. He did not obtain any of Porter's school, medical, or military service records or interview any members of Porter's family. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), we held counsel ‘fell short of ... professional standards’ for not expanding their investigation beyond the presentence investigation report and one set of records they obtained, particularly ‘in light of what counsel actually discovered’ in the records. Here, counsel did not even take the first step of interviewing witnesses or requesting records. Cf. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 130 S.Ct. 13, 18- 19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (November 9, 2009) (holding performance not deficient when counsel gathered a substantial amount of information and then made a reasonable decision not to pursue additional sources); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (‘[Counsel's] decision not to seek more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was ... reasonable’). Beyond that, like the counsel in Wiggins, he ignored pertinent avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware. The court-ordered competency evaluations, for example, collectively reported Porter's very few years of regular school, his military service and wounds sustained in combat, and his father's ‘over-disciplin[e].’ [Cit.] As an explanation, counsel described Porter as fatalistic and uncooperative. But he acknowledged that although Porter instructed him not to speak with Porter's ex-wife or son, Porter did not give him any other instructions limiting the witnesses he could interview. Counsel thus failed to uncover and present any evidence of Porter's mental health or mental impairment, his family background, or his military service. The decision not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment. Wiggins [ v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)]. Porter may have been fatalistic or uncooperative, but that does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation. See Rompilla [ v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381-382, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)].” Postconviction, defendant presented extensive evidence “about (1) Porter's heroic military service in two of the most critical-and horrific- battles of the Korean War, (2) his struggles to regain normality upon his return from war, (3) his childhood history of physical abuse, and (4) his brain abnormality, difficulty reading and writing, and limited schooling.” This evidence demonstrated prejudice to defendant, as “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the