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stage in his criminal prosecution that triggered his right to counsel. However, we have held that ‘neither the presence of appellant's counsel nor appellant's consent is required for the execution of a warrant calling for the seizure of hair, blood or other body fluids.’ Johnson v. State, 179 Ga.App. 467, 468(4), 346 S.E.2d 903 (1986). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Dickerson's motion to suppress.” 5. CIVIL CONTEMPT Miller v. Deal, 295 Ga. 504, 761 S.E.2d 274 (July 11, 2014). Affirming 321 Ga.App. 220, 739 S.E.2d 487 (2013), and reversing trial court’s certification of class action. “The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit are indigent parents, all of whom say that they have been incarcerated for failures to pay child support following civil contempt proceedings initiated by the Department and in which the Department was represented by lawyers.” Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they and similarly situated persons are entitled to appointed counsel. Held: 1. “[T]o the extent that named plaintiffs or other class members have a constitutional right to appointed counsel, they do not waive that right simply by failing to insist upon counsel in proceedings in which no one advised them that they could ask for counsel.” 2. Trial court erred by certifying class of plaintiffs, as “‘the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration.’ (Emphasis in original),” quoting Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, ____(III)(B), 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011). “The plaintiffs in this case, on the other hand, assert only that indigent parents have a right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings in which they are threatened with incarceration for a failure to pay child support and in which the Department is represented by a lawyer, a circumstance that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address in Turner. See id. at ____(III)(B) (‘We do not address civil contempt proceedings where the underlying child support payment is owed to the State.... [In such proceedings,] [t]he government is likely to have counsel or some other competent representative.’ (Citations omitted)).” “We suppose that due process sometimes may require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in a civil contempt proceeding in which the parent is threatened with incarceration. And as in Gagnon, perhaps there is even a ‘presumptive’ right to appointed counsel in some such proceedings if the parent is opposed by government lawyers. [FN10: For this reason, trial courts should consider advising unrepresented parents in such proceedings that they may have a right to request counsel.] But even so, presumptions sometimes can be overcome, and whether any particular parent is entitled to a lawyer at government expense depends always, we think, on the particular and unique circumstances of his case, including the complexity of the case, as well as the extent to which alternative measures might be employed to ensure that the proceeding is fundamentally fair. See State v. Currier, 295 P.3d 837, 843–844 (Wyo., 2013). See also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790– 791(III). As the United States Supreme Court has reminded, ‘the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224(IV), 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted). … We do not decide in this case precisely when, if ever, a lawyer must be appointed for an indigent parent in a civil contempt proceeding about child support. We conclude only that there is no absolute, inflexible, and categorical right to appointed counsel in such proceedings as a matter of due process, even when the Department, represented by its own lawyers, pursues the incarceration of an indigent parent.[fn]” Benham dissents. 6. CONTINUANCE TO HIRE COUNSEL Alwi v. State, 331 Ga.App. 903, 773 S.E.2d 387 (March 11, 2015). Rape, armed robbery, and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance for substitution of counsel. Counsel announced ready for trial one week before, but on day of, announced that she and Alwi had a disagreement about strategy and requested to withdraw; defendant also requested eight weeks to retain new counsel. Trial court denied both requests, but delayed start of trial for two days. “Two days later, the case was again called for trial, at which time, Alwi's counsel informed the court that the two were still at an impasse; however, Alwi had been able to obtain new counsel, who was asking for a two-week continuance.” Noting that the court’s next trial calendar “would be months away,” the trial court denied the request, and “informed Alwi that he had three options: proceed to trial with his old counsel, proceed with his new counsel instanter, or represent himself. Alwi opted to proceed with his old counsel.” Held, no abuse of discretion: in this situation, “a trial court must balance the defendant's constitutional right to the counsel of his choosing ‘against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice.’ (Citation omitted.) [ Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 62-63(9)(a) (414 S.E.2d 5) (1992)]. Here, the trial court engaged in such a balancing test. Weighing the fact that Alwi and his trial counsel, who was prepared for trial, disagreed regarding trial strategy against what the court determined was an undue delay in trying the case, the trial court chose to deny a continuance that would allow new counsel time to prepare. … [W]e cannot say that the trial court's ruling in this case represented a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” “‘[W]hen a defendant attempts to hire new counsel for purposes of delay, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by prohibiting such conduct,’