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his choice. “The record shows that the trial court appointed an attorney, John Connolly, to represent Cole. Approximately two years later – and five days before his trial began – Cole retained a new lawyer, Marsha Lake. Immediately before jury selection, Lake appeared on behalf of Cole and requested a continuance of the trial, and Connolly sought to withdraw as counsel. The trial court denied both Lake’s motion for continuance and Connolly’s motion to withdraw. Instead, the court permitted Lake to represent Cole, but required Connolly to remain as additional counsel. [fn] Connolly sat at the defense table throughout voir dire. Following jury selection, Cole entered a guilty plea.” Distinguishing Gonzalez-Lopez (June 26, 2006), below: Here, Cole was not denied his counsel of choice. Instead, because the trial court was concerned that Lake was not adequately prepared for trial and, presumably to avoid a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness of counsel based upon her unfamiliarity with the case and perceived lack of preparation, it permitted Lake to represent Cole and merely required Connolly to assist if necessary. [ footnote: Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant who is financially able to retain the services of an attorney the right to secure counsel of his own choosing, it does not require that a defendant be permitted to retain any attorney at any time he chooses. Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 62(9)(a) (414 S.E.2d 5) (1992) Thus, ‘[a] defendant’s right to counsel may not “be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.” ’ Id. (a trial court acts within its discretion to require a defendant to accept the appointment of an attorney or to retain a more experienced attorney when the court is concerned about the inexperience of the defendant’s retained attorney); see also Stewart v. State, 239 Ga.App. 543, 544(2) (521 S.E.2d 468) (1999) (defendant is not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing when trial court denies his request to continue the trial so that he can obtain new counsel). ] ” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (June 26, 2006). Appeals court properly reversed defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana, based on district court’s violation of defendant’s right to be represented by retained counsel of his choice. Defendant sought to be represented by out-of-state counsel, appearing pro hac vice; district court refused to allow him to practice before it, however, on grounds that government here concedes were erroneous. Government (and four justices in dissent) argues that defendant is not entitled to reversal despite trial court’s error, because defendant has shown no prejudice – that is, no showing that defendant’s counsel of choice would have been able to change the outcome of the trial, which was conducted by other counsel chosen by defendant. Five-member majority disagrees, holding that the wrongful denial of the right to retained counsel of choice requires reversal without any showing of prejudice . “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice … commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness by provided – to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” Cases dealing with the right to effective assistance of counsel are thus distinguishable. Erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice is ‘structural error’, similar to the denial of counsel, or self-representation, or public trial, requiring no showing of prejudice to make the deprivation “complete;” indeed, such a showing may well be impossible, as “[i]t is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. Many counseled decisions, including those involving plea bargains and cooperation with the government, do not even concern the conduct of the trial at all. Harmless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” Note, however, that not every denial of counsel of choice is wrongful : “Nothing we have said today casts any doubt or places any qualification upon our previous holdings that limit the right to counsel of choice and recognize the authority of trial courts to establish criteria for admitting lawyers to argue before them. [T]he right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them. See Wheat [ v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)]; Caplin & Drysdale [ Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 626, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989)]. Nor may a defendant insist on representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, or demand that a court honor his waiver of conflict-free representation. See Wheat, 486 U.S., at 159-160. We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, id., at 163-164, and against the demands of its calendar, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). The court has, moreover, an ‘independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.’ Wheat, supra, at 160. None of these limitations on the right to choose one’s counsel is relevant here. This is not a case about a court’s power to enforce rules or adhere to practices that determine which attorneys may appear before it, or to make scheduling and other decisions that effectively exclude a defendant’s first choice of counsel. However broad a court’s discretion may be, the Government has conceded that the District Court here erred when it denied respondent his choice of counsel. Accepting that premise, we hold that the error violated [defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that this violation is not subject to harmless-error analysis.” Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 610 S.E.2d 521 (March 14, 2005). “‘[T]he right to be represented by a particular attorney is