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right to appointed counsel at any critical stage of proceedings brought against him. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393) (1977). It is equally established that sentencing, or re-sentencing, is such a critical stage at which a defendant is generally entitled to be present at the sentencing hearing and to be represented by counsel. Id. For example, in instances where a defendant’s entire sentencing package has been vacated on appeal and, at resentencing, the trial court has full discretion to reconstruct the sentence and impose a more lenient punishment, the defendant retains a right to appointed counsel. Hall v. Moore, 253 F.3d 624 (11 th Cir., 2001). On the other hand, where the defendant’s sentence is mandatory or fixed in such a way that, at resentencing, the trial court is without discretion, the resulting resentencing proceeding is purely ministerial, and it is unnecessary for the defendant to be present at the sentencing hearing or be represented by counsel. Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1483, n. 9 (11 th Cir., 1985). See also, Shaheed v. State, 274 Ga. 716 (559 S.E.2d 466) (2002); Sullivan v. State, 229 Ga. 731 (194 S.E.2d 410) (1972); Hammond v. State, 277 Ga.App. 148 (625 S.E.2d 503) (2005) (defendant’s presence not required at re-sentencing regarding merger).” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (March 8, 2004). Reverses Iowa Supreme Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that a pro se defendant be given the following warnings before pleading guilty: “The trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked;” and “[t]he defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty.” “In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance … the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will ‘depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,’ [cit.]” This case, a DUI (“OWI”), is “so straightforward” that “the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him,” by causing him to pursue non-existent defenses, wasting either his own resources or the State’s. “The constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (November 23, 1999). Habeas court properly denied petitions, finding that pro se defendants made knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel upon entering their guilty pleas to misdemeanors in state court. Record included defendants’ written waiver of rights, stating in part: “I do not desire a lawyer, appointed or employed, and waive the right to have an appointed or employed lawyer to represent me.” 1. “The extrinsic evidence offered at the habeas corpus hearing demonstrated that the trial court advised defendants of their right to counsel; and that it satisfied itself that defendants were cognizant of that right and voluntarily waived it. This evidence authorized the habeas court's finding that petitioners knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived their right to counsel. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982); Huff v. Barnett, 230 Ga. 446, 197 S.E.2d 345 (1973); cf. Warner v. Jones, 241 Ga. 467, 246 S.E.2d 320 (1978).” 2. Petitioners assert that any waiver of counsel was invalid because they ‘announced’ their plea before the trial court advised them of their right to counsel. We cannot accept this assertion. The entry of a guilty plea is a process; it does not take place the moment a plea is uttered. Why? Because a guilty plea can be withdrawn up until the time sentence is pronounced. OCGA § 17-7-93. Thus, a defendant can insist on his constitutional rights and withdraw his plea until it is ‘accepted’ by the trial court. See Carney v. State, 131 Ga.App. 209, 210, 205 S.E.2d 518 (1974) (pronouncement of plea means signing of written sentence and its delivery to the clerk). See generally Boykin, supra at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (error for trial court to accept guilty plea without affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary).” Benham and Fletcher dissent on this point, would find waiver invalid where defendant was first forced to announce plea of guilty. 3. Trial court wasn’t required to make defendants aware of dangers of proceeding to trial pro se before entering guilty plea , distinguishing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (trial court must make defendant aware of dangers of proceeding to trial pro se). Overruled “to the extent [it] holds that a probated or suspended sentence of imprisonment does not trigger the right to appointed counsel and that a probationer’s claim of an invalid waiver of the right to appointed counsel need not be addressed until probation is revoked and imprisonment is imminent,” Barnes v. State , 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (September 23, 2002). 4. AT SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTION Dickerson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s rape conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence “because he was denied his right to counsel when his blood was drawn. [Defendant] argues that, because the search warrant was issued post-indictment , it constituted a critical