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affirmed (but no evidence of stalking). No ineffective assistance based on failure to seek pretrial hearing on immunity from prosecution based on self-defense. “Here, trial counsel testified that he did not request an immunity hearing because he did not want to subject Moran to cross-examination before trial and ‘there were some questions [he] wanted to ask [the victim] ... for the first time in front of a jury.’ Additionally, he did not believe a motion for immunity based upon self-defense would have been successful. As counsel did not employ an objectively unreasonable trial strategy, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Moran’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Boddie v. State, 327 Ga.App. 667, 670(1) (760 S.E.2d 668) (2014) (no ineffective assistance where trial counsel did not make unreasonable strategic decision against filing a pre-trial motion).” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 779 S.E.2d 322 (November 2, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel chose to present misidentification defense rather than self-defense defense preferred by defendant. 1. “Though Hendrix highlights the pitfalls of the misidentification defense, he ignores the similar problems he would have faced in asserting self-defense, namely, the undisputed testimony of four eyewitnesses that Hendrix left the car wash after the initial altercation and returned shortly thereafter with a gun, and the similarly undisputed testimony that Parker did not have a gun in his possession at the car wash that day. Trial counsel here was compelled to choose between two problematic defenses, both of which relied in large part on attacking the witnesses’ credibility. Under these circumstances, counsel’s election to pursue misidentification over self-defense did not constitute deficient performance.” 2. No prejudice shown from counsel’s failure to consult with defendant about presenting misidentification rather than self-defense. “[A]s we have previously held, an attorney’s failure to fulfill the duty to consult regarding trial strategy does not in and of itself constitute ineffective assistance. See Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 4, 426 S.E.2d 360 (1993). Rather, as with all ineffectiveness claims, we must assess the consequences of counsel’s alleged deficiencies. Id. In the context of a failure-to-consult claim such as that alleged here, the defendant must establish that his counsel’s failure to consult was prejudicial to his defense, i.e., ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [failure to consult], the result of [his trial] would have been different.’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To demonstrate such prejudice here, Hendrix would have to establish a reasonable probability that, had counsel consulted with him, counsel would have opted to pursue a self-defense strategy at trial and that such a strategy would in reasonable probability have resulted in a different outcome. In light of the unequivocal testimony of all four eyewitnesses describing Hendrix as the aggressor, there is no reasonable probability that, even if counsel had consulted with Hendrix and consequently decided to assert self-defense rather than misidentification, the jury’s verdict would have been different.” [FN3: As the Supreme Court made clear in [Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004)] , however, trial counsel is not obligated to obtain client consent as to decisions regarding trial strategy. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (noting that client consent is required only as to decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, whether to waive a jury trial, whether to waive the right to testify, and whether to pursue an appeal).”] Parrott v. State, 330 Ga.App. 801, 769 S.E.2d 549 (March 2, 2015). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to present evidence, in the guilt/innocence phase, of his troubled upbringing and education. “Though Parrott argues that his trial lawyer should have defended him based on that evidence of his family, education, and psychological background, ‘[s]uch after the fact disagreements about trial counsel's approach to the case ... do not amount to a showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.’ Reed v. State, 285 Ga. 64, 66(6), 673 S.E.2d 246 (2009).” Horne v. State, 333 Ga.App. 353, 773 S.E.2d 467 (June 23, 2015). Aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; choice of defenses wasn’t “patently unreasonable.” “Regardless of whether consent is a valid defense to aggravated assault, aggravated battery, or battery, Horne has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective. Horne was charged with rape, two counts of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated sodomy, false imprisonment, and battery. Trial counsel testified that the general defense strategy was that the victim consented to sex; many of the victim's injuries were the result of consensual rough sex; the injury to the victim's eye was self-inflicted during the August 11th argument; and the victim fabricated other allegations of abuse in order to retaliate against Horne. Horne concedes that the defense was reasonable as to some of his charged offenses, in particular the rape and aggravated sodomy counts that were nolle prossed after the jury could not reach a verdict. Given the favorable outcome as to nolle prossed offenses, we cannot say that trial counsel's decision to consistently employ the consent defense, whether ‘wise or unwise,’ was a patently unreasonable trial strategy.” State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876, 770 S.E.2d 1 (March 2, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred by granting motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance. Counsel wasn’t deficient by asking for jury charge on mutual combat, though it impaired his justification defense. Contrary to defendant’s argument, justification wasn’t his