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statement). Having failed to assert a contemporaneous objection, Brooks has waived his right to complain about the remarks on appeal. Compare Cook v. State, 276 Ga.App. 803, 807(4) (625 S.E.2d 83) (2005) (objection preserved for appeal where counsel immediately moved for a mistrial following prosecutor's allegedly improper comment during opening statements).” Accord, Gomez v. State , 315 Ga.App. 898, 728 S.E.2d 691 (May 17, 2012) (objection at end of opening statement was untimely); Johnson v. State , 293 Ga. 641, 748 S.E.2d 896 (September 23, 2013) (trial court has no duty to intervene pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-75 absent objection); Reinhard v. State , 331 Ga.App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (March 18, 2015) (objection at end of opening statement was untimely). Holton v. State, 280 Ga. 843, 632 S.E.2d 90 (June 26, 2006). “‘In Alexander v. State, 270 Ga. 346(2) (509 S.E.2d 56) (1998), we held that opening statements by the State should be confined to an outline of what the State expects admissible evidence will prove at trial, and that even if the opening statement departs from [that outline], a conviction will not be reversed if the State acted in good faith and if the trial court instructed the jury that the State’s opening statement is not evidence and has no probative value. We need not consider the good faith of the prosecutor in this case, or the effect of the trial court’s instruction that opening statements are not evidence, because the prosecution’s opening statement was not subject to the argument raised on appeal. Our review of the transcript reveals that the prosecution presented evidence intended to establish every one of the matters which [defendant] enumerates as improper. Thus, the present case is unlike Alexander , where the prosecution’s opening statement described in detail alleged connections between the crime and gang activities, but there was no attempt to prove the gang-related assertions. By contrast, the prosecuting attorney in the present case set forth in the opening statement what the State intended to prove, and then adduced evidence aimed at proving the specifics of the opening statement’s outline. No error appears in regard to the prosecution’s opening statement.’ Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 160 (527 S.E.2d 867) (2000). Hooker v. State, 278 Ga.App. 382, 629 S.E.2d 74 (March 23, 2006). Prosecutor’s opening statement was improper argument, but did not unfairly implicate defendant’s character. Trial court this properly sustained objection to it, but denied mistrial. “While, the inference that Hooker was a ‘dangerous man,’ was a conclusion that should have been reserved for closing once the evidence was presented, we find that the State's use of the term ‘dangerous man’ was not an improper comment on Hooker’s character and drew no unreasonable or improper inferences. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to grant Hooker’s motion for mistrial.” Hollis v. State, 269 Ga.App. 159, 603 S.E.2d 516 (August 16, 2004). Defendant could show no harm where court prevented him from mentioning certain evidence in opening (due to pending motion in limine), but then admitted the evidence. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (July 9, 2004). Trial court could, in its discretion, allow the prosecutor to tell the jury that the DUI trial would not, “for various legal reasons,” include any evidence of field sobriety evaluations. “There was nothing facially prejudicial in his remark: the prosecutor did not refer to Johnson’s refusal to take the tests, nor did he suggest that incriminating evidence related to the tests existed. Because DUI cases will generally include evidence of field sobriety tests, Johnson has failed to demonstrate why it would be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to permit the prosecutor to apprise the jury of the absence of this expected element.” Davis v. State, 264 Ga.App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192 (November 18, 2003). Defense counsel reserved opening statement until after presentation of state’s case, then elected to present no evidence. Held, trial court did not err in denying counsel the right to make opening statement. “Because the purpose of opening statement is to give the jury and the court an outline of the evidence that the party anticipates presenting, we find no harm. Contrary to argument advanced by Davis, the trial court was under no obligation to warn defense counsel at the outset of the trial that opening statement at the close of the state’s evidence would be inappropriate if no additional evidence were to be introduced.” Parker v. State, 277 Ga. 439, 588 S.E.2d 683 (October 20, 2003). “[I]t is inappropriate for a prosecutor in a criminal case to discuss in opening statement the evidence she anticipates the defense will present at trial. A criminal defendant is under no obligation to prove or disprove anything: ‘the law is absolutely clear that a criminal defendant carries no burden of proof or persuasion whatsoever.’ (Footnote omitted). Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 863(1), 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997). Notwithstanding pre-trial motions and discovery, a defendant may choose at the close of the State’s case to present no evidence whatsoever. Comments by a prosecutor in opening statement regarding the defendant’s anticipated evidence may constitute grounds for reversal should the defense rest without presenting such evidence.’” No reversal required here, however, because defense did present an alibi defense as anticipated by prosecutor’s opening statement (though not with the witnesses referenced in the statement). Three justices dissent, suggesting that this rule may prevent