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defendants who intend to present no evidence from making any opening statement at all. “A party may introduce its proof during direct or cross- examination, a distinction that should be irrelevant for purposes of the opening statement.” Accord, Cook v. State , 276 Ga.App. 803, 625 S.E.2d 83 (December 12, 2005); Hargett v. State , 285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (January 26, 2009). Gordillo v. State, 255 Ga.App. 73, 564 S.E.2d 486 (April 15, 2002). It was not error for the trial court to prohibit defense counsel from arguing to the jury in opening statement that defendant was, at most, guilty of a lesser offense than the one charged, where the court had neither instructed the jury on the lesser offense nor decided that the evidence would warrant such instruction. Billings v. State, 251 Ga.App. 432, 558 S.E.2d 10 (August 22, 2001). Prosecutor began his opening statement by telling the jury, “Welcome to your part in the war on drugs.” Court should have sustained defendant’s objection to this inflammatory statement; its failure to do so, however, was harmless, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. McGee v. State , 272 Ga. 363, 529 S.E.2d 366 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to use a drawing of the floor plan of the scene of the crime in opening statement. “The use of such a visual aid is a permissible part of the opening statement, as its purpose is to assist the jury to understand and to remember the evidence. Highfield v. State, 246 Ga. 478, 482(3), 272 S.E.2d 62 (1980). See also Teems v. State, 256 Ga. 675, 676(3), 352 S.E.2d 779 (1987). The trial court properly instructed the jurors that what the attorneys said to them was not to be considered as evidence. See Highfield v. State, supra at 482(3), 272 S.E.2d 62.” Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 515 S.E.2d 155 (April 12, 1999). “It is improper for a prosecutor to refer in the opening statement to a defendant’s incriminating statement prior to a Jackson-Denno hearing on the admissibility of the defendant’s statement. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862(2), 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983).” Hartry v. State, 270 Ga. 596, 512 S.E.2d 251 (February 8, 1999). “[T]he prosecution’s failure to offer evidence of gang- related activity, as detailed in its opening statement, warranted the granting of Hartry’s subsequent motion for mistrial, and … the trial court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise.” “ When the prosecution fails to offer evidence at trial in support of what was stated during opening statements, it is a prosecutor’s burden to show that the opening statement was made in good faith. In this matter, when Hartry moved for a mistrial due to the prosecution’s failure to offer evidence of gang activity, the State made no explanation for its failure to make such a proffer. Accordingly, as we found in Alexander [ v. State, 270 Ga. 346, 509 S.E.2d 56 (1998)] , we cannot conclude that the prosecution’s opening statement was made in good faith. ” Curative instruction was not sufficient: “because the prejudicial impact of the prosecution’s opening statement was great, the trial court’s general charge that opening statements are not evidence, without specific mention of the State’s improper references to gang activity, was not sufficient.” Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Three justices would find no abuse of discretion. Accord, Bellamy v. State , 272 Ga. 157, 527 S.E.2d 867 (March 6, 2000) (opening statement supported by evidence); Jennings (November 1, 2010), above. L. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT/DISQUALIFICATION See also subheading CLOSING ARGUMENT, above Samuels v. State, 335 Ga.App. 819, 783 S.E.2d 344 (February 25, 2016). DUI and related convictions affirmed; no mistrial required despite prosecutor’s reference to matter not in evidence (defendant’s history of alcohol abuse) in closing argument. “‘[I]f the trial judge acts immediately, and in the exercise of his discretion takes such action as in his judgment prevents harm to the accused as a result of such improper statements, a new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that such action failed to eliminate from consideration of the jury such improper statements.’ Campbell [ v. State, 329 Ga.App. 317, 318(1), 764 S.E.2d 895 (2014)].” “[W]hile Samuels claims that the court nevertheless erred by not also rebuking the prosecutor in addition to providing a curative instruction, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that when ‘the instruction by the court to the jury to disregard the remarks was full, it in effect amounted to a rebuke of counsel.’ Ward v. State, 252 Ga. 85, 89(2), 311 S.E.2d 449 (1984); see also Counts v. Moorehead, 232 Ga. 220, 221(1), 206 S.E.2d 40 (1974).” Lewis v. State, 317 Ga.App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (June 18, 2012). Convictions for family violence aggravated assault and battery affirmed; prosecutor’s single inadvertent reference to prior “revocation hearing” didn’t require mistrial nor, in these circumstances, curative instruction. “OCGA § 17–8–75 [requiring curative instruction when prosecutor injects