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cases requiring defendants “to show that but for counsel's error, the outcome of the case would have been different,” eliminating the “reasonable probability” language from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). “The Strickland Court specifically noted that ‘a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’ Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 693. ‘[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ Id. 466 U.S. at 695. Cases which have ignored the reasonable probability requirement of Strickland have placed a more stringent burden on the defendant-an unconditional showing that the defendant would have been acquitted had counsel not performed deficiently.” Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). “‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [ Allen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 469, 474(2)(a) (649 S.E.2d 583) (2007)].” Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 627 S.E.2d 562 (March 13, 2006). “The standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is ‘not errorless counsel and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel ... rendering reasonably effective assistance. ... [Cit.]’ Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 94(6), 575 S.E.2d 447 (2003). While hindsight made clear to trial counsel that he could have taken a different approach [here, to the issue of credibility], the record of the trial and the testimony at the motion for new trial hearing support the trial court’s holding that trial counsel’s representation of Harris fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Accord, Phillips v. State , 284 Ga.App. 683, 644 S.E.2d 535 (March 29, 2007); Jones v. State , 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (July 13, 2007) (“It cannot be said that counsel was ineffective simply because another attorney might have placed more or a different emphasis on the evidence.”); Smith v. State , 306 Ga.App. 693, 703 S.E.2d 329 (November 3, 2010) (effectiveness not judged in hindsight, as here, advice on right to testify). Gardner v. State, 261 Ga.App. 188, 582 S.E.2d 167 (May 7, 2003). “[T]here is no substantial difference in the legal standard used to resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution and under the Georgia Constitution.” Declines to adopt standard “which would require that the [defendant] show a mistake or deficiency of trial counsel, and demonstrate that the mistake resulted in the deprivation of an available and meritorious defense.” Boyd v. State, 275 Ga. 772, 573 S.E.2d 52 (November 25, 2002). Good quote from Stansell v. State , 270 Ga. 147(2), 510 S.E.2d 292 (1998): “The test for reasonable attorney performance ‘has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. [W]e are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.’” Accord, Williams v. State , 290 Ga.App. 829, 661 S.E.2d 563 (March 12, 2008). Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga.App. 73, 564 S.E.2d 486 (April 15, 2002). Standard for effective assistance of counsel is the same under the federal and Georgia Constitutions. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See also Gardner (May 7, 2003), above. Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (November 8, 1999). Convictions for robbery, false name, and driving on suspended license affirmed; defendant’s various claims of ineffective assistance fail for lack of showing of prejudice. “Wooten was ‘entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Clark v. State, 239 Ga.App. 245, 248, 520 S.E.2d 245 (1999).” Stansell v. State, 270 Ga. 147, 510 S.E.2d 292 (November 16, 1998). “The test for reasonable attorney performance ‘has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial ... we are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately .’” Accord, Franks v. State , 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (June 28, 2004). 99. STIPULATING TO FACTS, See also subheading CONCEDING GUILT/ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL HISTORY , above Stevens v. State, 329 Ga.App. 91, 762 S.E.2d 833 (August 29, 2014). Conviction for enticing a child affirmed; no