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advise Davis of the specific dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself, because Davis was assisted by a licensed member of the Bar [a new young associate in his office] sitting at counsel table. Thus, ‘[t]his is not a case where the defendant stood trial alone with no assistance or protection of his rights.’ (Footnote omitted.) Bollinger, supra at 691-692(1). Accord Granville v. State, 281 Ga.App. 465, 468(2) (636 S.E.2d 173) (2006); Davis v. State, 257 Ga.App. 500, 502(1) (571 S.E.2d 497) (2002).” Accord, Cain v. State , 310 Ga.App. 442, 714 S.E.2d 65 (July 1, 2011). Cook v. State, 297 Ga.App. 701, 678 S.E.2d 160 (May 6, 2009). Defendant’s conviction at bench trial for interference with custody reversed; “the State failed to meet its burden of proving that Cook knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel.” “No evidence was presented that Cook was ‘adequately informed of the nature of the charges against [her], the possible punishments [she] faced, the dangers of proceeding pro se, and other circumstances that might affect [her] ability to adequately represent [herself].’ Spears v. State, 247 Ga.App. 626, 627 (545 S.E.2d 136) (2001).” At hearing on motion for new trial, State presented testimony of an attorney who “was present in the courtroom when the trial court discussed the waiver of counsel with Cook.” “ The witness at the hearing testified that Cook was told proceeding pro se was generally ‘not a good idea,’ but he did not testify that Cook was informed specifically of any of the dangers of self-representation, the nature of the charges against her, or possible punishments. And the absence of a trial transcript prevents any consideration of whether the failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver was harmless. Compare Manning v. State, [260 Ga.App. 171, 172-173 (581 S.E.2d 290) (2003)].” State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 673 S.E.2d 243 (February 23, 2009). Reversing 288 Ga.App. 304, 653 S.E.2d 503 (2007), and reinstating burglary and related convictions. Court of Appeals used wrong criteria for determining whether defendant’s waiver of right to counsel at trial was valid. “In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied upon prior statements of that Court that ‘to effect a valid waiver, the trial court should advise the defendant of (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) any statutory lesser included offenses, (3) the range of possible punishments for the charges, (4) possible defenses, (5) mitigating circumstances, and (6) any other facts necessary for a broad understanding of the matter.’ Evans, supra at 307(1), 653 S.E.2d 503 (Citation omitted.). And, examining this ‘six-part test,’ the Court of Appeals declared that the trial court erred in its discharge of these imposed responsibilities, stating that ‘the trial court failed to discuss with Evans any lesser included offense. The trial court also failed to explain to Evans either the element of intent or the fact that he could be convicted as a party to that crime, even though both of these principles related directly to the defense theories articulated by Evans.’ Evans, supra at 307(1), 653 S.E.2d 503. However, regarding this six-part test, this Court has held that it is not incumbent upon the trial court to address each of the six points with the defendant. Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38(2), 495 S.E.2d 34 (1998). Rather, ‘[t]he record need only reflect that the accused was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’ Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 886(2), 536 S.E.2d 511 (2000) (Citations and punctuation omitted.). We take this opportunity to again reiterate that the rote application of the six-part test used by the Court of Appeals is not mandated, and a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel is valid if the record reflects that the defendant ‘was made aware of the dangers of self- representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’ [fn] Id. Nor is it required that the trial court probe the defendant's case and advise the defendant as to legal strategies to ensure that a waiver is intelligently made. Indeed, the defendant's ‘technical legal knowledge’ is irrelevant to the question of whether he validly waives his right to be represented by counsel. Lamar [ v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 153, 598 S.E.2d 488 (2004)].” Accord, Bradley v. State , 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (June 16, 2009); Davis v. State , 304 Ga.App. 355, 696 S.E.2d 381 (June 8, 2010); Walker v. State , 288 Ga. 174, 702 S.E.2d 415 (November 8, 2010) (waiver valid although trial court misstated possible sentence); Farley v. State , 317 Ga.App. 628, 732 S.E.2d 131 (September 14, 2012); Cox v. State , 317 Ga.App. 654, 732 S.E.2d 321 (September 21, 2012); Horne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (October 25, 2012). Watkins v. State, 291 Ga.App. 343, 662 S.E.2d 544 (May 1, 2008). Defendant’s pro se conviction for misdemeanor battery reversed; record failed to show that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of right to counsel. At arraignment, defendant signed forms waiving right to jury trial and right to counsel; on date of trial, defendant appeared and requested appointed counsel. The court denied the request without inquiry into defendant’s financial status other than that there had been “no change” in it since arraignment, “without any discussion whatsoever with Watkins to ensure that he fully appreciated both the nature and consequences of the constitutional right that he had relinquished and the repercussions of such a waiver, which is required to effect a valid waiver. Evans [ v. State, 288 Ga.App. 304, 307(1), 653 S.E.2d 503 (2007), reversed, 285 Ga. 67, 673 S.E.2d 243 (February 23, 2009)]. Although we acknowledge that there is no magic language that a trial judge must use to determine whether a defendant has made a valid waiver of his right to counsel, Hamilton [ v. State, 233 Ga.App. 463, 504 S.E.2d 236 (1998)], ‘ the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se. The record should