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closing argument on behalf of McDaniel, handled the charge conference on his behalf, and assisted McDaniel in the sentencing hearing, we cannot say that these efforts rendered the trial court's error harmless based upon the particular facts and circumstances of this case.” Hatcher v. State, 320 Ga.App. 366, 739 S.E.2d 805 (March 14, 2013). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no error in finding that defendant waived counsel by failing to use “reasonable diligence” to hire an attorney. Three different judges inquired of defendant over a span of months about his intent regarding counsel; each time, he indicated his intent to hire counsel. Defendant stated that he was employed and identified the attorney he intended to hire. At jury selection, defendant indicated he had paid the attorney some money, but not enough, and therefore had “no choice but to go with … a public defender.” Defendant never applied for the public defender, however, and after rejecting the State’s plea offer and discussing recidivist sentencing with the court, proceeded to trial pro se. Held, trial court could find that defendant had failed to exercise “reasonable diligence” to obtain counsel and had thus waived the right. “[F]or a non-indigent defendant ‘the constitutional right to counsel only entitles him to be defended by counsel of his own selection whenever he is able and willing to employ an attorney and uses reasonable diligence to obtain his services. Since a non-indigent defendant's right to counsel is predicated upon his own diligence, a failure on his part to retain counsel may constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. Thus, when presented with a non-indigent defendant who has appeared for trial without retained counsel, the trial judge has a duty to delay the proceedings long enough to ascertain whether the defendant has acted with reasonable diligence in obtaining an attorney's services and whether the absence of an attorney is attributable to reasons beyond the defendant's control. Notwithstanding a defendant's present verbal insistence upon his right not to be tried without counsel, his own past actions may nevertheless demonstrate that the right has been waived. Since a non-indigent defendant's right to counsel is predicated upon his own diligence, a failure on his part to retain counsel may constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. ’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Collins v. State, 269 Ga.App. 164, 165–166, 603 S.E.2d 523 (2004). … Moreover, contrary to Hatcher's argument here, the court was not required to give Hatcher a warning of the dangers of proceeding pro se [fn] because such requirement applies ‘ only in the context of a waiver of the right to counsel by election of the countervailing right of self-representation. [Cit.]’ (Emphasis in original.) Burnett v. State, 182 Ga.App. 539, 542(1), 356 S.E.2d 231 (1987). It does not apply where, as here, the waiver of the right to counsel was based upon Hatcher's own failure to exercise the requisite diligence. Id.” Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 702 S.E.2d 415 (November 8, 2010). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; 1. defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary despite trial court’s misstatement that defendant faced life without parole if convicted, “when in fact his prior conviction for terroristic threats did not authorize imposition of life without parole under OCGA § 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7(b). Walker has not explained, however, how the knowledge that he might face lesser punishment than he believed would have made him less inclined to waive counsel.” 2. Trial court wasn’t required to conduct a competency hearing to determine if defendant was competent to waive right to counsel, absent “reason to doubt the defendant’s competence. See Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 180-181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Biggs v. State , 281 Ga. 627, 629-630, 642 S.E.2d 74 (2007). … [Here], the information available and evidence presented to the trial court prior to trial provided no real indication that Walker was incompetent to waive his right to counsel, and thus the court did not err in failing sua sponte to conduct a competency hearing. See id. at 630.” Davis v. State, 304 Ga.App. 355, 696 S.E.2d 381 (June 8, 2010). Defendant’s cocaine possession conviction affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to counsel. Defendant validly waived counsel and chose to represent himself both before and at beginning of trial; trial court appointed stand-by counsel who advised defendant during first part of trial. While cross-examining officer, defendant requested that counsel take over. Held, no error in forcing defendant to finish cross- examination of police officer on stand at that time. “‘Whether to grant or deny a defendant's post-waiver request for counsel is within the broad discretion of the trial court,’ and the court ‘may consider, among other things, the timing of the request.’ Wilkerson [ v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204(2)(b) (686 S.E.2d 648) (2009)]. We have held in this respect that a trial court may ‘require that examination and cross-examination of witnesses be conducted by only one counsel[.]’ Gould v. State, 168 Ga.App. 605, 607(2) (309 S.E.2d 888) (1983). See Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. 126, 127(3) (269 S.E.2d 18) (1980). Accordingly, because Davis had already begun to cross-examine the arresting officer, the trial court acted within its discretion in not allowing Davis to change counsel mid-examination. See id.” Miller v. State, 303 Ga.App. 4, 692 S.E.2d 677 (March 18, 2010). At defendant’s trial for attempted armed robbery, no error where trial court proceeded with defendant’s motion hearing when defendant was not represented by counsel. Defendant had elected to discharge appointed counsel and proceed pro se rather than be represented. Trial court