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sufficient”). Accordingly, even plea negotiations, which identify the prior convictions as a basis for the State’s seeking enhanced punishment, suffice as notice. Ogle, supra, 256 Ga.App. at 28(3); Cabell, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 531.” Accord, McClam v. State , 291 Ga.App. 697, 662 S.E.2d 790 (May 29, 2008) (discussions at pre-trial hearing which specified prior convictions were sufficient though convictions not specifically set forth in State’s written notice). Mallon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 394, 597 S.E.2d 497 (March 19, 2004). “[E]ven if counsel had been objectively unreasonable in failing to prepare … witnesses [on sentencing], there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing portion of the case would have differed but for counsel’s deficient performance” where witnesses, defendant’s parents, would have testified that defendant is a loving person and that he was not “violent before he became involved in drugs.” Guyton v. State , 272 Ga. 529, 531 S.E.2d 94 (May 30, 2000). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c) doesn’t render trial counsel ineffective. The code section provides that, on a first conviction for a serious violent felony, a defendant sentenced to life must serve 14 years before being eligible for parole; a defendant sentenced to a term of years isn’t eligible for parole at all. “Appellant argues that these two subsections pose an insurmountable quandary for the defense attorney who attempts to seek leniency for a client: Should counsel pursue a life sentence so the defendant might be paroled after 14 years, or should counsel seek a term sentence, which must be served in its entirety? … While these provisions may lead to different consequences for a convicted felon, they by no means create a Hobson's choice for defense counsel, as counsel is always charged with acting in the best interest of his or her client, see Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 335 S.E.2d 567 (1985), and in so doing, is free to argue alternative theories before a sentencing court. The provisions of the Act complained of here do not prevent counsel from doing either of these, and cannot be said to render counsel ineffective per se. Furthermore, we note that regardless of counsel's best efforts on behalf of a client, sentencing remains largely a matter within the trial court's discretion, and is by and large outside of counsel's immediate control. Accordingly, we reject appellant's contention that OCGA § 17–10–6.1(c)(1) and (c)(3) renders counsel ineffective per se. ” 93. SEVERANCE, FAILURE TO SEEK Daughtry v. State, 296 Ga. 849, 770 S.E.2d 862 (March 27, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to seek severance of offenses. When arrested for murder, almost three months after the crime, defendant was found in possession of cocaine. The murder, cocaine possession, and other related charges were all tried together. “[G]iven the role that crack cocaine played in the death of the victim, the trial court would not have been required to grant a motion to sever, and Appellant's counsel cannot be said to have performed deficiently in failing to file such a motion.” “In severance cases, we have generally ‘“upheld joinder of two crimes when one crime is a circumstance of the arrest on the other crime.”’ Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139, 140(2), 644 S.E.2d 828 (2007). We have said that, in these circumstances, the crime committed at the time of arrest is a related offense to the other crimes. See Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504(3), 511 S.E.2d 190 (1999). But we have on occasion examined the circumstances of the arrest to determine if the crimes committed then are directly related and relevant to the original crimes other than for the reason that the crimes occurred at the time of arrest. See Woolfolk, 282 Ga. at 140–141, 644 S.E.2d 828 (holding that the defendant's crime at the time of his arrest of aggravated assault against a peace officer was directly related to the original crimes …). See also Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 368, 369 & n. 8(3), 589 S.E.2d 563 (2003) (holding that the defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to move to sever a disorderly conduct charge that occurred at the time of arrest on the original homicide crime, stating that joinder of two crimes is proper ‘when one crime is a circumstance of the arrest on the other crime,’ …).” Distinguishing Benford v. State, 272 Ga. 348(3), 528 S.E.2d 795 (2000) (circumstances of arrest may not be admissible “where the evidence is wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the arrest is remote in time from the charged crime, and the evidence is not otherwise shown to be relevant....”). Benford didn’t involve a severance motion, but in any event allowed in evidence of cocaine possession at time of arrest “given the role crack cocaine played in the events leading up to the murder of the victim.” Wallace v. State, 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to seek severance of trial from co-defendant. Defenses were not antagonistic, and contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence against co-defendant wasn’t stronger. “Wallace … ‘has not shown either that a motion should or would have been granted.’ Dulcio v. State, 292 Ga. 645, 654(3)(h) (740 S.E.2d 574) (2013).” Baker v. State, 316 Ga.App. 122, 728 S.E.2d 767 (June 6, 2012). Statutory rape conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel despite failure to seek severance of offenses. Defendant argues that charges of statutory rape and interstate interference with custody should have been severed, because in trial on interference with custody, he should