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not absolute when it would unduly delay and require the adjournment of a trial because of counsel’s illness. [Cit.]’ Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 94(2), 270 S.E.2d 185 (1980). Therefore, representation by the associate of the lead attorney did not violate Cox’s constitutional right to counsel. See Blair v. State, 166 Ga.App. 434(1), 304 S.E.2d 535 (1983). Although Cox made a post-trial claim that he did not approve of the substitution, he did not object when the attorney informed the trial court that his client had given permission for the associate to assume the role of defense counsel should that prove necessary. ‘A statement by an attorney relating to the conduct of his client is to be considered as a statement by the client himself. [Cit.]’ White v. State, 153 Ga.App. 808, 809, 266 S.E.2d 528 (1980).” Turman v. State, 272 Ga.App. 570, 613 S.E.2d 126 (March 11, 2005). Physical precedent only: trial court erred in forcing defendant to trial with counsel appointed by court, whose services were to be repaid by defendant. Arrested in January for aggravated assault and related charges, defendant was arraigned in February, appeared pro se at calendar calls in March and April, despite court’s demands that he retain counsel. The court appointed counsel on June 29. Retained counsel entered an appearance on July 18. The case was called for trial on July 23. Appointed counsel announced not ready because counsel had been retained; retained counsel was in the hospital. “Under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge had a duty to delay the proceedings long enough to ascertain whether [retained counsel’s] absence was attributable to reasons beyond Turman’s control. The court did not attempt such an inquiry, instead stating that it had appointed a lawyer to represent Turman, and because that lawyer was present, Turman was adequately represented. The issue is not whether Turman was diligent in procuring his lawyer, because he had done so, and that lawyer, Smith, had prepared for trial but was absent because of circumstances beyond Turman’s control. This action by the trial court, and the resulting denial of Turman’s request for a continuance, was erroneous. [Cits.]” Two judges concur in judgment only. Compare Hampton v. State , 272 Ga.App. 565, 612 S.E.2d 854 (March 29, 2005) (Defendant agreed to proceed to trial with appointed counsel, then announced he was trying to hire private counsel even as jury selection was ongoing; no error in refusing continuance.). Stone v. State , 272 Ga. 351, 529 S.E.2d 136 (May 1, 2000). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error where trial court refused “to permit an attorney who was not a member of the Georgia bar to conduct portions of his trial.” “It is well-settled that Stone did not have a ‘constitutional right to demand that [out-of-state attorney Rawls] be allowed to represent’ him. (Emphasis in original.) Lipham v. State, 257 Ga. 808, 811, 364 S.E.2d 840 (1988). Whether to permit Rawls to conduct portions of Stone's trial was a decision left to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not disturb the exercise of that discretion unless it was abused. Id. Because Stone did not move to have Rawls admitted pro hac vice until the day of trial; because Stone was already represented by a qualified member of the Georgia bar; because the trial court permitted Rawls to advise Stone's appointed counsel during the trial; and because the record shows that Rawls did so, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Rawls to actually conduct portions of the trial. Id.” Stewart v. State, 239 Ga.App. 543, 521 S.E.2d 468 (August 9, 1999). Trial court didn’t violate defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice by ordering trial to proceed when defendant announced that morning that he wanted to dismiss his lawyer. “[T]he right to obtain counsel of choice ‘does not mean that a defendant may retain any counsel at any time he wishes.... A defendant's right to counsel may not be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 62(9)(a), 414 S.E.2d 5 (1992). A motion for continuance based on a desire to discharge counsel or a claim of inadequate preparation addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court, which decision we will not disturb absent a clear showing of abuse. Massalene v. State, 224 Ga.App. 321, 322(1), 480 S.E.2d 616 (1997). One factor to consider is the request's timing. This dismissal request made on the morning of trial, particularly where the case had been on the calendar for some time, indicated that Stewart was attempting to use the discharge as a dilatory tactic, which the judge was authorized to prevent. Massalene, supra; Mallory v. State, 225 Ga.App. 418, 422(4), 483 S.E.2d 907 (1997).” 8. CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS See EVIDENCE – STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT – RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS , below 9. EFFECT OF DENIAL Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (November 23, 1999). Defendant’s conditional, probated sentence cannot be revoked, whether for felony or misdemeanor, if defendant was denied the right to counsel when he was placed on probation. Overruled on other grounds, Barnes v. State , 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (September 23, 2002).