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Iles v. State, 278 Ga.App. 895, 630 S.E.2d 148 (April 14, 2006). Aggravated child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance. “[C]ounsel’s decision to try the case before a jury [as opposed to a bench trial] was plainly strategic, and we cannot find that such decision ‘fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Cit.]” Paige v. State, 277 Ga.App. 687, 627 S.E.2d 370 (February 1, 2006). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance. “The decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross- examination, which jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of counsel after consultation with the client. Trial counsel’s strategic decisions made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. They provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.’ Botelho v. State, 268 Ga.App. 129, 132(3) (601 S.E.2d 494) (2004).” Accord, Hollman v. State , 280 Ga.App. 53, 633 S.E.2d 395 (June 21, 2006); Long v. State , 281 Ga.App. 356, 636 S.E.2d 88 (August 29, 2006); Bradley v. State , 322 Ga.App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2013); Brown v. State , 325 Ga.App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (November 8, 2013); Perez v. State , 331 Ga.App. 164, 770 S.E.2d 260 (March 13, 2015) (decision on which witnesses to call was trial strategy). Silver v. State, 276 Ga.App. 801, 625 S.E.2d 81 (December 12, 2005). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed. Fact that trial counsel pursued a different strategy than that proposed by appellate counsel does not establish ineffective assistance, particularly where strategy was chosen in consultation with defendant. “[A]fter thorough investigation and client consultation, strategic decisions on matters such as which witnesses to call, how to conduct cross-examinations, and what objections to make are virtually unchallengeable and do not amount to ineffective assistance. See Schwindler v. State, 254 Ga.App. 579, 588-589(10), 563 S.E.2d 154 (2002). Here, Silver’s counsel consulted with her about the State’s witness and pursued a defense theory that the victim was a willing participant in the attempted robbery, and chose not to assert that the victim was lying about the robbery to avoid disciplinary action. Nevertheless, trial counsel elicited testimony from Silver herself indicating that the victim allegedly feared disciplinary action for voluntarily allowing Silver and her companion behind the counter during the planned robbery. ‘While other counsel, had they represented [defendant], may have exercised different judgment, the fact that the trial counsel chose to try the case in the manner in which it was tried and made certain difficult decisions regarding the defense tactics to be employed with which [defendant] and h[er] present counsel now disagree, does not require a finding that the representation below was so inadequate as to amount to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 4-5, 426 S.E.2d 360 (1993).” Accord , Adkins v. State , 280 Ga. 761, 632 S.E.2d 650 (July 13, 2006); Mayberry v. State , 281 Ga. 144, 635 S.E.2d 736 (October 2, 2006); Smith v. State , 282 Ga. 388, 651 S.E.2d 28 (September 24, 2007); McKenzie v. State , 284 Ga. 342, 667 S.E.2d 43 (September 22, 2008); Reed v. State , 285 Ga. 64, 673 S.E.2d 246 (February 23, 2009); Smith v. State , 304 Ga.App. 846, 698 S.E.2d 355 (July 7, 2010) (counsel chose to focus cross-examination of officer, not on officer’s initial mis-identification of drug, but on question of whether defendant possessed it). Vincent v. State, 276 Ga.App. 415, 623 S.E.2d 255 (November 17, 2005). Defense counsel’s strategic decision to forego Bruton objection to honor “her client’s desire to be tried with the other two defendants and to present a unified front” did not amount to ineffective assistance, even though “[i]t would appear that this strategy may have backfired.” Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (November 7, 2005). “Tollette notes with disapproval that his lead counsel stated in his closing argument, ‘I have great loathing for my own client.’ However, as trial counsel’s testimony in the motion for new trial hearing indicated, this statement was made as part of a strategy to appear ‘credible to the jury.’ Counsel’s argument continued by emphasizing that the jury was not required to impose a death sentence in order to ‘keep [Tollette] out of society’ and encouraging the jurors not to impose a death sentence so that they would not ‘always think of [themselves] as someone who put another person to death when [they] didn’t have to.’ We find that trial counsel’s strategy in forging his overall argument was not unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.” Rolling v. State, 275.App. 902, 622 S.E.2d 102 (October 18, 2005). Determination of effective assistance of counsel in strategic decisions made at trial involves “consideration of trial counsel’s perspective at the time of trial.” Keown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 166, 620 S.E.2d 428 (August 17, 2005). No ineffective assistance shown where counsel decided not to call polygraph examiner to testify that defendant passed lie detector test agreed upon with prosecutor; counsel interviewed the examiner and determined that his testimony would be equivocal, and examiner, a law enforcement officer, would likely shade his testimony to favor the state. “Once counsel had intentionally apprised the jury that Keown had taken a polygraph test, … it was, perhaps, less than prudent not to follow through and offer evidence