☢ test - Í

ineffective assistance where counsel stipulated to part of State’s case, for purposes of keeping the victim off the stand. “Trial counsel … testified that the victim was extremely sympathetic, and keeping the victim off the stand strengthened Stevens's defense that he had no sexual contact with the victim. Trial counsel stated that he discussed his strategy of keeping the victim off the stand and agreeing to stipulate to her age with Stevens and Stevens agreed.” Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 644 S.E.2d 837 (May 14, 2007). “Trial counsel did not perform deficiently when he entered into a stipulation with the prosecution to the effect that vaginal penetration could occur without leaving ‘testable’ DNA material. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel testified he agreed to the stipulation because it was a ‘common sense’ proposition that ‘any physician would have said....’ Entering into a stipulation is a valid trial strategy (see Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676(6b) (620 S.E.2d 356) (2005); Osterhut v. State, 266 Ga.App. 319(4a) (596 S.E.2d 766) (2004)), and reasonable trial strategy does not constitute deficient performance. McKinney v. State, [281 Ga. 92(2), 635 S.E.2d 153 (2006)].” Accord, Chance v. State , 291 Ga. 241, 728 S.E.2d 635 (June 18, 2012); Littlejohn v. State , 320 Ga.App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (March 8, 2013). 100. STRATEGIC DECISIONS, GENERALLY Seminal case: Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 219 S.E.2d 740 (1975). Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 561, 769 S.E.2d 307 (February 16, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown. Counsel was terminally ill at time of trial and died shortly thereafter. “A strong presumption exists that trial counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel's decisions and choices at trial fell within the broad range of professional conduct as assessed from counsel's perspective at the time of trial and under the specific circumstances of the case. See Miller v. State, 295 Ga. 769(2)(a)(I), 764 S.E.2d 135 (2014); Hendricks v. State, 290 Ga. 238, 241(4), 719 S.E.2d 466 (2011). Even where, as here, trial counsel is no longer available to testify regarding the manner in which he conducted appellant's defense at trial, appellant must still overcome this presumption. See Sweet v. State, 278 Ga. 320(8), 602 S.E.2d 603 (2004) (in a case in which appellant's trial counsel was deceased at the time of the amended motion for new trial hearing, this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, trial counsel's actions are presumed to be strategic and that appellant presented no evidence to support the assertion that trial counsel's failure to object to a comment made by the State's attorney in closing argument demonstrated ineffective assistance). The record shows no evidence was presented to defeat the presumption that trial counsel's decisions and choices with respect to his participation in voir dire questioning and the content of his opening statement were part of his reasonable trial strategy and were within the range of reasonable professional conduct.” Washington v. State, 294 Ga. 560, 755 S.E.2d 160 (February 24, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel allegedly “failed to adequately cross-examine one witness at trial and … failed to call another. … [A]t the hearing on his motion for new trial, Washington never asked his lawyer why he did not bring out the testimony on cross-examination. As we have explained, ‘when trial counsel does not testify at the motion for new trial hearing about the subject, it is extremely difficult to overcome the presumption that his conduct was reasonable.’ Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 876(3)(b) (742 S.E.2d 707) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).” King v. State, 320 Ga.App. 90, 739 S.E.2d 654 (February 14, 2013). Conviction for aggravated sodomy affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to seek curative instruction, based on alleged improper comment by juror during voir dire. “Trial counsel considered the trial court's offer, including the court's caution that it might draw more attention to the comments, and declined, noting that there was ‘no way to unring the bell.’ Thus, trial counsel's refusal of the offer for curative instructions was a reasonable strategic decision, and such ‘strategic decisions do not amount to deficient performance.’ [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294 (March 25, 2011). Convictions for felony murder, kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown where trial counsel simply couldn’t remember why he made decisions about cross-examination of witnesses when testifying at motion for new trial, over eight years after trial. “‘We have said that “[w]here trial counsel does not testify at the motion for new trial hearing, it is extremely difficult to overcome th[e] presumption” that counsel’s conduct resulted from reasonable trial strategy. Russell v. State , 269 Ga. 511, 511 (501 S.E.2d 206) (1998). The same may be said here, where trial counsel testified but was unable to recall anything specific about the trial. Although courts may not indulge “ post hoc rationalization” for counsel’s decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. There is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than “sheer neglect.” . . . [Strickland] calls for an inquiry into the objective