☢ test - Í

Hampton [ v. State, 272 Ga.App. 565, 566(2) (612 S.E.2d 854) (2005)].” Roberts v. State, 322 Ga.App. 659, 745 S.E.2d 850 (July 3, 2013). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying defense motion for continuance based on retention of counsel on the eve of trial. “A motion for a continuance predicated on the basis of counsel's lack of preparation for trial addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling denying such a motion will not be interfered with unless the court has abused its discretion in denying the motion. Mere shortness of time does not by itself show a denial of the rights of the accused, and mere shortness of time will not reflect an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying a continuance, where the case is not convoluted and is without a large number of intricate defenses. Additionally, when there is no showing that a continuance would have benefitted the defendant, he has not established harm in the denial of the continuance. (Punctuation omitted.) Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga.App. 145, 148(2), 671 S.E.2d 180 (2008). Here, Roberts has not established that he exercised due diligence to retain trial counsel. Between Roberts's March 16, 2009 indictment and his September 9, 2012 trial, Roberts discharged three attorneys before making the decision to retain trial counsel the afternoon before trial. Roberts has failed to offer any explanation for his numerous discharges of attorneys or last-minute change of counsel beyond lacking funds to secure his retainer. See Lee v. State, 254 Ga.App. 417, 419(2), 562 S.E.2d 800 (2002) (holding that the defendant who had refused counsel and failed to make arrangements for representation until the eve of trial because he ‘did not have ample funds to retain an attorney’ could not establish due diligence to support a motion for continuance). Indeed, Roberts's attorney of record immediately prior to trial counsel reported that Roberts was ‘extremely uncooperative and antagonistic’ toward the case and that he had been prepared to go forward with the trial had Roberts cooperated with him. If trial counsel was unprepared to proceed, any lack of preparedness was directly a result of Roberts's lack of diligence. See Marion v. State, 224 Ga.App. 413, 416(1), 480 S.E.2d 869 (1997) (‘Mere shortness of time will not reflect an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying a continuance where the case is not convoluted and is without a large number of intricate defenses. This case involve[d] serious issues, but they [were] not intricate or convoluted.’) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Tyner v. State, 313 Ga.App. 557, 722 S.E.2d 177 (January 12, 2012). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance to hire counsel “on the day of trial just before the beginning of jury selection, claiming that she was not satisfied with how her current hired counsel was handling her case. Nevertheless, ‘even where a defendant expressed lack of confidence in trial counsel's ability and disagreement with his advice and strategy, we have affirmed a trial court's denial of a last-minute request for a continuance to retain new counsel if it appears that the defendant negligently failed to employ new counsel promptly or if it appears he is using the tactic for delay.’ [ Thornton v. State, 305 Ga.App. 692, 696(2) (700 S.E.2d 669) (2010)] (punctuation omitted); see Jordan v. State, 247 Ga.App. 551, 555(3) (544 S.E.2d 731) (2001) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for continuance to hire new counsel made five days before trial even though defendant expressed disagreement with current counsel's strategy).” Simmons v. State, 309 Ga.App. 369, 710 S.E.2d 193 (March 30, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying continuance to hire counsel. Case had previously been on three trial calendars; public defender had represented defendant for almost a year. “On the eve of trial, Simmons told the court that he was dissatisfied with his public defender and wanted a continuance so that he could hire a private attorney. The trial court denied the request as untimely and proceeded to trial. However, on February 23, 2009, after Simmons refused to cooperate during voir dire, the trial court declared a mistrial. Simmons testified during the motion for new trial hearing that, thereafter, the judge gave him an opportunity to hire a private attorney, but that he was unable to gather the needed funds. On March 26, 2009, when the court next called the case for trial, the court denied Simmons' second pro se request for a continuance, finding that Simmons had ‘had more than enough time’ to retain his own attorney but had failed to do so. The case was eventually tried on March 30 and 31, 2009. Under the circumstances, we find no basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Simmons' pro se request for a continuance. See, Holder v. State, 242 Ga.App. 479, 483(7) (529 S.E.2d 907) (2007) (‘Denial of a continuance may be proper where defendant negligently failed to employ counsel promptly or where it appears he is using the tactic for delay.’) (citations and punctuation omitted); Smith v. State, 161 Ga App. 512, 514(3) (288 S.E.2d 754) (1982) (‘A defendant will not be permitted to use the discharge of appointed counsel and employment of another counsel as a dilatory tactic in requesting a continuance.’) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Bakyayita v. State, 278 Ga.App. 624, 629 S.E.2d 539 (March 31, 2006). Trial court did not err in denying continuance to allow defendant’s family to hire private counsel in lieu of court-appointed counsel. “Bakyayita was arrested on May 3, 2001. On July 16, 2001, an attorney filed a leave of absence, claiming to be Bakyayita’s lead attorney. On October 8, 2001, Bakyayita requested a court-appointed attorney, and on January 19, 2002, a court-appointed attorney filed an entry