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on involuntary manslaughter where defendant told counsel he “didn’t do it.” “Based upon her interviews with King, it was entirely reasonable for the trial attorney to base the defense and, consequently, the requested jury instructions on his assertion of innocence, rather than on the inculpatory statements which he had expressly recanted.” Accord, McNear v. State , 326 Ga.App. 32, 755 S.E.2d 844 (March 6, 2014) (counsel reasonably based defense on defendant’s claims of innocence, despite possible claim of self-defense). Daly v. State, 285 Ga.App. 808, 648 S.E.2d 90 (May 30, 2007). “‘Counsel’s decision as to which theory of defense to pursue is a matter of strategy and tactics,’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted) Kemp v. State, 257 Ga.App. 340, 341(2) (571 S.E.2d 412) (2002), and such strategic decisions do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Accord, Warren v. State , 289 Ga.App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (January 8, 2008). Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). “Feaster argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not following his suggestions regarding lines of defense to pursue. The fact that [a defendant] and his trial counsel later disagree about the difficult decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy made by trial counsel does not require a finding that the [defendant] received representation amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel. Vaughn v. State, 226 Ga.App. 318, 321(6) (486 S.E.2d 607) (1997). Furthermore, the [defendant] must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. Id. at 322.” Here, defendant fails to establish any lines of defense counsel failed to pursue. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (December 1, 2006). No ineffective assistance for failing to pursue a defense which defendant never raised. “Johnson cites, and we find, no authority for the proposition that an attorney can be faulted for failing to mount a defense not brought to her attention.” Hutchens v. State, 281 Ga.App. 610, 636 S.E.2d 773 (September 20, 2006). No ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel and defendant agreed to trial strategy conceding the commission of certain offenses, which were supported by compelling evidence including defendant’s confession, to focus defense on offense where evidence was more equivocal. “‘Counsel’s decision as to which theory of defense to pursue is a matter of strategy and tactics[.]’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Kemp v. State, 257 Ga.App. 340, 341(2) (571 S.E.2d 412) (2002). ‘As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with the trial court’s implicit determination that trial counsel’s choice of trial strategy was not unreasonable.’ (Citations omitted.) Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397, 400-401(2)(c) (603 S.E.2d 228) (2004). See Kendrick v. State, 279 Ga.App. 263, 266-267(2)(a) (630 S.E.2d 863) (2006); Lawson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 334, 339-340(4)(a) (620 S.E.2d 600) (2005).” Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 633 S.E.2d 537 (July 14, 2006). Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present a justification defense. This entitled defendant to a new trial on his charges of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony – all of the charges to which the justification defense related. “However, counsel’s ineffective assistance with regard to the justification defense did not warrant a new trial on the other firearm charge, i.e., possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The facts demonstrated that defendant, a convicted felon, was in possession of a firearm before he exchanged words and fought with the victim. Thus, the justification defense was not applicable to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under the circumstances of this case. See Heard v. State, 261 Ga. 262, 263, n. 2, 403 S.E.2d 438 (1991). It follows that counsel’s ineffective assistance played no role in defendant’s conviction for that offense.” Patel v. State, 279 Ga. 750, 620 S.E.2d 343 (September 19, 2005). Distinguishes Benham v. State , 277 Ga. 516, 591 S.E.2d 824 (January 12, 2004) (see below): counsel made reasoned strategic decision to forego “defense of habitation” defense, and instead present theory of defense of property other than habitation. This allowed theory that victim, who was breaking into defendant/store owner’s storage shed, was in process of “commission of a forcible felony,” and that defendant was acting to prevent that felony – entering defendant’s property, as opposed to theory that defendant is entering the property “for the purpose of committing a felony therein” – or, as stated by trial counsel, “that ‘this man is shooting a kid because he is stealing some beer.’” Hall v. State, 272 Ga.App. 204, 612 S.E.2d 44 (March 15, 2005). “‘The battered woman syndrome describes a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives. The syndrome does not stand as a separate defense but rather is evidentiary support for a claim of justification under OCGA § 16-3-21(d).’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adame v. State, 244 Ga.App. 257, 258(1) (534 S.E.2d 817) (2000).” Here, counsel was not ineffective for failing to present such a