☢ test - Í

affirmed. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, fact that victim’s testimony was directly contradictory of prior testimony as to who shot him didn’t necessarily mean that his testimony at defendant’s trial was perjured (or that prosecutor suborned perjury). “According to the victim's trial testimony, he falsely identified [someone else] as the shooter at the juvenile court hearing because he was scared and because he did not want Arnold to go to jail.” “‘There is no constitutional requirement that the witnesses upon whom the State relies to prove its case must give consistent evidence.’ Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 471(2) (500 S.E.2d 329) (1998). See Ward v. State, 205 Ga.App. 504, 507(3) (423 S.E.2d 288) (1992) (victim's trial testimony not proven to be false, notwithstanding her prior inconsistent statements).” Accord, White v. State , 315 Ga.App. 54, 726 S.E.2d 548 (March 21, 2012); Brown v. State , 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (October 15, 2012) (“inconsistency in the testimony of the State's witnesses does not constitute a knowing use of perjury.”). Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Buchanan, 285 Ga. 553, 679 S.E.2d 712 (June 15, 2009). No conflict of interest prevented Attorney General from representing the Public Defender Standards Council in a fee dispute with private appointed counsel after the underlying criminal prosecution was concluded. “Because [defendant] Buchanan's criminal case is completed and because the Attorney General's representation of the Council does not involve the merits of Buchanan's criminal case but only whether the Council should pay attorney fees for the efforts of Buchanan's counsel to be reinstated as counsel after substitute counsel was appointed for Buchanan by the Standards Council, we conclude there is no conflict in the present case that merits the Attorney General's disqualification.” Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (January 26, 2009). State’s witness Arnold contradicted her prior statement to police on the stand by claiming that defendant Cox was with her and not at the scene of the crime. After her testimony, and outside the jury’s presence, prosecutor had witness arrested for perjury. The next morning, witness “changed her testimony so that it was consistent with the statement she had given the police. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from [witness] that, after leaving the stand the previous day, she had been ‘locked up’ and charged with perjury. [fn] [Co-defendant] Cox now asserts that Arnold's arrest constituted prosecutorial misconduct that violated his right to a fair trial, relying on OCGA § 16-10-93(a), which makes it a crime for any person, ‘with intent to deter a witness from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully to any matter pending in any court’ to communicate ‘directly or indirectly, to such witness any threat of injury or damages to the person, property, or employment....’ However, no testimony was elicited from Arnold at trial regarding the effect of her arrest on her testimony that day or the truthfulness (or lack thereof) of her prior day's testimony. Nor was Arnold called to testify regarding the matter at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Therefore, although we do not condone the prosecutor's actions in this case, the record is utterly devoid of any evidence intimating a violation of OCGA § 16-10-93(a) by the prosecutor in regard to Arnold's arrest for the crime of perjury.” Sears concurs specially, would declare this prosecutorial misconduct, but harmless. Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 663 S.E.2d 844 (June 25, 2008). 1. Trial court properly denied defendant’s demurrer and motion to quash his indictment for theft by taking by a police officer; contrary to defendant’s contention, district attorney did not commit misconduct by refusing to draw an indictment for misdemeanor theft by taking at grand jury’s request. “According to Brandeburg, this violated OCGA § 45-11-4(h) [relating to charges against public officials], which states in part that, ‘[a]t any time during the presentation of evidence or during deliberations, the grand jury may amend the indictment or instruct the district attorney to cause a new indictment to be drawn as in any other case.’ The record shows that the grand jury asked the district attorney why the State had ‘dropped’ the misdemeanor theft by taking charge and whether it could change the felony charges to misdemeanors. The district attorney explained to the jury why the State had charged Brandeburg with a felony and that a misdemeanor charge was not an option. The grand jury subsequently directed the district attorney to separate the three felony counts into two separate indictments, one charging Brandeburg with theft by taking and violation of his oath of office, and the other charging him with a separate count of violation of his oath of office, and the district attorney complied.” Contrary to defendant’s assertion, ‘[t]he hearing transcript does not show that the grand jury ever directed the district attorney to produce an indictment charging Brandeburg with a misdemeanor. Moreover, if the grand jury had disapproved of charging Brandeburg with felony theft by taking, it could have refused to indict him pursuant to the proposed indictment, but it did not. Thus, Brandeburg has failed to show that the State violated OCGA § 45-11-4(h) or that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash based on such alleged violation.” 2. Defendant was not entitled to dismissal based on “prosecutorial vindictiveness” where district attorney originally obtained indictment for misdemeanor theft, but obtained new indictment for felony theft after defendant refused to plead guilty. Based on “ U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74) (1982),” where “[t]he Court contrasted such a situation from one in which a prosecutor adds additional charges after a defendant successfully appeals from a conviction, a situation from which a presumption of vindictiveness might arise because of the perception that the prosecutor was punishing the defendant for appealing his conviction. [Cit.] Id. at 374-380(II). In a pre-