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retrieval and examination of the damaging testimony itself. Moreover, the Court noted that the found unreasonableness of not securing the actual file for review ‘was heightened by the easy availability of the file,’ and the ‘great risk that testimony about a similar violent crime would hamstring counsel's chosen defense of residual doubt.’ The Supreme Court expressly cited these circumstances as rendering unacceptable the conclusion that Rompilla's counsel could reasonably decline to make any effort whatsoever to review the file. Id. at 389–390. The Court expressly acknowledged that in situations in which the prosecutor does not intend to use a defendant's prior conviction in the manner as in Rompilla v. Beard, a different assessment of reasonableness might well be warranted. Id. at 390.” Here, counsel “counsel researched Barker's previous pleas, which involved counsel physically going to the clerk's office, taking the list of prior convictions, and reviewing every file to see if a certified copy of each previous conviction existed; counsel was able to verify that the pleas were ‘factually entered’; the pleas were purportedly signed by Barker, and entered in the court record as part of the clerk's file.” Counsel also reviewed the prior convictions with Barker, “but he never made any claim that his prior convictions were improper; and the issue of possible irregularity with any of the prior pleas had never arisen until it was raised by Barker's habeas counsel.” Counsel’s efforts met the Rompilla reasonableness standard. “This Court likewise declines to, as Barker in essence urges, impose an absolute duty upon defense trial counsel when representing a recidivist to retrieve and review transcripts of prior plea proceedings or otherwise be deemed ineffective. This is not only unwarranted as a matter of law, but in many instances, would prove unworkable as a matter of fact.” Rucker v. State, 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault affirmed; no ineffective assistance for requesting pre-sentence investigation, revealing defendant’s 43 prior arrests and eight convictions, six of which were introduced in aggravation of punishment. “Although trial counsel was familiar with Rucker's arrest history through discovery, he believed that ‘the evidence in mitigation would far outweigh the listing of the charges in the [PSI]’ and did not object to hearsay evidence of Rucker's arrests, believing the trial court would consider admissible evidence only. Since trial counsel's decision to request the PSI in order to present mitigating evidence and failure to assert a hearsay objection were matters of reasonable trial strategy, the trial court's finding that Rucker was afforded effective assistance of counsel is supported by the record.” Armstrong v. State, 298 Ga.App. 855, 681 S.E.2d 662 (July 9, 2009). No ineffective assistance where defendant was represented at sentencing by a different public defender, because trial counsel was engaged in another trial. “Armstrong has not argued that the lawyer who represented him during the sentencing hearing performed deficiently. He merely asserts that, without ‘his’ lawyer, he was at a ‘disadvantage.’ ‘The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a “meaningful relationship” can be established.’ Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 358(3) (541 S.E.2d 362) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, Armstrong has shown no merit in his contention that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim. Id.” Mora v. State, 295 Ga.App. 641, 673 S.E.2d 23 (January 23, 2009). “Mora … contends that counsel was ineffective because she failed to inform him that the state intended to prosecute him as a recidivist, OCGA § 17-10-7, or explain the consequences of a life sentence. While the record reflects that trial counsel was confused about OCGA § 17- 10-7 and that she did not know the state intended to prosecute Mora as a recidivist, she testified that there is always a possibility of a life sentence for rape and that she discussed this possibility with Mora. She further explained that the state offered Mora a plea of twenty years but that Mora ‘was emphatic that he was not pleading guilty to rape.’ Although Mora contradicted trial counsel's testimony during the hearing on his motion for new trial, he never testified that he would have accepted a plea offer had he known that he was facing the prospect of being sentenced as a recidivist. In fact, Mora's testimony during the hearing on his motion for new trial confirms trial counsel's testimony that Mora was bent on proving his innocence: ‘I asked [trial counsel] if we could work out any kind of a plea. That is, I just wanted an opportunity to show that I wasn't guilty of any kind of a rape. And I asked her [at trial] if she couldn't obtain a reduction or a dismissal of the rape charge because I didn't rape anybody or do anything.’” Evans v. State, 290 Ga.App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (April 3, 2008). State’s pre-trial notice of intent to present prior convictions in aggravation of sentence was adequate, where it attached GCIC report. “‘The important requirement is that the defendant be given an unmistakable advance warning that the prior convictions will be used against him at sentencing so that he will have enough time to rebut or explain any conviction record.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Ogle v. State, 256 Ga.App. 26, 28(3) (567 S.E.2d 700) (2002). See Cabell [ v. State , 250 Ga.App. 530, 531 (551 S.E.2d 386) (2001)] (notice is sufficient where the defense counsel was aware of the defendant’s prior convictions and was aware that the State intended to use those convictions in aggravation of punishment); Rielli v. State, 174 Ga.App. 220, 223(5) (330 S.E.2d 104) (1985) (‘the furnishing of defense counsel with a list of convictions upon which the State expects to rely is