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also show that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.’ Clarke [ v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197, 275 S.E.2d 49 (1981)]. Accord Holt v. State, 244 Ga.App. 341, 343(1), 535 S.E.2d 514 (2000). See also Evans, supra (‘most effective way of ensuring this understanding [of defendant’s appreciation of his rights] is for the trial judge to discuss these matters with the defendant, and such a discussion should be placed on the record’); Hamilton, supra (fitting and appropriate for determination of a proper waiver to appear upon the record). Because there was no such evidence in the record of any discourse between the court and Watkins, we must reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. See Hamilton, supra at 469(1)(c), 504 S.E.2d 236 (no knowing relinquishment of right to counsel where trial court did not provide either a record with sufficient particularity regarding the information given to inform defendant of his right to counsel or to set forth the findings of fact upon which the conclusions of law were based). See generally Ford [ v. State, 254 Ga.App. 413, 415-416, 563 S.E.2d 170 (2002)] (trial court abused its discretion when it forced defendant to proceed to trial without the assistance of counsel after denying defendant’s request for counsel and failing to inquire as to lack of counsel). Compare Annaswamy v. State, 284 Ga.App. 6, 7-8(1), 642 S.E.2d 917 (2007) (valid waiver found where in addition to evidence that defendant signed waiver form, trial court questioned him about his waiver of the right to counsel); Bollinger v. State, 272 Ga.App. 688, 691(1), 613 S.E.2d 209 (2005) (valid waiver found where record shows with convincing clarity that the defendant knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived the right of representation by counsel and made a decision to represent himself).” Accord, Yancey v. State , 295 Ga.App. 649, 673 S.E.2d 22 (January 23, 2009) (Defendant’s conviction for loitering reversed; record fails to show valid waiver of counsel or jury trial.). Evans v State, 288 Ga.App. 304, 653 S.E.2d 503 (October 18, 2007). Reversed on this ground, see Evans (February 23, 2009), above. Defendant’s convictions for burglary and giving a false name reversed; “the trial court erred in allowing Evans to represent himself.” The court failed to explain to defendant the relevant concepts of intent (formed after entry), criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense, and parties to a crime. Further, record shows that defendant “‘lacked an adequate knowledge of trial procedure and evidentiary matters,’” quoting Manning v. State, 260 Ga.App. 171, 172 (581 S.E.2d 290) (2003). “Accord, Raines v. State, 242 Ga.App. 727, 730(1) (531 S.E.2d 158) (2000) (reversal required where, even though ‘substantial’ evidence of guilt existed, transcript ‘reflects [defendant’s] inexperience in legal matters.’) Here, the record shows that Evans had virtually no understanding of procedural matters or evidentiary issues. Nor did he understand what the State was required to prove, and therefore what he was required to defend against, as to the intent element of burglary. Evans also was unaware that when he testified in his own defense he could be cross-examined with respect to his prior arrests, including arrests for burglary. Moreover, Evans testified that he was guilty only of criminal trespass, yet he lacked the knowledge that he could request a jury charge on that lesser included offense. See Hiley [ v. State, 245 Ga.App. 900 (539 S.E.2d 530) (2000)] (‘[W]here the accused admits the unauthorized entry but denies the intent to commit a felony or theft, the trial court must give a requested charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. [Cits.]’)” Keller v. State, 286 Ga.App. 292, 648 S.E.2d 714 (June 28, 2007). Trial court properly found that defendant’s decision to discharge counsel on the second day of his trial was merely dilatory, and amounted to a waiver of the right to counsel. “Keller initially represented himself in the case, filing multiple pleadings that included discovery requests, a speedy trial demand, and motions to suppress. He hired counsel prior to trial, apparently after a discussion of the issue with the trial court. On the second day of trial, Keller fired his trial counsel and filed a written motion to dismiss him, outlining what he perceived to be trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Keller fired his trial counsel after his attorney informed him that he would be unable to offer a particular witness’s testimony due to ethical concerns about the witness’s veracity. Keller acknowledged that he knew his choice was to go forward with existing trial counsel or to represent himself. The trial court treated this as a waiver of the right to counsel; however, it appointed a different attorney to sit with Keller and assist him if necessary. … Under these unique circumstances, … we find no error in the trial court requiring Keller to proceed pro se. [Cit.] Moreover, ‘“it is unlikely that the defendant’s convictions were attributable to his decision to represent himself.”’ See Riviere v. State, 231 Ga.App. 329, 331(1) (498 S.E.2d 332) (1998).” Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (June 25, 2007). Trial court did not improperly force death penalty defendant to act as his own co-counsel during sentencing phase. “After the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts of the indictment, Rivera requested to address the trial court. In response, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with Rivera and his counsel outside the presence of the jury in which Rivera inquired about several scenarios, including his presenting no mitigation evidence, his waiving his presence during the sentencing phase, and his acting as co-counsel to his attorneys. Rivera now argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte forcing upon him, without making any inquiry as to whether he was competent to control his defense, a form of hybrid representation in which he represented himself as co-counsel.” “A review of the transcript shows that once the trial court explained to Rivera that the