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10. INVESTIGATORS, EXPERTS, ETC. See PROCEDURE – EXPERTS, MOTION FOR FUNDS TO HIRE, below 11. GENERALLY Gibson v. State, 319 Ga.App. 627, 737 S.E.2d 728 (January 31, 2013). Following guilty pleas to various theft counts, trial court violated defendant’s right to counsel by refusing to allow counsel to participate in restitution hearing due to defendant’s absence. 1. Despite defendant’s failure to attend, “a separate hearing to determine the amount of restitution to be made part of a defendant's sentence is a critical stage of proceedings. In some cases an order for restitution is merely a pro forma, ministerial act not requiring the exercise of the court's discretion, and thus is not a critical stage of the proceedings. See Robertson [ v. State, 280 Ga. 885, 886 (635 S.E.2d 138) (2006)]; Golden [ v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1484, n.9 (11 th Cir., 1985)]. But here, the trial court took evidence and exercised its discretion at a separate hearing to set the amount of restitution. Gibson has enumerated specific issues with regard to the amount of restitution which his counsel was prevented from asserting on his behalf. The trial court's action in determining the amount of restitution was part of Gibson's sentencing and was not ‘purely ministerial,’ and the hearing was thus a critical stage of proceedings at which Gibson was entitled to representation by counsel.” 2. “Prohibiting counsel from cross-examining the witness and from making argument prevents any meaningful challenge to the State's case, and in such circumstances the mere presence of counsel does not amount to representation.” Brown v. Incarcerated Public Defender Clients, 288 Ga.App. 859, 655 S.E.2d 704 (December 13, 2007). Trial court acted within its power when it ordered that all indigent defendants be brought to courthouse for pre-arraignment interviews with public defender, after finding that inability to hold physical meeting with counsel at jail “resulted in an unacceptable interference and delay in the court’s processes.” 1. Rejects sheriff’s challenge to order because it was not entered in any specific pending case. “ Every court has inherent power to ‘compel obedience to it judgments, orders, and process’ and ‘[t]o control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto.’ OCGA § 15-1-3(3), (4). The order appealed here was entered to effectuate these purposes.” 2. Trial court’s order is proper based on “ Wright v. State, 250 Ga. 570 (300 S.E.2d 147) (1983), which recognizes ‘that pretrial detainees are denied meaningful access to their counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment if, in the facilities provided for attorney-client conferences, conversation is difficult and privacy is impossible.’ Id. at 572(1). The order appealed safeguards that right so as to ensure that the defendants receive effective assistance of counsel at arraignment, a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. We find the order sustainable, on those grounds only.” 3. Order does not ‘usurp’ the sheriff’s authority “to provide security at the courthouse.” “The sheriff does not claim that the order appealed conflicts with the security plan for the DeKalb County Courthouse. Moreover, a court can compel the attendance of witnesses and of the defendant at the proceedings it conducts. Reagan v. Powell, 125 Ga. 89, 92 (53 SE 580) (1906). And where the defendant’s right to a fair trial is implicated, a court is obligated to supervise the implementation of courtroom security measures sought by the sheriff. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 354, 359(7) (490 S.E.2d 75) (1997). Here, the sheriff complains that the court’s order will compromise his ability to provide courthouse security. But testimony given by the sheriff during the hearings below authorized the court to find that although ‘[a] lot of things [might] have to be reshuffled,’ the sheriff could ‘accommodate [the] new task.’ ‘In regulating and controlling the business of the court, wide discretion is necessarily placed in the judge, and the appellate courts should never interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is made to appear that wrong or oppression has resulted from its abuse.’ Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432, 433(4) (175 S.E.2d 654) (1970) (citation omitted). We find no abuse here.” Lowery v. State, 282 Ga. 68, 646 S.E.2d 67 (June 4, 2007). Defendant “argues the trial court erred when it failed to disclose to [defendant] and his counsel the contents of the jury communication reporting their deadlocked status prior to the trial court responding to the communication by giving the Allen charge. By a written note, the jury foreman informed the trial court, ‘We have a couple of people that says no way to change mind. What do we do?’ The trial court notified counsel of receipt of a communication from the jury, but not the contents, and summoned counsel to the courtroom,” where it responded to the inquiry. Defendant contends that his right to be present and his right to counsel were violated by the trial court’s failure to disclose the contents of the jury’s communication, and its failure to consult with counsel before formulating a response. Supreme Court unanimously finds that defendant’s right to be present was not violated, based on Barrett v. State , 275 Ga. 669(4), 571 S.E.2d 803 (2002). Does not rule on whether defendant’s right to counsel was violated, but finds any such violation harmless, as the charge given did not constitute reversible error. “In an exercise of this Court’s inherent power to maintain a court system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an orderly and efficient manner ( Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 532 (408 S.E.2d 97) (1991)), we take this opportunity to require trial courts to have jurors’ communications submitted to the court in writing; to mark the