☢ test - Í

that Keown had passed the test. But … because Keown has not shown that any inference as to the result of the polygraph was raised, Keown has shown no prejudice resulting from counsel’s error. Collins v. State, 276 Ga. 726, 728-729(2) (583 S.E.2d 26) (2003).” Johnson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 21, 619 S.E.2d 731 (August 8, 2005). “Johnson argues that his trial counsel improperly put his character into issue by asking the arresting officer about the officer’s testimony at the parole revocation hearing. The trial transcript shows that Johnson’s trial counsel asked the officer about this testimony at Johnson’s insistence. The purpose of the questioning was to impeach the officer by showing that his testimony at the revocation hearing as to the location of the stolen items differed from the officer’s testimony at trial. While trial counsel risked opening the door for the State to show that Johnson had been on parole, trial counsel had reason to believe the officer could be impeached and so stood to gain a substantial benefit for her client if she was successful in impeaching the officer. Considering the decision at the time it was made, we conclude Johnson’s trial attorney’s attempt to impeach the officer was within the ambit of reasonable trial strategy and was not deficient. See Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 479(4) (480 S.E.2d 32) (1997) (reasonableness of the trial counsel’s conduct is viewed at the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case).” Stapp v. State, 273 Ga.App. 899, 616 S.E.2d 215 (June 23, 2005). “‘When inadequate representation is alleged, the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; and whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Skillern v. State, 240 Ga.App. 34, 36(3) (521 S.E.2d 844) (1999).” Here, defendant received ineffective assistance for reasons relating both to inadequate preparation and unwise strategy: “Prior to trial, counsel did not file any pre-trial motions nor did he opt into reciprocal discovery. At the hearing [on defendant’s motion for new trial], he freely admitted that his decision in this regard was not tactical. Counsel further testified that, had he obtained a copy of [victim’s] statement to police before trial, he would have been better prepared to cross-examine [victim]. When counsel spoke with [co-defendant], she told him that she had stabbed [victim]. But [co-defendant] denied stabbing [victim] more often than she admitted to it. Even so, counsel determined his strategy would be to call [co- defendant] to testify so he could ask her about her admission that she stabbed [victim]. When he learned at the beginning of trial that [co-defendant] would not testify, counsel conceded that he should have sought severance of the trial, but did not do so in hopes that [co-defendant] would change her mind. We question counsel’s ‘strategy.’ [Cit.] In view of the fact that [co-defendant] was a co-defendant, counsel had no means of compelling her to testify. [Cit.] We also question counsel’s decision to rely on [co-defendant]’s testimony given her propensity for prevarication. Moreover, had [co- defendant] taken the stand and denied stabbing [victim], counsel would have been greatly hampered in his ability to impeach her testimony since he subpoenaed no witnesses. [Cit.] Under these circumstances, we find counsel’s strategy unreasonable. [Cit.] Furthermore, we find counsel’s failure to request any jury instructions to be unreasonable. During trial, counsel acknowledged that self-defense was a viable defense. Nonetheless, counsel failed to request a charge on either this defense or on accident, which was, counsel conceded, another applicable defense. Counsel also acknowledged that, although it can ‘be an important thing to give the jury an alternative [to aggravated assault,]’ he did not request any charges on lesser included offenses. Again, the attorney testified that his decision in this regard was not strategic. Thus, the only offense the jury had to consider was aggravated assault, and it was not instructed that it could consider whether Stapp was acting in self-defense or whether the stabbing was accidental.” Bales v. State, 277 Ga. 713, 594 S.E.2d 644 (March 29, 2004). “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel testified she chose not to have a ballistics expert conduct a pre-trial examination of the victim’s shirt because the State had not conducted any tests and the results of any future testing by the State would be given to the defense, what was known was consistent with the defense theory of justification and, had she decided to have an expert examination, she would have had to get the shirt from the State, thereby making the State aware of what the defense was up to. As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 548(3) (580 S.E.2d 224) (2003). We agree with the trial court’s implicit determination that trial counsel’s choice of trial strategy was not unreasonable.” Mallon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 394, 597 S.E.2d 497 (March 19, 2004). Not ineffective assistance of counsel to recommend waiving jury trial in favor of bench trial “based on the ‘not pleasant’ photographs of the victim’s injuries, that the trial court ‘would [be] a less impassioned arbiter or judge of the case than a jury would.’” See also Marshall v. State , 253 Ga.App. 645, 560 S.E.2d 118 (2002) (“counsel’s advice that a bench trial would be preferable to a jury trial fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”).