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speculative conflict.”’ Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 640(2) (522 S.E.2d 225) (1999). An actual conflict of interest must be involved. In addition, because of their differing roles and responsibilities, the neutrality required of a judge is necessarily of a higher degree than that required of a prosecutor. ‘While the prosecuting officer should see that no unfair advantage is taken of the accused, yet he is not a judicial officer. Those who are required to exercise judicial functions in the case are the judge and jury. The public prosecutor is necessarily a partisan in the case. If he were compelled to proceed with the same circumspection as the judge and jury, there would be an end to the conviction of criminals.’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Sutherland, 190 Ga.App. 606, 607 (379 S.E.2d 580) (1989). See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 810- 811(B) (107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740) (1987) (‘the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not necessarily as stringent as those applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial officers.... We may require a stronger showing for a prosecutor than a judge in order to conclude that a conflict of interest exists’). (Citation omitted.)” Held, AG staff involvement in briefing and consulting after their recusal was improper, but reversal of the conviction is not required as a result. “Where there has been a recusal, even a voluntary one, there should ordinarily be no further involvement in the case by the recused persons. See Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 214(28) (345 S.E.2d 831) (1986) (recusal generally refers to ceasing involvement in case). … The better practice would have been for any briefing of Morgan in this case to have been done by Skandalakis, the former prosecutor, or the GBI. And the giving of advice on the plea proposal would appear to have been improper. [Cit.]” No reversal, however, because no actual conflict of interest and no prejudice shown; further, while the AG staff’s continued involvement was improper, that wrongdoing is not imputed to Morgan. “‘The imputed disqualification rule was not meant to encompass governmental law offices.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Frazier v. State , 257 Ga. 690, 694(4), 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987).” Elliott v. State, 275 Ga.App. 359, 620 S.E.2d 584 (September 1, 2005). Conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute affirmed. Defendant moved for mistrial, alleging that prosecutor improperly informed jury of court’s ruling that defendant’s custodial statement was voluntary. “Elliott cites Dean v. State, 168 Ga.App. 172, 174(3) (308 S.E.2d 434) (1983), in which we held that the trial court erred by telling the jury that a police officer ‘did comply with the constitution and the statute’ in obtaining the defendant’s statement. Id. Because the voluntariness of a statement is ultimately a question of fact for the jury, we concluded that the court had improperly commented on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-55. Id. at 176. Dean does not apply here because the prosecutor, not the court, made the comments to which Elliott objects. Moreover, the prosecutor did not disclose the court’s Jackson-Denno findings to the jury; she merely commented that she did not believe there was any evidence of threats, harassment, or intimidation.” Hall v. State, 273 Ga.App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (May 9, 2005). Aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter convictions affirmed. “In a novel enumeration of error, Hall asserts that the grand jury proceedings were improper and void because an investigator employed by the district attorney’s office testified before the grand jury. He claims that, as an agent of the district attorney, the investigator is bound by the ethical and legal standards that prohibit the district attorney from testifying before the grand jury. Hall has provided no law in support of this assertion; he merely cites decisions holding that an attorney is generally not permitted to appear as both witness and advocate in the same cause” Court of Appeals doesn’t buy it – rule cited is specific to the attorney; investigator was testifying about his own knowledge, not that of the district attorney. “As the State points out, such a rule would render inadmissible the testimony of any employee of the district attorney's office who happened to be a victim of crime, as well as the testimony of any expert witness retained by an attorney.” Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 593 S.E.2d 335 (March 1, 2004). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed. “Sealey argues that the entire office of the district attorney should have been disqualified because one assistant district attorney, while previously in private practice, had represented Sealey in two unrelated criminal cases. Because the record confirms that the assistant district attorney was properly ‘screened from any direct or indirect participation’ in Sealey’s prosecution in this case, the trial court did not err in allowing other members of the district attorney's office to continue in the case,” citing Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987). Accord, Lemming v. State , 292 Ga.App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (May 23, 2008). Clemons v. State, 265 Ga.App. 825, 595 S.E.2d 530 (February 5, 2004). Armed robbery conviction affirmed. Prosecutor’s explanation to jury, made with court’s advance consent, that a certain witness had refused to testify, did not call for action by trial court under OCGA 17-8-75 (imposing duty on court to prevent “statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence”). Opinion criticizes this procedure, however; generally, “a party is not permitted to explain the failure of an absent witness to testify. While we have held in this case that any error was harmless, it is far better to prevent such situations from arising, than it is to cure them.” Suggests this may have allowed the State to “benefit from an inference on the part of the jury that the State had the evidence it said it did but could not present it because the