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aware of reported defects in the model of gun used in the shooting and located experts who would testify about these defects and problems they found in their examination of the actual murder weapon. Based on his past experience as a criminal defense lawyer, counsel concluded that the jury was more likely to believe a defense based on the accidental discharge of a defective weapon than one based on sleepwalking. Though Smith himself favored the sleepwalking defense, it was trial counsel's prerogative to decide, after his many consultations with Smith on the issue, which defense theory to pursue.” Westbrook v. State, 291 Ga. 60, 727 S.E.2d 473 (May 7, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defense counsel was not “deficient in eliciting an arresting officer's testimony that he had heard over the police radio that Appellant ‘was armed Appellant next contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a jury charge on accident. See OCGA § 16–2–2 (“A person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence”). However, self-defense was Appellant's theory of the case, and the only possible evidentiary support for an accident charge was Appellant's own confused and contradictory testimony about the cause of his second shot to Jefferies's head. Appellant suggested at one point in his testimony that the second shot was accidental, saying the gun went off unexpectedly when Jefferies moved and Appellant fell backwards. However, Appellant also insisted at trial that he shot all the victims in self- defense, including both times he shot Jefferies, and at another point, he testified clearly that he fell backwards only after he shot Jefferies the second time . It would be reasonable for trial counsel to decide that, even if an accident instruction could be obtained from the trial court based on this very slender evidentiary basis, [fn] it could distract the jury from Appellant's main defense of justification and could even backfire by making it seem like he was willing to say and argue anything in order to avoid conviction.” Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (June 13, 2011). Malice murder, aggravated battery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel pursued self-defense theory, rather a theory of complete non-involvement, especially in light of eyewitness testimony identifying him as the shooter. “The trial court was entitled to credit trial counsel's testimony that he and Jimmerson had agreed upon a self-defense theory. See Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240(2)(a) (675 S.E.2d 28) (2009). In view of the strength of the evidence implicating Jimmerson in the shootings, we agree with the trial court that Jimmerson failed to show that his trial counsel's choice of strategies was unreasonable, and, thus, ineffective. See Fuller v. State, 278 Ga. 812(2)(c) (607 S.E.2d 581) (2005) (matters of reasonable trial strategy do not amount to ineffective assistance). The fact that Jimmerson, in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance. See Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235(2) (647 S.E.2d 48) (2007).” Accord, Faniel v. State , 291 Ga. 559, 731 S.E.2d 750 (September 10, 2012). Hickson v. State, 308 Ga.App. 50, 706 S.E.2d 670 (February 2, 2011). Convictions for voluntary manslaughter and related offenses affirmed. At first trial, defendant was acquitted of malice murder and lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, but jury hung on felony murder. At re-trial, counsel requested charge on voluntary manslaughter as lesser- included offense to felony murder. Held, no ineffective assistance based on strategic waiver of defendant’s double jeopardy rights: “Given that the record clearly shows that trial counsel made a strategic decision to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter, and because we cannot say that this decision was patently unreasonable, we affirm the trial court's finding that Hickson failed to prove deficient performance. See Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 487(3)(b) (690 S.E.2d 177) (2010) (decision over whether to request charge on voluntary manslaughter was strategic one that provided no basis for reversal).” Lambert v. State, 287 Ga. 774, 700 S.E.2d 354 (September 20, 2010). Defendant’s malice murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance despite counsel’s attempt to use an invalid defense – “coercion is not a legal defense to murder. OCGA § 16-3-26; Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424(2) (589 S.E.2d 108) (2003). But, whether trial counsel's actions are reasonable may be determined or substantially influenced by a defendant's own statements. Hall v. Lee, 286 Ga. 79, 86(3) (684 S.E.2d 868) (2009), citing Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 691. As the trial court noted in denying Lambert a new trial, defense counsel was constrained by Lambert's admissions to police that he had committed the fatal beating.” And defendant fails to suggest any other defense counsel should have pursued. Henderson v. State, 303 Ga.App. 898, 695 S.E.2d 334 (May 6, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, counsel’s failure to present defense of justification was presumed strategic since defendant wouldn’t waive attorney-client privilege at motion for new trial hearing, and allow counsel to testify about his strategy conversations with defendant. “By his own actions, he foreclosed the necessary inquiry into the reasons for trial counsel's decision.”