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“are expected to screen prospective clients for possible conflicts and decline representation where one exists.” Sanchez v. State, 242 Ga.App. 686, 530 S.E.2d 775 (March 9, 2000). Cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking convictions affirmed; no “prosecutorial vindictiveness” shown by re-indictment to a higher charge after mistrial. After first trial ended in hung jury, State re-indicted from cocaine trafficking – 28-grams or more, to cocaine trafficking – 400-grams or more. “Sanchez argues that, by reindicting him for the larger amount, he faced a significantly increased punishment which is ‘presumed to be prosecutorial vindictiveness,’ as proscribed by the United States Supreme Count in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 24(I), 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). This issue has been decided adversely to Sanchez by the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision in Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. 115, 119-120, 464 S.E.2d 371 (1995). In Griffin, the Supreme Court noted that the ‘presumption’ of prosecutorial vindictiveness discussed in Blackledge focused on a prosecutor's motivation to discourage other defendants from exercising their right to appeal, a constitutionally protected right. However, ‘[t]he reasoning of Blackledge is inapplicable in the context of jury deadlock. Here, as the State points out, what provided the State an opportunity to “up the ante” was not a successful appeal of a conviction, but rather a mistrial. The appeal of the plea of former jeopardy, had it been successful, would have created no opportunity for enhancement of charges or penalty. A mistrial resulting from an inability of a jury to reach a verdict, especially when entered on the trial court's own motion, is not subject to chilling as is the exercise of the right to appeal. Therefore, no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises.’ (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, supra at 120, 464 S.E.2d 371. The trial court did not err in denying Sanchez's plea in abatement.” Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 522 S.E.2d 225 (October 18, 1999). “The trial court did not err in refusing to grant Lyons' motion to disqualify the district attorney's office from prosecution of the case. It was established that two attorneys who had been appointed to represent Lyons following his arrest withdrew their representation when they were hired by the district attorney. In each instance, the attorney had represented Lyons for only a few months; and Lyons acknowledges that neither former attorney had improper communications about his case while in the employ of the district attorney. Lyons continued to be represented by the same lead trial counsel during the remainder of the pretrial period (more than 14 months), during trial, and presently on appeal. At no time was Lyons without continuous representation.” Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (May 17, 1999). “The trial court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to use the word ‘murder’ instead of ‘homicide.’ The prosecutor's use of the word ‘murder’ did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.” Thompson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 466, 517 S.E.2d 339 (April 1, 1999). Physical precedent only. “After [witness] Beaudry testified in a manner inconsistent with her prior testimony, the prosecuting attorney directed her: ‘Let’s try this again, because I don’t want you to get in any more trouble.’ Thompson’s motion for a mistrial was denied. When the prosecutor then commented to Beaudry that ‘ this time I want you to tell the truth, ’ Thompson asked the jury to be instructed that determinations as to the credibility of witnesses are solely within the province of the jury. Without giving any instructions to the jury at that point, the court granted the prosecutor permission to treat Beaudry as a hostile witness and impeach her with her prior inconsistent testimony and statement.” Held, “it was not error to refuse a mistrial or fail to rebuke counsel. Such remedies are required when counsel, by way of argument, introduces facts not in the record and calculated to prejudice the accused. See OCGA § 17-8-75; Smith v. State, 118 Ga.App. 464, 465(1), 164 S.E.2d 238 (1968); Thompson v. State, 150 Ga.App. 567, 568(2), 258 S.E.2d 180 (1979); Simmons v. State, 174 Ga.App. 171, 177(12), 329 S.E.2d 312 (1985); Hall v. State, 180 Ga.App. 881, 882(3), 350 S.E.2d 801 (1986). That is not what happened here. ‘That [the witness] may not have told the truth was a permissible inference from the evidence’ and did not constitute an objectionable comment by counsel. Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 824, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975); see Thomas v. State, 146 Ga.App. 501(1), 246 S.E.2d 498 (1978) (disapproving Iler v. State, 139 Ga.App. 743(3), 229 S.E.2d 543 (1976), to the extent that it conflicts with Shy ).” Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). No prejudice where district attorney hired defendant’s original counsel to represent him personally in a matter prior to defendant’s trial, and different counsel was appointed for defendant. “Based on Chandler’s representation of the district attorney outlined in the previous enumeration, Pruitt moved to disqualify the district attorney due to conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety. While we do not condone the actions of the district attorney, this is not a situation where the prosecutor previously represented the defendant, and there is no evidence that the district attorney gained any information about Pruitt’s defense through his personal retention of one of Pruitt’s attorneys. [Cits.] In fact, Pruitt does not allege that Chandler divulged any information acquired in the representation of Pruitt to the district attorney, or that Chandler assisted the prosecution in any way. Therefore, we find no error in the denial of the motion to disqualify the district attorney.”