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result of the proceeding would have been different,’” quoting Strickland. Accord, Hall v. Lance , 286 Ga. 365, 687 S.E.2d 809 (January 25, 2010) (counsel’s strategy of focusing on doubt about defendant’s guilt “must be regarded as deficient because that strategic choice was made without trial counsel's first conducting a reasonable investigation” as to potential mental health issues,” but no prejudice because evidence presented at habeas hearing revealed no evidence that “in reasonable probability [would have] changed the outcome of Lance’s trial.”). Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (November 9, 2009). Sixth Circuit erred in granting defendant habeas relief from his capital sentence; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel gathered a substantial amount of information and then made a reasonable decision not to pursue additional sources. Sixth Circuit’s finding of ineffective assistance was based on 2003 ABA Guidelines for capital defense counsel, although defendant’s trial occurred in 1985. Sixth Circuit erred in considering the ABA Guidelines “not merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel ‘must fully comply. ’ [Cit.] Strickland stressed, however, that “American Bar Association standards and the like” are “only guides” to what reasonableness means, not its definition. 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We have since regarded them as such. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). What we have said of state requirements is a fortiori true of standards set by private organizations: ‘[W]hile States are free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented, we have held that the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices.’ Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000).” Counsel’s extensive investigation and use of mitigating evidence here was effective “under professional standards prevailing at the time,” though they did not speak to every living relative or potential source of information on defendant and his family. “[T]here comes a point at which evidence from more distant relatives can reasonably be expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it distractive from more important duties. The ABA Standards prevailing at the time called for Van Hook's counsel to cover several broad categories of mitigating evidence, see 1 ABA Standards 4-4.1, comment., at 4-55, which they did. And given all the evidence they unearthed from those closest to Van Hook's upbringing and the experts who reviewed his history, it was not unreasonable for his counsel not to identify and interview every other living family member or every therapist who once treated his parents. This is not a case in which the defendant's attorneys failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared them in the face, cf. Wiggins, 539 U.S., at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, or would have been apparent from documents any reasonable attorney would have obtained, cf. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389-393, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). It is instead a case, like Strickland itself, in which defense counsel's ‘decision not to seek more’ mitigating evidence from the defendant's background ‘than was already in hand’ fell ‘well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments.’ 466 U.S., at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052.” Expresses no opinion as to use of ABA Guidelines as prevailing standard post-2003. Accord, Hulett (October 20, 2014), above (ABA Guidelines are not “the definition of attorney reasonableness.”). Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (June 20, 2005). Reversing denial of federal habeas, Pennsylvania courts erred in finding no ineffective assistance by counsel at defendant’s capital murder trial. “We hold that even when a capital defendant's family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.” “This case, like some others recently, looks to norms of adequate investigation in preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, when defense counsel's job is to counter the State's evidence of aggravated culpability with evidence in mitigation.” Here, prosecutors notified defense counsel that they planned to use defendant’s prior rape conviction in a similar case as evidence in aggravation of sentence, but defense counsel failed to ever review the files of either the court or the prosecutor in that case, although “the prior conviction file was a public document, readily available for the asking at the very courthouse where Rompilla was to be tried.” “The dissent thinks this analysis creates a ‘rigid, per se ’ rule that requires defense counsel to do a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced, post, at 2475 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), but that is a mistake. Counsel fell short here because they failed to make reasonable efforts to review the prior conviction file, despite knowing that the prosecution intended to introduce Rompilla's prior conviction not merely by entering a notice of conviction into evidence but by quoting damaging testimony of the rape victim in that case. The unreasonableness of attempting no more than they did was heightened by the easy availability of the file at the trial courthouse, and the great risk that testimony about a similar violent crime would hamstring counsel's chosen defense of residual doubt. It is owing to these circumstances that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in concluding that counsel could reasonably decline to make any effort to review the file. Other situations, where a defense lawyer is not charged with knowledge that the prosecutor intends to use a prior conviction in this way, might well warrant a different assessment.” Prejudice shown by the “range of mitigation leads” found in the file “that no