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sole defense; rather, defendant also argued for voluntary manslaughter (thought the Supreme Court acknowledges this lesser offense isn’t strictly a defense. “Nevertheless, pursuing a finding of guilt of voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to murder may properly form a part of the defense theory of a case.”). The mutual combat charge impaired the justification defense because it required a finding “that the defendant withdrew from the encounter, effectively communicated to the deceased the intent to do so, and the deceased notwithstanding, continued or threatened to continue the use of unlawful force,” findings not otherwise required for a justification defense. But it also “presented the benefit of improving the chances that the jury might find Mobley guilty of only voluntary manslaughter, not murder. Whether the potential upside of a charge is worth its costs is a quintessential question of trial strategy. … Moreover, a strategy that presents alternative defense theories—all of which are better for the defendant than the prosecution theory of the case—generally falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. See Ramsey v. State, 272 Ga. 28, 30(3) (526 S.E.2d 842) (2000); Hodges v. State, 260 Ga.App. 483, 485(2) (580 S.E.2d 614) (2003), disapproved on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 812(II), n. 1 (642 S.E.2d 56) (2007). More specifically, it ordinarily is not unreasonable for a defense lawyer to seek a charge on voluntary manslaughter as an alternative defense theory in a murder case, in the event that the jury does not accept the primary defense theory. See Thornton v. State, 292 Ga. 87, 89(4) (734 S.E.2d 393) (2012). And it usually is not unreasonable in a murder case to request a charge on mutual combat in aid of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375(2)(c) (659 S.E.2d 376) (2008). In this case in which the lawyers pursued not only a justification defense, but also voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to murder, it cannot be said that no reasonable lawyer would have asked for the charge on mutual combat, even though it might have impaired to some extent the principal defense of justification.” Davis v. State, 329 Ga.App. 17, 763 S.E.2d 371 (September 5, 2014). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial counsel wasn’t “ineffective for presenting the legally invalid defense that Davis thought the victim was old enough to consent. See Schultz v. State, 267 Ga.App. 240, 241–242(1) (599 S.E.2d 247) (2004) (knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of the crime of child molestation). … In his statement, Davis admitted having sex with the victim, but claimed that she told him she was 18 or 19. At a motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained that although a defendant's knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of the crime, ‘it was our hopes that twelve Decatur County jurors would-would believe that he didn't know and despite the charges, the court would find him not guilty.’ He explained that although mistake of fact was not a valid defense, ‘it was all we had.’ Given that counsel had to combat Davis's statement admitting having sex with the victim, Davis has failed to show that this was an unreasonable strategy. See Lambert v. State, 287 Ga. 774, 776(2) (700 S.E.2d 354) (2010) (despite presenting legally invalid coercion defense to murder charge, trial counsel was not ineffective where she ‘was constrained by [the defendant's] admissions to police that he had committed the fatal beating’).” Washington v. State, 294 Ga. 560, 755 S.E.2d 160 (February 24, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel could find no evidence to support a theory that someone else might have committed the crime. Defendant contends that other men might have fathered victim’s unborn child and thus might have killed victim, but defendant’s “lawyer could locate no credible evidence that any person besides Washington had a belief that he was the father of the unborn child, much less that any such individual was actually a viable suspect in the murder. See Cook v. State, 274 Ga. 891, 897(7) (561 S.E.2d 407) (2002). ‘Despite counsel's efforts, he was unable to connect any additional suspect to the shooting.’ Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 124(6)(e) (702 S.E.2d 151) (2010). As a result of his investigation, the trial court found, the lawyer made a reasonable strategic decision to contend at trial only that the State had failed to prove that Washington was guilty, rather than to attempt to make an affirmative case that some specific other person might have committed the crime, whether by calling witnesses to identify other suspects or by calling the suspects themselves.” Allen v. State, 293 Ga. 626, 748 S.E.2d 881 (September 23, 2013). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel argued for justification defense in opening statement, but changed it to voluntary manslaughter based on provocation in closing argument. “Here, trial counsel assessed the evidence and made the tactical decision in light of the evidence presented at trial. The arguable merit of that decision is supported by the fact that the trial court charged the jury on both self-defense as justification to malice murder, and voluntary manslaughter.” Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 740 S.E.2d 158 (March 18, 2013). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s choice of defense strategies. “Smith maintains that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by refusing to assert a sleepwalking defense. At the new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he considered asserting the sleepwalking defense as had been done by prior counsel at Smith's first trial, but that during his investigation he became