☢ test - Í

thoroughly reviewed defendant’s waiver of counsel on record. Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 686 S.E.2d 648 (November 23, 2009). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court erred by telling defendant that, when he chose to discharge appointed counsel and represent himself at trial, “if he did elect to represent himself, he could not later ‘change [his] mind and ask for a lawyer to represent [him].’” “After a defendant properly waives his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right is no longer absolute. See, e.g., United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 207 (3 rd Cir., 2008); United States v. Merchant, 992 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10 th Cir., 1993); Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 700 (9 th Cir., 1989); United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 286 (4 th Cir., 1989); United States v. Solina, 733 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (7 th Cir., 1984). The right to counsel, however, does not evaporate following a valid waiver, and a defendant may make a post-waiver request for counsel if, for example, he discovers he is overwhelmed by the trial process. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 205, 207-208; Merchant, 992 F.2d at 1095. Whether to grant or deny a defendant's post-waiver request for counsel is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Leveto, 540 F.3d at 207- 210; Merchant, 992 F.2d at 1095; Menefield, 881 F.2d at 700; West, 877 F.2d at 286; Solina, 733 F.2d at 1211-12. In considering a post-waiver request for counsel, a trial court may consider, among other things, the timing of the request. ‘[A]s the trial date draws nearer, the [trial] court can and should consider the practical concerns of managing its docket and the impact that a request may have on its general responsibilities for the prudent administration of justice.’ Leveto, 540 F.3d at 207 (bracketed material added). The possibility of a disruption of trial proceedings may be diminished, however, if a ‘defendant has had standby counsel and requests that the standby counsel represent him.’ 3 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 11.5(c), p. 751 (3 rd ed., 2007). If an examination of the record reveals that a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a post-waiver request for counsel during trial, it is a structural Sixth Amendment violation, Leveto, 540 F.3d at 207-208, and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal, United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, 406, n. 13 (1 st Cir., 1999); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409) (2006). Under this analysis, the trial court appears to have erred in stating flatly that Wilkerson could not, if he waived his right to counsel, make a request for counsel once the trial began. Clearly, the better practice would have been for the trial court simply to caution Wilkerson that, due to his assertion of the right to represent himself on the day of trial and the potential disruption of trial proceedings, the court would likely deny any mid-trial request for counsel. But the court still should have left the door open to exercise its discretion if and when such a request was made. We conclude, however, that Wilkerson's failure to object to the trial court's statement or to make a post-waiver request for counsel bars him from asserting this error on appeal.” Prior appointed counsel continued to act as stand-by counsel throughout trial; neither defendant nor counsel ever objected to trial court’s statement or requested the trial court to reconsider it. Hunstein and Benham dissent, would find that the error was not waived. Accord, Davis v. State , 304 Ga.App. 355, 696 S.E.2d 381 (June 8, 2010) (no harm where trial court first announced that it wouldn’t consider a request for counsel mid-trial, but then did just that.). Davis v. State, 301 Ga.App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (November 13, 2009). 1. At defendant’s DUI trial, evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant, an experienced trial attorney, made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. “Neither this Court nor the Georgia Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether the trial court must warn a defendant who is an attorney of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation in order to effect a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the question have held that although an attorney/defendant must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive the right to counsel, the trial court is not required to use any specific language in this regard when conducting a waiver-of-counsel colloquy. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 977(D)(1) (2d Cir., 1990); United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 845(IV)(A) (1st Cir., 1989); Neal v. Texas, 870 F.2d 312, 314-315(1) (5 th Cir., 1989); State v. van Aelstyn, 917 A.2d 471, 474-477(I) (Vt., 2007); Butler v. State, 767 So.2d 534, 537(II), 539(III) (Fla. 4 th Dist.Ct.App., 2000). It has been stated that ‘the appropriate inquiry is what the defendant understood – not what the court said.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) van Aelstyn, supra at 476(I)(B); Butler, supra at 539(III).” “‘The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. ” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Clarke v. Zant, supra at 196; accord, Thomas v. State, 244 Ga. 608, 611(2) (261 S.E.2d 389) (1979); Bollinger v. State, 272 Ga.App. 688, 689(1) (613 S.E.2d 209) (2005). The record reflects that Davis is a longstanding member of the Georgia Bar with experience in trying DUI cases. In fact, at trial, Davis testified that he advises all of his DUI clients to take a blood test. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Davis, who again represented himself, admitted that he had tried and won DUI cases. Davis has never denied that he is an experienced, competent trial lawyer. ‘[C]ompetence in the law evidenced by licensure as an attorney and years of experience in criminal litigation, obviously carries with it an awareness of the dangers of self-representation.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Neal, supra at 315(1).” 2. “In any event, there was no harm arising from the trial court's failure to