☢ test - Í

Arnold v. State, 303 Ga.App. 825, 695 S.E.2d 299 (April 23, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery affirmed; failure to request jury charge on accident was strategic, as counsel “concluded that such a charge was inappropriate where the acts of Arnold were arguably criminally negligent. Trial counsel, instead, opted to argue lack of criminal intent.” Accident wouldn’t apply if defendant was criminally negligent, as here, pointing a gun at two people after drinking, not knowing if the gun was loaded. Coats v. State, 303 Ga.App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (April 22, 2010). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elected not to pursue a medical defense and instead focus on defendant’s professed innocence. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Coats presented expert testimony of an emergency room physician who had examined Coats after sentencing and who had reviewed his medical records, including records from an emergency room visit on July 1, 2008. … The expert testified that … it was his medical opinion that Coats suffered from drug-induced hypoxia (or lack of oxygen) at the time of the crimes, resulting in delirium, confusion, and aggressive conduct. Coats maintained at the hearing that his trial counsel performed deficiently by not presenting such expert testimony at trial.” “[T]rial counsel testified that she was aware of the possibility of presenting a medical defense through expert testimony based upon her pre-trial discussions with Coats's wife and her review of the medical records, but chose not to present the defense for two reasons. First, trial counsel believed that the medical defense would have been an affirmative defense requiring Coats to admit to the underlying criminal conduct alleged in the indictment. … Despite the fact that she had explained to Coats how affirmative defenses worked, Coats gave conflicting stories about what had occurred and on several occasions told her ‘he didn't do it.’ Having concluded that Coats was not prepared to admit that he committed the acts alleged, trial counsel chose not to enter a special plea of insanity or involuntary intoxication. Second, trial counsel had reviewed the case file pertaining to the prior difficulty between Coats and his wife and knew that Coats's sentence had been reduced in mitigation in that case due to his misuse of a prescription medication. Given that there had been a prior altercation between Coats and his wife involving his misuse of a prescription medication, trial counsel believed that the jury likely would reject any medical defense she might present as nothing more than ‘a pattern of conduct’ by Coats. We conclude that trial counsel's decision not to pursue a medical defense through expert testimony was a reasonable strategic one, and, therefore, did not constitute deficient performance.” “Furthermore, the effectiveness of trial counsel's strategic decision to defend on the alternative ground that Coats did not commit the alleged criminal acts is demonstrated by the fact that the jury acquitted Coats of several of the charged offenses. See Young v. State, 213 Ga.App. 278, 280(3) (444 S.E.2d 598) (1994) (noting that the ‘strongest evidence of trial counsel's effectiveness’ was the defendant's acquittal on one of the charges). was a reasonable strategic one, and, therefore, did not constitute deficient performance.” Mantooth v. State, 303 Ga.App. 330, 693 S.E.2d 587 (April 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for family violence battery and related offenses affirmed; where defendant admitted some of the offenses charged, no ineffective assistance in counsel’s strategy to focus on “the more serious charges. This decision was obviously strategic in nature and, as such, it was within ‘the exclusive province of counsel after consultation with the client.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Abernathy v. State , 278 Ga.App. 574, 586(3)(b), 630 S.E.2d 421 (2006).” Accord, Norton v. State , 320 Ga.App. 327, 739 S.E.2d 782 (March 13, 2013) (overwhelming evidence of drug possession justified defense strategy to focus on defending against trafficking charge). Pyburn v. State, 301 Ga.App. 372, 687 S.E.2d 909 (December 1, 2009). No ineffective assistance at defendant’s trial for incest: “Pyburn … asserts that his counsel was deficient because he failed to pursue defenses, such as Pyburn's belief that the adoption was void and fraudulently induced, that would have increased the likelihood of a verdict based on jury nullification. However, ‘[a]n assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker....’ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695(III)(B) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984).” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (March 24, 2009). Reversing Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. Supreme Court holds that defendant’s habeas petition should have been denied. Circuit Court found that trial counsel was deficient for convincing defendant to withdraw his insanity defense at trial although the same jury had already rejected the same evidence regarding defendant’s mental state by finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Counsel had also intended to present at the not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) phase the testimony of defendant’s parents, but on the morning of trial they refused to testify. Defense counsel therefore recommended that defendant withdraw his NGI plea, and defendant agreed. Ninth Circuit finds this recommendation to be ineffective on the theory that