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Munn v. State, 263 Ga.App. 821, 589 S.E.2d 596 (October 28, 2003). Trial counsel considered withdrawing as defendant’s attorney so that she could testify about his prior consistent statements to her, but decided she could best serve defendant as his attorney. “This was not ineffective assistance. A claim of ineffective assistance is not judged by a standard of errorless counsel or hindsight. Failure to do what Munn now claims should have been done was a considered decision due to counsel’s trial strategy and tactics, and not a result of inadequate preparation or presentation.” Prince v. State, 277 Ga. 230, 587 S.E.2d 637 (October 20, 2003). Counsel’s failure to introduce, at trial or Jackson-Denno hearing, evidence of defendant’s mental incapacity due to cocaine intoxication was not ineffective, inasmuch as it would have “conflicted with [defendant’s] plea of not guilty[; it] is a matter of trial strategy within the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client, and falls within the bounds of reasonable professional conduct.” Shelnutt v. State, 242 Ga.App. 723, 531 S.E.2d 122 (March 10, 2000). Defendants’ aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on strategic failure to request jury charges on lesser-included offenses. “While defense lawyers should consult fully with defendants in determining whether to request lesser included offenses, the failure to follow this crucial practice in every case does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 3, 426 S.E.2d 360 (1993). The decision of whether to seek the submission to the jury of lesser included offenses ‘is often based on legal complexities only the most sophisticated client could comprehend, not unlike the tactical decisions involved regarding the assertion of technical defenses.’ Id. The relevant inquiry is ‘“what is the consequence when that practice has not been followed.”’ Id. at 4, 426 S.E.2d 360.” Contrary to defendants’ contention, record shows that defendants insisted on presenting an alibi defense; counsel therefore declined to additionally argue for lesser-included offenses. Teat v. State, 237 Ga.App. 867, 516 S.E.2d 794 (April 23, 1999). “The decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, which jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 77, 79(1), 447 S.E.2d 74 (1994). Trial counsel’s strategic decisions made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 120, 122(2), 453 S.E.2d 443 (1995).” Accord, Bolick v. State , 244 Ga.App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (June 22, 2000) (decision not to call character witnesses to avoid opening door to admission of prior convictions). 101. SUPPRESS, FAILURE TO FILE MOTION, See subheading MOTION TO SUPPRESS, FAILURE TO FILE above 102. THEORY OF DEFENSE Brown v. State, S16A0179, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1628059 (April 26, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel argued for defenses and lesser offenses defendant now contends weren’t supported by the evidence. “Here, trial counsel reasonably tried to provide the jury with less severely punished alternatives to the charges relating to the murder of Freeman, and, even if we accept Brown’s contention that trial counsel’s defenses should not have been allowed by the trial court, they were, in fact, allowed. The record shows that the trial court instructed the jury on justification, involuntary manslaughter, and reckless conduct, notwithstanding Brown’s current contentions that the trial court was prohibited from giving these instructions. See Demery v. State, 287 Ga. 805, 809(3), 700 S.E.2d 373 (2010). So, at worst, Brown’s trial counsel was able to provide him with extra defenses to which Brown now claims that he was not entitled. This is a benefit to Brown, not a harm. There was no prejudice.” Amos v. State, S15A1580, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 856588 (March 7, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on “failing to assert a Second Amendment challenge to the weapons carry license statute insofar as it was applied to deprive him of his statutory right to immunity under the circumstances of this case.” “[N]either the U.S. Supreme Court nor this Court has yet determined that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home for self-defense is an impermissible infringement on citizens’ Second Amendment rights. … To the extent Amos asserts that Second Amendment jurisprudence is headed in this direction, even assuming arguendo he were correct on this point, ‘there is no requirement for an attorney to prognosticate future law in order to render effective representation.’ Williams v. Rudolph, 298 Ga. 86, 89, 777 S.E.2d 472 (2015). Accord Rickman v. State, 277 Ga. 277(2), 587 S.E.2d 596 (2003) (there exists no general duty on the part of counsel to anticipate changes in the law). Moran v. State, 334 Ga.App. 765, 780 S.E.2d 529 (November 20, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions