☢ test - Í

professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’ Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-522(II)(A), 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Martin v. Barrett, 279 Ga. 593, 619 S.E.2d 656 (2005). Counsel’s failure to investigate is unreasonable where, as the habeas court found in this case, it resulted from inattention and not from reasoned strategic judgment. Wiggins, supra at 526(II)(B)(1), 534(II)(B)(3). ... As determined by the habeas court, ‘this is not a case where, after investigation, counsel for the defendant decided to pursue one strategy rather than another’ but a case where counsel’s ‘investigation into their own theory of the case was entirely inadequate.’” Johnson v. State, 274 Ga.App. 641, 618 S.E.2d 716 (July 27, 2005). “‘The decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, which jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client. Trial counsel’s strategic decisions made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable. (Citation omitted.) Teat v. State, 237 Ga.App. 867, 869(2) (516 S.E.2d 794) (1999). A review of the transcript of the motion for new trial reveals that Johnson’s trial attorney spoke with Johnson’s potential alibi witness, and this witness stated that he would not testify on Johnson’s behalf. In addition, after speaking with this alibi witness, trial counsel determined that the alibi, itself, strained credulity and, as a matter of strategy, might harm Johnson’s case if presented to the jury. As Johnson has provided no evidence which unequivocally shows that he was harmed by his counsel’s trial strategy, we must reject his argument that he received ineffective assistance.” Accord, Moss v. State , 278 Ga.App. 362, 629 S.E.2d 5 (January 19, 2006); Frazier v. State , 278 Ga.App. 685, 629 S.E.2d 568 (April 7, 2006); Fortson v. State , 280 Ga. 435, 629 S.E.2d 798 (April 25, 2006); Walker v. State , 280 Ga.App. 457, 634 S.E.2d 93 (June 20, 2006); Phillips v. State , 280 Ga. 728, 632 S.E.2d 131 (July 6, 2006); Thompson v. State , 281 Ga.App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (September 20, 2006); Palmer v. State , 286 Ga.App. 751, 650 S.E.2d 255 (June 4, 2007); Stanford v. State , 288 Ga.App. 463, 654 S.E.2d 173 (October 29, 2007); Smith v. State , 283 Ga. 237, 657 S.E.2d 523 (January 28, 2008); Navarrete v. State , 283 Ga. 156, 656 S.E.2d 814 (January 28, 2008); Gibson v. State , 291 Ga.App. 183, 661 S.E.2d 850 (April 16, 2008); Holsey v. State , 291 Ga.App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (April 17, 2008); Ventura v. State , 284 Ga. 215, 663 S.E.2d 149 (June 30, 2008) (no ineffective assistance for failing to call police officer witness who was “wishy washy” or expert witness who admitted at pre-trial hearing that his theory of case was incorrect); Davis v. State , 293 Ga.App. 799, 668 S.E.2d 290 (October 2, 2008) (attorney determined that witness couldn’t establish basis for knowing facts in question – who was driving car at time of accident); McDougal v. State , 284 Ga. 427, 667 S.E.2d 592 (October 6, 2008); Christian v. State , 297 Ga.App. 596, 677 S.E.2d 767 (April 22, 2009); Wallace v. State , 306 Ga.App. 118, 701 S.E.2d 554 (September 16, 2010) (“Trial counsel testified that he did not pursue an alibi defense through these witnesses because he did not believe their testimony was credible based on the evidence in the case.”); Kay v. State , 306 Ga.App. 666, 703 S.E.2d 108 (October 29, 2010) (counsel feared he couldn’t control witness, didn’t want to open the door to bad character evidence); Battise v. State , 309 Ga.App. 835, 711 S.E.2d 390 (June 8, 2011) (no ineffective assistance where counsel declined to call defendant’s mother, who saw defendant in bed earlier but “could not provide an alibi for Battise at the time of the robbery.”); Benjamin v. State , 322 Ga.App. 8, 743 S.E.2d 566 (May 23, 2013) (counsel’s decision not to call defendant’s mother as an alibi witness was presumed strategic; at hearing on motion for new trial, counsel testified that she had a reason for not calling the witness, but couldn’t remember what it was); Davis v. State , 326 Ga.App. 778, 757 S.E.2d 443 (April 2, 2014) (not ineffective in choosing not to present witness who “said that he wanted to have nothing to do with Davis's trial”); Goggins v. State , 330 Ga.App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (October 8, 2014) (in child molestation prosecution, “Goggins and his trial counsel discussed the issue of whether to hire a psychologist, and they decided that there were other matters that were more critical to the defense.”); Shockley v. State , 297 Ga. 661, 777 S.E.2d 245 (September 14, 2015) (Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to call defendant’s mother as alibi witness, as “her testimony did not conclusively establish that appellant was at his home during that period of time. Further, trial counsel testified he was concerned that jurors would not give much credit to the mother’s testimony given her familial ties to appellant.”); Hall v. State , 335 Ga.App. 895, 783 S.E.2d 400 (March 2, 2016) (witness couldn’t remember the date defendant came to her office, or even if it was the same month as the offenses). Brown v. State, 273 Ga.App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (June 8, 2005). “[I]t was not unreasonable for trial counsel to defer to Brown’s strategy about contacting … witnesses. ‘The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.’”