☢ test - Í

of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. [fn] In the instant case, it is undisputed that Williams had a right-indeed, a constitutionally protected right-to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.” “[The Virginia Supreme Court’s] decision turned on its erroneous view that a ‘mere’ difference in outcome is not sufficient to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” Trial judge properly ruled that defendant had shown through mitigation evidence presented on motion for new trial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” b) SENTENCING, GENERALLY Parrott v. State, 330 Ga.App. 801, 769 S.E.2d 549 (March 2, 2015). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to present evidence, in the sentencing phase, of his troubled upbringing and education. “Decisions about which witnesses to call, if any, and when to call them are matters of strategy and thus ‘do not amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them under similar circumstances.’ Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9, 12(4)(a), 764 S.E.2d 823 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). Moreover, ‘a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.’ Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 435(6)(a), 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009) (citation omitted).” Freeman v. State, 328 Ga.App. 756, 760 S.E.2d 708 (July 16, 2014). Convictions for burglary and attempted murder affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to request first offender sentencing. “[T]he record shows no inclination by the trial court to allow first offender status in light of the nature of the offenses Freeman committed. Nor was there evidence that the trial court was constrained to impose the sentence Freeman received. To the contrary, the trial court noted Freeman's lack of a criminal record and that it could have sentenced Freeman from one to thirty years for the attempted murder count. Nevertheless, after recounting on the record Freeman's use of a hammer, Nelson's fractured scull, staples ‘all up her head,’ the pool of blood, and Nelson's fear that she was going to be suffocated, the trial court imposed a sentence of 30 years with 10 to serve.” Grant v. State, 326 Ga.App. 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (March 12, 2014). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed, but sentence vacated. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to admission of one of defendant’s prior convictions, used to sentence him as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(c). Record of his 1981 guilty plea to armed robbery showed that defendant was advised of only one of his three Boykin rights. “Grant having produced affirmative evidence showing ‘an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea,’ the burden should thus shift back to the State to prove the constitutionality of the 1981 plea. Nash [ v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999)]. The State has not yet had an opportunity to make such a showing, but we conclude that a reasonable probability exists that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to object to the use of this plea, Grant might have received a different sentence. Thompson v. State, 276 Ga. 701, 704, 583 S.E.2d 14 (2003) (trial court erred in relying on uncounseled guilty plea to enhance sentence). Accordingly, Grant's sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Jackson v. State, 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to victim impact evidence admitted during sentencing although “the defense had no prior notice of her testimony.” No prejudice shown, given that testimony was cumulative of other evidence properly admitted. Barker v. Barrow, 290 Ga. 711, 723 S.E.2d 905 (March 19, 2012). Denial of habeas petition affirmed; trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to review the transcripts of defendant’s prior guilty pleas to determine validity under Boykin . Habeas court initially found that three of defendant’s prior convictions were invalid under Boykin , but defendant waived that direct challenge by failing to raise it at sentencing. “Relying principally upon Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360) (2005), Barker urges that, given the State's notification that it would seek to enhance his sentence by his prior pleas, his trial counsel had a basic legal duty to retrieve and read the plea transcripts.” Rompilla , however, doesn’t “create a ‘“rigid, per se”’ rule that requires defense counsel to do a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced.’” Id. at 389. Instead, it found counsel in that case lacking for failing to make reasonable efforts to review the file of the defendant's prior conviction despite knowledge that the prosecution intended to introduce Rompilla's prior conviction not ‘merely by entering a notice of conviction into evidence but by quoting damaging testimony of the rape victim in that case.’ Id. Thus, unlike the present case, there was no viable substitute for