☢ test - Í

of appearance on Bakyayita’s behalf. On October 8, 2002, the first day of trial, Bakyayita moved for a continuance, arguing that his family needed additional time to retain a private attorney. The trial judge informed Bakyayita that he had never notified the court of any problems with his trial counsel and that he and his family could retain additional counsel, but the case would proceed. … ‘In all cases, the party making an application for a continuance must show that he has used due diligence,’ [cit.] and the question of whether a defendant has exercised due diligence in hiring counsel is a factual one that is determined by the trial judge. [cit.] The record here shows that Bakyayita’s family was aware that he desired a private attorney at the outset as evidenced by the fact that his first attorney was privately retained. Once Bakyayita requested and was appointed an attorney by the court, several months passed, during which it appears that Bakyayita did nothing to inform the court of his desire to retain an attorney. Bakyayita also made no showing that his father would or could hire an attorney. [Cit.] Bakyayita has not shown that he exercised due diligence in his quest to hire a private attorney. Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance on this ground was not an abuse of discretion. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (March 19, 2003). Convictions for stalking and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance on eve of trial to hire substitute counsel. “‘[W]here a party has had several months in which to employ counsel and neglects to do so, no continuance will be granted for such reason.’ McLendon v. State, 123 Ga.App. 290, 295(2), 180 S.E.2d 567 (1971).” Emphasis is on “neglect” — trial court must evaluate defendant’s efforts and ability to hire counsel. 7. COUNSEL OF CHOICE See also subheading APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL – APPOINTED COUNSEL OF CHOICE, above Calloway v. State, 313 Ga.App. 708, 722 S.E.2d 422 (January 26, 2012). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to counsel of choice. After jury selection with appointed counsel, defendant said he wanted to hire a local attorney. The attorney’s wife was in court, and said that they had told defendant’s family that they would have to talk to the court before agreeing to take the case. The court declined to continue the trial. “[T]he record reflects that Calloway failed to use reasonable diligence in obtaining substitute counsel. [fn] Indeed, the trial court stated its belief that because of Calloway's timing, his requested continuance was made for purposes of delay; and the record supports the court's conclusion. [Cits.] Specifically, Calloway's family met with Murray for the first time during the lunch break after a jury had been empaneled and just prior to the start of trial. Further, Murray was never formally retained, as evinced by his wife's statement to the court. [Cits.] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Calloway's request for a continuance and instead proceeding with Calloway's appointed counsel, who was prepared for trial.” Accord, Davis v. State , 295 Ga. 168, 758 S.E.2d 296 (May 5, 2014) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance where defendant retained new counsel on third day of murder trial). Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007). At defendant’s trial to determine mental retardation in regard to his capital murder conviction, “[w]e find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in the exercise of its inherent power to control court proceedings by limiting the number of attorneys permitted to speak before the court to the two attorneys appointed to Rogers. Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 62(9)(a) (414 S.E.2d 5) (1992). Although the trial court prevented a pro bono member of Rogers’s defense team from arguing certain motions, it did not prevent her from continuing to assist defense counsel. Compare United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563, 165 L.Ed.2d 409) (2006). Rather, it merely limited argument to Rogers’s lead counsel and co-counsel, both of whom were appointed two years before Rogers’s trial with his full agreement and in response to his counsel’s motion that, as a precautionary measure, death-qualified counsel be appointed. See U.A.P. (II)(A)(1). Furthermore, Rogers’s co-counsel, who ultimately argued the motions at issue, never intimated that he was not prepared to go forward. The record shows that he was familiar with the facts and issues involved, having the previous day conducted the expert’s deposition that formed a substantial basis for the motions, and the trial court had before it the written motions and supporting briefs submitted by Rogers’s counsel.” Northington v. State, 287 Ga.App. 96, 650 S.E.2d 760 (August 2, 2007). Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice was not violated: defendant’s counsel of record was suspended from practicing law. Counsel of record arranged for substitute counsel who successfully obtained one continuance of trial, but was unable to obtain a second continuance and was required to proceed to trial while original counsel was still suspended. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (June 26, 2006) “recognized that a defendant may not ‘insist on representation by a person who is not a member of the bar....’” Cole v. State, 284 Ga.App. 246, 643 S.E.2d 733 (January 31, 2007). Defendant was not denied his right to counsel of