☢ test - Í

(1999), when the state seeks to introduce evidence of a prior guilty plea, it bears the initial burden of proving the existence of the plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel. See Hall v. State, 261 Ga.App. 64, 66(1) (581 S.E.2d 695) (2003) (discussing Nash ). The state met that burden at Lattimore’s bench trial. Had Lattimore sought to challenge the validity of his prior plea, he would then have had the burden of ‘produc[ing] some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea.’ Nash, supra at 285. But as Lattimore presented no such evidence at the hearing on his motion for new trial, he failed to show that an objection by counsel to the introduction of the prior plea would have been successful. Thus, he demonstrated no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, the outcome at trial would have been different.” 97. SPEEDY TRIAL/SPEEDY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, FAILURE TO SEEK Brock v. State, 293 Ga. 156, 743 S.E.2d 410 (May 20, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to assert speedy trial rights. “At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Brock's trial counsel testified that he did not file a motion for speedy trial because he believed the passage of time would only benefit Brock. He explained that the lifestyle of the witnesses did not promote long lives and their transient nature would make it difficult for the State to locate them for trial. In addition, he did not believe it was in his client's best interest to push for a trial since Brock was out on bond. Finding that the defendant had an incentive for delaying the trial, the trial court determined that trial counsel's failure to challenge the delay was a reasonable strategy and tactic. We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to raise Brock's right to a speedy trial.” Chalk v. State, 318 Ga.App. 45, 733 S.E.2d 351 (October 16, 2012). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failing to move to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Record doesn’t support a claim of speedy trial violation: three-year delay was uncommonly long, but at least part of it was caused by defense continuance requests. No prejudice shown, and in fact, “trial counsel testified that he believed the longer the delay, the more it damaged the State's case, and the more it benefited Chalk's defense. See Jenkins v. State, 282 Ga.App. 55, 56, 637 S.E.2d 785 (2006) (noting that pre-trial delay often works to a defendant's advantage).” Counsel also testified that defendant never demanded speedy trial. Baker v. State, 295 Ga.App. 162, 671 S.E.2d 206 (November 24, 2008). No ineffective assistance in failing to file speedy trial demand, despite defendant’s claim “that the failure to do so allowed the state to collect evidence and witnesses against him and to better prepare its case.” “ At the time he made his request, Baker had just been indicted on 21 new charges stemming from incidents involving six additional victims. His counsel thus had a choice of rushing to trial unprepared or taking time to investigate the additional charges against him. ‘As it is a reasonable strategy for counsel to be prepared for trial, we agree with the trial court that appellant has not shown deficient performance on the part of trial counsel [in failing to file a speedy trial demand].’ Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 565(5)(c) (651 S.E.2d 674) (2007).” Browning v. State, 283 Ga. 528, 661 S.E.2d 552 (May 19, 2008). No ineffective assistance for failure to prosecute defendant’s motion for new trial. “This Court has addressed the proper resolution of claims asserting due process violations based on inordinate appellate delay, and determined that the appropriate analysis is application of the four speedy trial factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101) (1972), which are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256(2)(a) (626 S.E.2d 102) (2006). … Here, even though more than ten years elapsed from the time that trial counsel timely filed the motion for new trial and the resolution of the motion for new trial, as amended, there is evidence that much of this delay was caused by Browning’s own inaction. As noted, there is evidence that in 2000, trial counsel made plain that he would not pursue the motion for new trial or any other phase of the appellate process because he could not discern any merit in an appeal , and that he further advised that Browning could retain or possibly be appointed new counsel to review his case. Yet, it appears that Browning made no meaningful attempt to secure relief until his partially successful pro se efforts in 2007. Thus, the factors of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and Browning’s effort to assert his right to post-conviction relief, can be properly resolved adversely to Browning. But, even assuming that such factors are weighed in Browning’s favor, he has failed to allege, much less establish, any prejudice as a result of the post-trial delay. Accordingly, application of the Barker v. Wingo analysis mandates the finding that neither the actions or inaction of trial counsel resulted in the denial of due process to Browning. [fn]” Accord, Chalk (October 16, 2012), above (no prejudice shown in 34-month delay in preparation of trial transcripts).