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prejudicial facts into trial] does not apply in this situation … because the State did not state prejudicial facts which were not in evidence and did not inject into the case illegal elements ‘calculated to place before the jury, indirectly and inferentially, a fact which under the rules of evidence the assistant solicitor would not be permitted to demonstrate directly.’ Brown v. State, 118 Ga.App. 617, 619 (165 S.E.2d 185) (1968). The State simply made an inadvertent reference to the nature of a hearing at which the victim's statement differed from her testimony at trial.” Trial court had just given curative instruction following “the victim’s unsolicited improper reference to a probation violation.” Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (June 18, 2012). Habeas court erred in granting relief as to defendant’s malice murder conviction; no prosecutorial misconduct in presenting evidence that incidentally touched on victim impact during guilt/innocence phase. “[N]ot all testimony that describes how the crime has affected the victim is impermissible in the guilt/innocence phase. ‘“[D]etails of context that allow [jurors] to understand what is being described” ... are not improper in the guilt/innocence phase when they are necessary to show something sufficiently relevant.’ (Citations omitted.) Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 643(2)(b) (555 S.E.2d 440) (2001).” Here, victim’s daughter was cross-examined on whether she had discussed the murder with her brother. On re-direct, prosecutor properly placed that testimony into context by having her testify that her contact with her brother and other family members had been limited because she was in a foster home. She also testified that it upset her to talk about her mother’s killing; that she felt bad about no longer having a mother; and that these things “affected her ability to talk with other people about that night.” Duvall v. State, 290 Ga. 475, 722 S.E.2d 62 (February 6, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no prosecutorial misconduct in prosecutor’s question to defendant’s mother as to whether all her children had Muslim names. State here contended that defendant murdered victim who had argued with defendant’s brother, Ali; mother took the stand and denied that defendant had a brother named Ali. “It is clear from the record that, in posing the questions at issue, the prosecutor was not attempting to inflame religious or other prejudice. Instead, the prosecutor was pursuing, perhaps inartfully at first, the highly relevant issue of whether Appellant's mother had lied on the witness stand about a material issue in the case, namely, whether Appellant had a brother named Ali. … The prosecution did not use religion or Appellant's family names as a significant theme of its case, and after the issue emerged, the court focused the jury on the relevant issue and instructed that, ‘otherwise, religion would not be a factor.’ The prosecutor and the court handled a relevant line of inquiry in a succinct manner and with appropriate sensitivity. There was no prosecutorial misconduct or judicial abuse of discretion.” Sanders v. State, 289 Ga. 655, 715 S.E.2d 124 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder convictions affirmed for parents who “were vegans who fed their baby only soy milk and apple juice.” Child died of “extreme malnourishment or starvation.” Defendants waived objection to alleged improper evidence elicited by State, by failing to raise contemporaneous objection, and cannot revive the issue post-conviction by calling it “prosecutorial misconduct.” “‘[T]he “contemporaneous objection rule cannot be avoided by characterizing trial occurrences as examples of prosecutorial misconduct.” [Cit.]’ Ledford v. State, 264 Ga. 60, 67(18)(a), 439 S.E.2d 917 (1994).” Accord, Ford v. State , 298 Ga. 560, 783 S.E.2d 906 (March 7, 2016). Kitchens v. State, 289 Ga. 242, 710 S.E.2d 551 (May 31, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutorial misconduct did not entitle defendant to new trial. “While the trial court determined there was prosecutorial misconduct because the county DA's office had access to the jail's telephone monitoring system without ensuring the blockage of inmate communications with their attorneys, it also determined that the ‘extent of misconduct was not sufficient to warrant’ granting a new trial to appellant specifically,” inasmuch as evidence showed that “no one working on appellant's case had listened to any of appellant's telephone calls.” Willis v. State, 309 Ga.App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (April 26, 2011). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; a single instance of prosecutor injecting her own knowledge of businesses in the area of the crime scene was not sufficient “prosecutorial misconduct” to warrant a mistrial. Prosecutor did this at least three times, but the other examples were either withdrawn on defendant’s objection or “spontaneously disallowed” by the court. “Certainly, the prosecutor should not have been injecting facts that were not in evidence, [cit.] but ‘prosecutorial misconduct is a serious charge, and [,] once appellant raises a charge of prosecutorial misconduct, he has the duty to prove it by the record and by legal authority.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Colley v. State, 225 Ga.App. 198, 201(3) (483 S.E.2d 355) (1997). … [W]e will not reverse a conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct where the defendant did not take proper exception or where the defendant received a favorable ruling on any objection or requested corrective action.” Arnold v. State, 301 Ga.App. 714, 688 S.E.2d 714 (December 16, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault