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been something that they did some tests on to see whether or not there were any fingerprints on it?” Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (January 26, 2009). No ineffective assistance from failure to object to prosecutor’s opening statement discussing anticipated defense witnesses. Defendants had given notice of alibi defenses; prosecutor told the jury “that the State was ‘prepared to expose and refute the alibi defense we anticipate from’ [defendants] and was ‘confident that we have the evidence to prove our case and to disprove the proffered defense.’” In fact, all defendants did present alibi defenses. “Accordingly, while it is inappropriate for a prosecutor in a criminal case to discuss in opening statement the evidence the State anticipates the defense will present at trial, Parker v. State, [277 Ga. 439, 441(2) (588 S.E.2d 683) (2003)], [defendants] cannot carry their burden of showing that, had trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's improper comments, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494(3) (651 S.E.2d 702) (2007). See also Parker, supra at 442(2) (even where counsel objects, uncorrected argument of prosecutor does not require reversal where it is highly probable the improper argument did not contribute to judgment).” O’Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (November 3, 2008). Announces new rule: “the sentencing phase of a trial in which the State is seeking the death penalty is a ‘criminal matter[ ]’ within the scope of USCR 10.2 and, therefore, that a death penalty defendant is entitled to make an opening statement in the sentencing phase.” Trial court committed error, but harmless, in denying defense counsel the opportunity to make opening statement in sentencing phase of defendant’s death penalty trial. Overrules contrary authority: Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240 (510 S.E.2d 1) (1998); Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 818(8) (525 S.E.2d 339) (1999); Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549, 550(3) (221 S.E.2d 185) (1975); McKenzie v. State, 248 Ga. 294, 297(11) (282 S.E.2d 95) (1981); McArthur v. State, 169 Ga.App. 263, 264(2)(d) (312 S.E.2d 358) (1983); Mims v. State, 159 Ga.App. 712, 712(1) (285 S.E.2d 67) (1981). Error harmless because “despite the number of witnesses O'Kelley called, the volume of exhibits he tendered, and the duration of his presentation at the sentencing phase, O'Kelley's defense was a straightforward mitigation theory focusing on issues of mental illness and childhood abuse and neglect. As such, it was neither unusual nor complex,” and “was presented in an orderly, easy-to- follow format. In addition, the trial court informed the jury at the beginning of the sentencing phase of its purpose and charged the jury on the consideration of mitigating evidence, and, in an extensive closing argument, defense counsel thoroughly summarized the mitigating evidence and integrated it into O'Kelley's mitigation theory. Therefore, we conclude that it is highly improbable that the trial court's error contributed to the jury's verdict as to penalty and, thus, we find that the error was harmless. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 S.E.2d 869) (1976).” Accord, Brockman v. State , 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013) (denial of opening statement in sentencing phase was error, but harmless). Crane v. State, 294 Ga.App. 321, 671 S.E.2d 123 (October 31, 2008). No abuse of court’s discretion where court admonished defense counsel about opening statement: “One admonition occurred after counsel stated that evidence she intended to present would be ‘worth staying awake for.’ The court stopped counsel, held a discussion at the bench, and then stated to the jury, ‘I am admonishing defense counsel. I ask that you disregard the last statements as inappropriate opening statements. This is not evidence of anything. Ma‘am, please conclude properly.’ Shortly afterward, defense counsel commented that ‘there are lots of robberies that have gone on in [the neighborhood] before this period, since this period.’” “‘The trial court has the right and duty to govern the scope of argument by counsel both prior to and after the presentation of evidence. The proper range of comment by counsel is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.’ Williams v. State, 218 Ga.App. 571, 573(2) (462 S.E.2d 457) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Jackson v. State, 288 Ga.App. 339, 654 S.E.2d 137 (October 3, 2007). No reversal where trial court erroneously “restricted [defense] counsel’s opening argument by limiting his comments related to [co-defendant] Bridge’s plea bargain,” but reversed itself and allowed counsel to thoroughly cross-examine co-defendant on the terms of the plea deal. “Cf. Lewyn v. Morris, 135 Ga.App. 289, 290(1) (217 S.E.2d 642) (1975) (plaintiff was not harmed when the trial court erroneously restricted the use of a blackboard during his opening statement but later allowed its use).” Austin v. State, 286 Ga.App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414 (June 6, 2007). Prosecutor’s comment in opening statement that defendant viewed kidnapping/battery victim as his “meal ticket and a slave” was not improper where supported by expected testimony of a witness. Witness’s testimony here supported the statement. Brooks v. State, 284 Ga.App. 762, 644 S.E.2d 891 (April 3, 2007). “‘[I]t is plain that a defendant must timely object to the alleged impropriety in [opening] argument so that the trial court can take remedial action, if any is warranted.’ (Citations omitted.) Butler v. State, 273 Ga. 380, 384(8) (541 S.E.2d 653) (2001) (waiver of objection to closing argument). Accord Felts v. State, 256 Ga.App. 733, 734(1) (569 S.E.2d 633) (2002) (applying Butler to opening