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trial, plea negotiation setting, however, the Court acknowledged that there is no element of punishment, ‘so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 378(II).” Anderson v. State, 285 Ga.App. 166, 645 S.E.2d 647 (April 24, 2007). Prosecutor asked police officer on stand if defendant gave a statement after being arrested, knowing that the defendant stood on his right to remain silent. Defendant immediately moved for and was granted mistrial. Trial court denied plea in bar to retrial, based on double jeopardy due to prosecutorial misconduct. Held, trial court abused its discretion in denying the plea in bar. “As in Wilson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 327 (503 S.E.2d 924) (1998) (physical precedent only), ‘[w]e find it impossible to believe that an error which is so blatant and so contrary to the most basic rules of prosecutorial procedure and conduct could have been simply a negligent act. To allow this prosecutor’s action to be categorized as a mistake would require this Court to assume that this prosecutor was totally lacking the foundational knowledge for prosecutorial conduct in a courtroom .... State prosecutors are generally knowledgeable and well trained – too knowledgeable and well-trained not to know the consequences of a question such as that asked by the prosecutor in this case.’ Id. at 330(3).” Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 644 S.E.2d 116 (April 24, 2007). No mistrial required where prosecutor told jury venire during voir dire that “[t]his is not [a] death penalty case.” “The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections to the prosecutor’s comments but denied their motion for mistrial, which counsel for [co-defendant] Hobdy renewed after the trial court gave the potential jurors the requested instruction that they were not to concern themselves with the issue of possible punishment. [fn] We find meritless Hobdy’s argument that the prosecutor’s comment violated OCGA § 17-8-76 (prohibiting counsel in criminal case from arguing to jury that convicted defendant may not serve full sentence if pardoned, paroled or granted clemency). As in Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292 (313 S.E.2d 98) (1984), in which the trial court questioned the prosecutor in front of the jury panel to clarify that the State was not seeking the death penalty, the prosecutor’s comment here ‘did not reflect upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant to be tried. [Hobdy] has not demonstrated any harm attributable to the statement and this [C]ourt cannot discern any harm under the circumstances presented here.’ Id. at 293(2).” Meeker v. State, 282 Ga.App. 77, 637 S.E.2d 806 (October 24, 2006). “[R]eferring to [pending charges before the jury as] felonies does not inject punishment into the jury’s deliberations on guilt or innocence. Wynn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 98, 101(4) (511 S.E.2d 201) (1999).” Morse v. State, 277 Ga.App. 67, 625 S.E.2d 489 (December 16, 2005). During pendency of case, and while defendant was represented by counsel, defendant wrote a letter to district attorney “that described his version of events.” District attorney made several references to the letter in cross-examination of defendant at trial. Held, use of the letter by the district attorney did not violate Rule 4.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits communication with persons represented by other counsel. “The assistant district attorney who received and reviewed the letter and who handled the prosecution of Morse did not ‘communicate’ with Morse in violation of the rule. The assistant district attorney did not solicit the letter from Morse; indeed, Morse chose to send the letter against the advice of his trial counsel in an attempt to dissuade the State from proceeding with its case. Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that the assistant district attorney ever responded to Morse’s letter or otherwise attempted to communicate or initiate contact with Morse outside the presence of defense counsel.” Whitworth v. State, 275 Ga.App. 790, 622 S.E.2d 21 (September 29, 2005). Physical precedent only; one judge concurs in judgment only. Extended discussion of recusal of prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of “influencing legislative action for pay while a State official.” J. Tom Morgan was appointed special prosecutor after the Attorney General recused himself and his entire staff. Despite that recusal, an assistant attorney general briefed Morgan on the case and advised him about it during plea negotiations. Later, it was revealed that Morgan had an agreement, during the prosecution, to take a position with the same law firm that represented a key witness in her civil action against the Paroles Board, where defendant was formerly chairman. Held, neither the consultations with the AG nor the employment with the law firm required the reversal of defendant’s conviction. “As a general matter, the standard for disqualification was set forth in Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 314(2)(B) (369 S.E.2d 232) (1988). Our Supreme Court held: ‘There are two generally recognized grounds for disqualification of a prosecuting attorney. The first such ground is based on a conflict of interest, and the second ground has been described as “forensic misconduct.” ‘[For example, a] conflict of interest has been held to arise where the prosecutor previously has represented the defendant with respect to the offense charged, or has consulted with the defendant in a professional capacity with regard thereto; such conflict also has been held to arise where the prosecutor has acquired a personal interest or stake in the defendant’s conviction.’ (Citation omitted.) In applying these standards, the reversal of a conviction due to such a conflict of interest requires more than a ‘“theoretical or