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M. RIGHT TO COUNSEL See also subheading APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, above 1. AT ARRAIGNMENT

Coney v. State, 316 Ga.App. 303, 728 S.E.2d 899 (June 20, 2012). Conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; no reversal where defendant was arraigned without counsel of record being present, absent a showing of prejudice. Contrary to defendant’s contention, he didn’t lose ability to pursue motions due to counsel’s absence at arraignment; rather, trial court had a local rule allowing motions to be filed within 10 days of discovery being provided by State, which occurred here 23 days after arraignment. “[A]s our Supreme Court has … held, a reversal for lack of counsel at any ‘critical stage of a criminal proceeding,’ including an arraignment, ‘is by no means automatic.... The harmfulness of counsel's absence must appear.’ Dixon v. Hopper, 237 Ga. 811, 812(1) (229 S.E.2d 656) (1976). ‘[W]here the record does not show whether or not the defendant was prejudiced by the absence of counsel’ at a pretrial appearance, a trial court ‘should determine whether the lack of counsel was harmless error.’ State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 60 (222 S.E.2d 333) (1976). ‘A federal constitutional error can be held harmless only if the state shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Id. Thus in Bache v. State, 208 Ga.App. 591 (431 S.E.2d 412) (1993), this Court held that a defendant who lacked counsel at arraignment, but who could not show how any specific motion not made ‘would have enhanced his defense,’ could not show harm arising from the absence of counsel at that stage of the proceedings. Id. at 592(1). Because the record shows that Coney did not lose the right to a hearing on his motion to suppress as a result of a lack of counsel at arraignment, because he has not alleged any other specific harm resulting from that event, and because he was afforded the assistance of counsel at trial, we conclude that the State has carried its burden of showing that any error arising from the absence of counsel at arraignment was harmless. See Dixon, 237 Ga. at 812–813 ( State carried its burden of showing no harm arising from lack of counsel at arraignment when defendant failed to allege any specific harm arising therefrom and when he was represented by counsel at trial); Bache, 208 Ga.App. at 592(1); compare Ledford v. State, 247 Ga.App. 885 (545 S.E.2d 396) (2001) (reversing defendant's conviction because she lost the right to file a motion to suppress when she appeared without counsel at arraignment).” King v. State, 270 Ga.App. 399, 606 S.E.2d 616, (November 9, 2004). “‘[R]eversal is by no means automatic for absence of counsel [at arraignment]. The harmfulness of counsel’s absence must appear.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bache v. State, 208 Ga.App. 591, 592(1), 431 S.E.2d 412 (1993). King argues that he would not have waived his right to insist on an indictment by a grand jury, but has failed to show that he would not have been indicted on the charges. In fact, even trial counsel testified that in his opinion there would have been no advantage to insisting upon a grand jury indictment given the evidence in the case. We therefore hold that any error in the trial court proceeding in the absence of counsel (if indeed counsel was absent) was harmless in this case. See id . at 592(1), 431 S.E.2d 412.” 2. AT LINE-UP Brown v. State , 243 Ga.App. 430, 533 S.E.2d 453 (April 11, 2000). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress victim’s lineup identification. Contrary to defendant’s argument, he was not entitled to counsel at the lineup. “‘[T]he right to counsel attaches only to corporeal identifications taking place “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings – whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, [406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)].’ Coleman v. State, 160 Ga.App. 158(1), 286 S.E.2d 494 (1981). Brown's argument assumes that he had been indicted for these offenses before the lineup because he was extradited from Illinois to Georgia. This allegation is not supported by the record, as he was not indicted until months after the lineup, and an indictment is not required before extradition may be requested. OCGA §§ 17-13-1(4); 17-13-23. As a result, this enumeration of error is without merit.” Accord, Smith v. State, 244 Ga.App. 165, 534 S.E.2d 903 (May 24, 2000); Roman v. State , 245 Ga.App. 225, 537 S.E.2d 684 (July 18, 2000). 3. AT PLEA ENTRY/SENTENCING See also SENTENCING – AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – PRIOR CONVICTIONS, below Fulwood v. State, 290 Ga. 335, 720 S.E.2d 642 (January 9, 2012). After defendant’s pro se guilty plea on felony drug charges, habeas court erred in denying petition for relief; “[t]he sentencing court instructed Fullwood about his rights at a jury trial including ‘that at a jury trial, you have the right to have a lawyer’; however, it is undisputed that the court never informed him that he had a right to counsel during the plea hearing.” Robertson v. State, 280 Ga. 885, 635 S.E.2d 138 (September 18, 2006). On remand from prior appeal, trial court was directed to enter life sentence; it did so without defense counsel present. Held, this did not violate defendant’s right to counsel, as trial court was without discretion in sentence to be entered. “It is a well-established rule that a defendant has a