☢ test - Í

Stanford v. State, 288 Ga.App. 463, 654 S.E.2d 173 (October 29, 2007). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to seek dismissal based on violation of constitutional speedy trial right; most of two year delay was caused by defendant’s three changes of counsel, and defendant alleges no prejudice from the delay. Jenkins v. State, 282 Ga.App. 55, 637 S.E.2d 785 (October 20, 2006). No ineffective assistance for failure to file a speedy trial demand where defense counsel “testified that in his professional opinion, making a speedy trial request would have been a bad tactic. He explained that the State had a strong case and that the best chance that Jenkins had was if the State’s case fell apart over time. The Supreme Court has noted that ‘[d]elay often works to a defendant’s advantage.’ Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 181 (549 S.E.2d 381) (2001). Furthermore, ‘[t]he decision to file a speedy trial demand is usually tactical in nature, and with regard to trial strategy, effectiveness should not be evaluated in hindsight.’ Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 776 (583 S.E.2d 825) (2003). See also Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga.App. 587, 593(2)(c) (612 S.E.2d 887) (2005) (attorney not ineffective when he strongly urged against filing speedy trial demand as a matter of trial strategy despite defendant’s repeated demands). We find no clear error in the trial court’s decision that Jenkins received effective assistance of counsel. See also Floyd v. State, 263 Ga.App. 3, 4(3) (587 S.E.2d 166) (2003).” Accord, Bowling v. State , 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (October 17, 2011); Riggs v. State , 319 Ga.App. 189, 733 S.E.2d 832 (October 31, 2012).; Smith v. State , 297 Ga. 214, 773 S.E.2d 209 (June 1, 2015) (delay allowed counsel to “develop a rapport” with one witness, while another witness for State became unavailable); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015). Iles v. State, 278 Ga.App. 895, 630 S.E.2d 148 (April 14, 2006). No ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file speedy trial demand where defendant “has not demonstrated – or even argued – that he was prejudiced by any delay [fn] or that the outcome of his trial would have been different had counsel moved for a speedy trial.” Accord, Jones v. State , 296 Ga. 561, 769 S.E.2d 307 (February 16, 2015). Baker v. State, 270 Ga.App. 762, 608 S.E.2d 38 (November 18, 2004). Defendant’s statutory speedy trial demand was ineffective because it was not served “upon the judge to whom the case is assigned,” in addition to the prosecutor, as required in OCGA § 17-7-170(a). Trial counsel’s performance was thus deficient, but defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not prejudiced, inasmuch as delay has not yet exceeded one year. As Ruffin points out in concurrence, “prejudice” analysis confuses rules for statutory and constitutional speedy trial, and is thus clearly defective. Ruffin concurs, however, because case at bar involves different charge (rape) than case in which speedy trial demand was filed (misdemeanor sexual assault). Appears to conflict with Crawford v. Thompson (September 27, 2004), below. Crawford v. Thompson, 278 Ga. 517, 603 S.E.2d 259 (September 27, 2004). Defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when attorney failed to preserve defendant’s statutory speedy trial rights by announcing “ready” in open court for two successive terms, as required in capital cases such as this armed robbery prosecution by OCGA § 17-7-171. Counsel mistakenly based speedy trial demand on OCGA § 17-7-170, which applies to non-capital cases. Appellate counsel likewise provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise this as an ineffective assistance of counsel issue; habeas court therefore should have granted defendant’s petition. Habeas court found that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s mistake, because he received a fair trial, albeit not within the time required by the speedy trial demand. Supreme Court finds that “Crawford was more directly prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance in that he was denied his statutory right to be tried within two regular terms of court after the term at which his demand was filed.” Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299, 519 S.E.2d 219 (July 6, 1999). Habeas court erred in denying petition; defendant showed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel who failed to note trial counsel’s deficient failure to enforce properly- filed statutory speedy trial demand. “Sloan's trial counsel filed a demand for speedy trial during the July term under OCGA § 17-7-170. Nevertheless, the state did not try Sloan during the July or the succeeding September term. When Sloan's case was called for trial during the November term, his trial counsel failed to assert Sloan's right under OCGA § 17-7-170 to have the charges dismissed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Sloan's new appellate counsel also failed to raise this issue as ineffectiveness of trial counsel. … [B]ecause of the mandatory nature of OCGA § 17-7-170, a claim that trial counsel failed to assert Sloan's speedy trial rights is a strong one. Indeed, appellate counsel admitted during the habeas hearing, ‘[i]f it's in the record I should have raised it.’” 98. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING INEFFECTIVENESS Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009). Reverses and remands 292 Ga.App. 636 (665 S.E.2d 692) (2008); Court of Appeals erred in stating standard for review of ineffective assistance claim. Disapproves of a line of