☢ test - Í

defendant had “nothing to lose” in pursuing his NGI plea. Supreme Court reverses: “This Court has never established anything akin to the Court of Appeals' ‘nothing to lose’ standard for evaluating Strickland claims.” “[T]his Court has never required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for success.” Nor did counsel’s failure to persuade the parents to testify amount to deficient performance: “Competence does not require an attorney to browbeat a reluctant witness into testifying, especially when the facts suggest that no amount of persuasion would have succeeded. Counsel's acceptance of the parents' ‘convey[ance] [of] ... a refusal,’ [cit.], does not rise to the high bar for deficient performance set by Strickland .” “The Court of Appeals insisted, however, that ‘“[r]easonably effective assistance” required here that counsel assert the only defense available....’ [Cit.]; see also [ Mirzayance v. Knowles, 175 Fed.Appx. 142, 145 (9 th Cir., 2006)]. But we are aware of no ‘prevailing professional norms’ that prevent counsel from recommending that a plea be withdrawn when it is almost certain to lose. See Strickland, supra, at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. And in this case, counsel did not give up ‘the only defense available.’ Counsel put on a defense to first-degree murder during the guilt phase. Counsel also defended his client at the sentencing phase. [Fn] The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining, in case involving similar issue of counsel's responsibility to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, that ‘ Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant ... [or even to] present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case’). Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason – above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success – for recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether. Mirzayance has thus failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient.” Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (March 9, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel strategically chose to portray defendant as a drug dealer, to help explain his presence at murder scene. “Given that [co- conspirator] Ross and all four surviving victims placed Henderson at the scene, it was reasonable for counsel to elicit this information in an attempt to undermine the State's position that the incident at the duplex was a pre-planned armed robbery.” Accord, State v. Reynolds , 332 Ga.App. 818, 775 S.E.2d 187 (July 8, 2015) (counsel not ineffective in strategic decision to present defendant’s history as a drug dealer to explain presence of his fingerprint on robbery victim’s car). Martinez v. State, 284 Ga. 138, 663 S.E.2d 675 (July 7, 2008). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where defense counsel failed to present an insanity defense at trial, despite prior counsel’s filing notice thereof. New counsel “were not bound by the strategy employed by prior counsel, and the fact that they did not take the same defense path does not, in and of itself, demonstrate ineffectiveness. See Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 565(5)(c) (651 S.E.2d 674) (2007). Furthermore, trial counsel provided ample justification for not pursuing a defense involving Martinez's mental health,” including that defendant was not willing to admit beating and killing the victim. Accord, Lopez v. State , 332 Ga.App. 763, 774 S.E.2d 802 (July 6, 2015) (failure to pursue coercion defense wasn’t ineffective when defendant was willing to admit participating in the robbery). Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 663 S.E.2d 206 (June 30, 2008). At defendant’s murder trial, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel opted for defense based on lack of intent rather than self-defense. “Self-defense was supported by only slight evidence at best, and reliance on that defense would have required Muller’s attorneys to argue that the victim was the initial aggressor and to risk alienating the jury if it had become sympathetic towards the victim. Given all the evidence in this case, presenting both justification and the lack of intent defense simultaneously could certainly backfire. Moreover, defense counsel reasonably concluded that, if Muller sought a charge on self-defense, the State would respond by requesting a charge on voluntary manslaughter, which Muller did not want, but which the trial court would probably have given.” Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga.App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (January 23, 2008). No ineffective assistance where counsel, in consultation with defendant, elected to pursue a defense of accident rather than self-defense. “Counsel explained that based on the facts, a self-defense theory ‘would have put [Breazeale] with an offensive move ... in the presence of the two children, ’ and counsel advised against it. ‘Counsel’s decisions as to which theory of defense to pursue and which charges to request in light of the defense theory are strategic ones and therefore are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. As a general rule, matters of strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. ’ (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Mosely v. State, 267 Ga.App. 275, 278(2) (599 S.E.2d 252) (2004).” King v State, 282 Ga. 505, 651 S.E.2d 711 (October 9, 2007). Trial counsel not ineffective for failing to request a charge