☢ test - Í

defense; although defendant and her now-deceased husband had a violent history, counsel could establish no pattern of abuse. Lewis v. State, 270 Ga.App. 48, 606 S.E.2d 77 (October 12, 2004). Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel pursued a different defense than the one defendant wanted. “As outlined in Prince v. State, 277 Ga. 230, 234(3) (587 S.E.2d 637) (2003), ‘decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to testify. What trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, ‘[a]n attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of trial strategy’ that is within his province to make,” quoting Washington v. State , 276 Ga. 655, 658(3) (581 S.E.2d 518) (2003). Defense pursued by attorney was reasonable, based on the evidence. Seems to conflict with Wright v. State, below (March 10, 2003) and cases cited therein (defendant makes ultimate decisions about what defense to pursue). Washington doesn’t expressly say a lawyer can overrule his client’s choice of defense. Accord, with Washington, Giddens v. State , 276 Ga.App. 353, 623 S.E.2d 204 (November 14, 2005). Bates v. State, 277 Ga. 771, 596 S.E.2d 145 (April 27, 2004). “Bates’s contentions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel stem from counsel’s pursuit of a defense based on involuntary manslaughter with the underlying offense being either reckless conduct or pointing a gun at another. Bates contends that trial counsel was deficient in pursuing this defense. Bates, however, has not pointed to any other defense that should have been pursued. Therefore, he has failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice.” Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 591 S.E.2d 824 (January 12, 2004). In her trial for aggravated assault, defendant “was denied constitutionally effective assistance of trial counsel by counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of habitation as provided in OCGA § 16-3-23,” instead of just self-defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 . Defendant got in a fight with another woman while defendant was seated in her car; the other woman reached in the car window and threw the first punch. Defendant responded by repeatedly slashing the other woman with a box cutter. This use of deadly force would be justified as self-defense only if the jury “found that Benham reasonably believed her use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to herself or others, or to prevent a forcible felony,” and must be rejected if defendant provoked the attack “as an excuse to inflict bodily harm on her assailant.” Defense of habitation, however, “may have justified the use of deadly force in this case even if that amount of force was not necessarily required to repel [the] attack.” “Even assuming that trial counsel in this case knowingly made the tactical decision to forego requesting a charge on defense of habitation, it is not a reasonable decision a competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances.” Carley, J., dissents, arguing that deadly force in defense of habitation, like self-defense, must be shown to be necessary. Distinguished in Patel (September 19, 2005); Bly v. State , 286 Ga.App. 43, 648 S.E.2d 446 (June 20, 2007), reversed on other grounds, 283 Ga. 453, 660 S.E.2d 713 (April 21, 2008) (not ineffective assistance to forego charge on defense of habitation where defendant charged with aggravated assault for stabbing a police officer who was trying to get defendant out of his vehicle); Smith v. State , 309 Ga.App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (March 17, 2011) (no showing that counsel misunderstood the law, as in Benham ; choice of defenses was presumptively tactical); Sorrells v. State , 326 Ga.App. 888, 755 S.E.2d 586 (March 28, 2014) (physical precedent only) (no reasonable attorney would have tendered defendant’s 20 prior booking records, to show that he didn’t use the nickname claimed by officers when previously arrested for the same type of drug charges, plus numerous others). Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 419, 577 S.E.2d 782 (March 10, 2003). “‘[A]fter having been informed, the defendant, and not his attorney, makes the ultimate decision about ... what line of defense to pursue, [cit.]....’ Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686(3), 373 S.E.2d 506 (1988). Thus, trial counsel is not ineffective when, contrary to his recommendation, the client elects to abandon one defense and to assert another.” But see Lewis (October 12, 2004), above. Bryant v. State, 274 Ga. 798, 560 S.E.2d 23 (February 25, 2002). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant’s counsel not ineffective for failing to seek independent DNA testing and blood evidence or for allegedly failing to diligently pursue defendant’s alibi because defense counsel determined that DNA results were valid. Accord, Wheeler v. State , 290 Ga. 817, 725 S.E.2d 580 (March 23, 2012) (decision to explain presence of defendant’s DNA at victim’s home rather than seeking an independent expert analysis was reasonable trial strategy). Brown v. State, 237 Ga.App. 231, 517 S.E.2d 529 (February 10, 1999). “An attorney’s decision to pursue one defense over another is a question of trial strategy with which this Court generally will not interfere. Phillips v. State, 233